diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
index 1144ea3229a37..e9c18dabc5523 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
@@ -994,6 +994,9 @@ This is a directory, with the following entries:
 * ``boot_id``: a UUID generated the first time this is retrieved, and
   unvarying after that;
 
+* ``uuid``: a UUID generated every time this is retrieved (this can
+  thus be used to generate UUIDs at will);
+
 * ``entropy_avail``: the pool's entropy count, in bits;
 
 * ``poolsize``: the entropy pool size, in bits;
@@ -1001,10 +1004,7 @@ This is a directory, with the following entries:
 * ``urandom_min_reseed_secs``: obsolete (used to determine the minimum
   number of seconds between urandom pool reseeding). This file is
   writable for compatibility purposes, but writing to it has no effect
-  on any RNG behavior.
-
-* ``uuid``: a UUID generated every time this is retrieved (this can
-  thus be used to generate UUIDs at will);
+  on any RNG behavior;
 
 * ``write_wakeup_threshold``: when the entropy count drops below this
   (as a number of bits), processes waiting to write to ``/dev/random``
diff --git a/Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst b/Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst
index fb496b2ebfd38..92d3432460d75 100644
--- a/Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst
+++ b/Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ as you intend it to.
 
 The maintainer will thank you if you write your patch description in a
 form which can be easily pulled into Linux's source code management
-system, ``git``, as a "commit log".  See :ref:`explicit_in_reply_to`.
+system, ``git``, as a "commit log".  See :ref:`the_canonical_patch_format`.
 
 Solve only one problem per patch.  If your description starts to get
 long, that's a sign that you probably need to split up your patch.
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 7d5b0bfe79602..6b1d606a92f6f 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 VERSION = 5
 PATCHLEVEL = 18
-SUBLEVEL = 0
+SUBLEVEL = 2
 EXTRAVERSION =
 NAME = Superb Owl
 
diff --git a/arch/alpha/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/alpha/include/asm/timex.h
index b565cc6f408e9..f89798da8a147 100644
--- a/arch/alpha/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/alpha/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -28,5 +28,6 @@ static inline cycles_t get_cycles (void)
 	__asm__ __volatile__ ("rpcc %0" : "=r"(ret));
 	return ret;
 }
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
 
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/s5pv210-aries.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/s5pv210-aries.dtsi
index c8f1c324a6c26..26f2be2d9faa2 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/s5pv210-aries.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/s5pv210-aries.dtsi
@@ -895,7 +895,7 @@
 		device-wakeup-gpios = <&gpg3 4 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
 		interrupt-parent = <&gph2>;
 		interrupts = <5 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
-		interrupt-names = "host-wake";
+		interrupt-names = "host-wakeup";
 	};
 };
 
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/timex.h
index 7c3b3671d6c25..6d1337c169cd3 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -11,5 +11,6 @@
 
 typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
 #define get_cycles()	({ cycles_t c; read_current_timer(&c) ? 0 : c; })
+#define random_get_entropy() (((unsigned long)get_cycles()) ?: random_get_entropy_fallback())
 
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/ia64/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/ia64/include/asm/timex.h
index 869a3ac6bf23a..7ccc077a60bed 100644
--- a/arch/ia64/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/ia64/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ get_cycles (void)
 	ret = ia64_getreg(_IA64_REG_AR_ITC);
 	return ret;
 }
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
 
 extern void ia64_cpu_local_tick (void);
 extern unsigned long long ia64_native_sched_clock (void);
diff --git a/arch/m68k/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/m68k/include/asm/timex.h
index 6a21d93582805..f4a7a340f4cae 100644
--- a/arch/m68k/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/m68k/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ static inline unsigned long random_get_entropy(void)
 {
 	if (mach_random_get_entropy)
 		return mach_random_get_entropy();
-	return 0;
+	return random_get_entropy_fallback();
 }
 #define random_get_entropy	random_get_entropy
 
diff --git a/arch/mips/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/mips/include/asm/timex.h
index 8026baf46e729..2e107886f97ac 100644
--- a/arch/mips/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/mips/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -76,25 +76,24 @@ static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
 	else
 		return 0;	/* no usable counter */
 }
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
 
 /*
  * Like get_cycles - but where c0_count is not available we desperately
  * use c0_random in an attempt to get at least a little bit of entropy.
- *
- * R6000 and R6000A neither have a count register nor a random register.
- * That leaves no entropy source in the CPU itself.
  */
 static inline unsigned long random_get_entropy(void)
 {
-	unsigned int prid = read_c0_prid();
-	unsigned int imp = prid & PRID_IMP_MASK;
+	unsigned int c0_random;
 
-	if (can_use_mips_counter(prid))
+	if (can_use_mips_counter(read_c0_prid()))
 		return read_c0_count();
-	else if (likely(imp != PRID_IMP_R6000 && imp != PRID_IMP_R6000A))
-		return read_c0_random();
+
+	if (cpu_has_3kex)
+		c0_random = (read_c0_random() >> 8) & 0x3f;
 	else
-		return 0;	/* no usable register */
+		c0_random = read_c0_random() & 0x3f;
+	return (random_get_entropy_fallback() << 6) | (0x3f - c0_random);
 }
 #define random_get_entropy random_get_entropy
 
diff --git a/arch/nios2/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/nios2/include/asm/timex.h
index a769f871b28d9..40a1adc9bd03e 100644
--- a/arch/nios2/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/nios2/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -8,5 +8,8 @@
 typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
 
 extern cycles_t get_cycles(void);
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
+
+#define random_get_entropy() (((unsigned long)get_cycles()) ?: random_get_entropy_fallback())
 
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/parisc/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/parisc/include/asm/timex.h
index 06b510f8172e3..b4622cb06a75e 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/parisc/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -13,9 +13,10 @@
 
 typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
 
-static inline cycles_t get_cycles (void)
+static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
 {
 	return mfctl(16);
 }
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
 
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/timex.h
index fa2e76e4093a3..14b4489de52c5 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
 {
 	return mftb();
 }
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
 
 #endif	/* __KERNEL__ */
 #endif	/* _ASM_POWERPC_TIMEX_H */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c
index 45c993dd05f5e..36f2314c58e5f 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c
@@ -361,13 +361,15 @@ static bool kvmppc_gfn_is_uvmem_pfn(unsigned long gfn, struct kvm *kvm,
 static bool kvmppc_next_nontransitioned_gfn(const struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot,
 		struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long *gfn)
 {
-	struct kvmppc_uvmem_slot *p;
+	struct kvmppc_uvmem_slot *p = NULL, *iter;
 	bool ret = false;
 	unsigned long i;
 
-	list_for_each_entry(p, &kvm->arch.uvmem_pfns, list)
-		if (*gfn >= p->base_pfn && *gfn < p->base_pfn + p->nr_pfns)
+	list_for_each_entry(iter, &kvm->arch.uvmem_pfns, list)
+		if (*gfn >= iter->base_pfn && *gfn < iter->base_pfn + iter->nr_pfns) {
+			p = iter;
 			break;
+		}
 	if (!p)
 		return ret;
 	/*
diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/timex.h
index 507cae273bc62..d6a7428f6248d 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ static inline u32 get_cycles_hi(void)
 static inline unsigned long random_get_entropy(void)
 {
 	if (unlikely(clint_time_val == NULL))
-		return 0;
+		return random_get_entropy_fallback();
 	return get_cycles();
 }
 #define random_get_entropy()	random_get_entropy()
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/timex.h
index 2cfce42aa7fc4..ce878e85b6e4e 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -197,6 +197,7 @@ static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
 {
 	return (cycles_t) get_tod_clock() >> 2;
 }
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
 
 int get_phys_clock(unsigned long *clock);
 void init_cpu_timer(void);
diff --git a/arch/sparc/include/asm/timex_32.h b/arch/sparc/include/asm/timex_32.h
index 542915b462097..f86326a6f89e0 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/include/asm/timex_32.h
+++ b/arch/sparc/include/asm/timex_32.h
@@ -9,8 +9,6 @@
 
 #define CLOCK_TICK_RATE	1193180 /* Underlying HZ */
 
-/* XXX Maybe do something better at some point... -DaveM */
-typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
-#define get_cycles()	(0)
+#include <asm-generic/timex.h>
 
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/um/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/um/include/asm/timex.h
index e392a9a5bc9bd..9f27176adb26d 100644
--- a/arch/um/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/um/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -2,13 +2,8 @@
 #ifndef __UM_TIMEX_H
 #define __UM_TIMEX_H
 
-typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
-
-static inline cycles_t get_cycles (void)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
 #define CLOCK_TICK_RATE (HZ)
 
+#include <asm-generic/timex.h>
+
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h
index a4a8b1b16c0c1..956e4145311b1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -5,6 +5,15 @@
 #include <asm/processor.h>
 #include <asm/tsc.h>
 
+static inline unsigned long random_get_entropy(void)
+{
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_TSC) &&
+	    !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TSC))
+		return random_get_entropy_fallback();
+	return rdtsc();
+}
+#define random_get_entropy random_get_entropy
+
 /* Assume we use the PIT time source for the clock tick */
 #define CLOCK_TICK_RATE		PIT_TICK_RATE
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h
index 01a300a9700b9..fbdc3d9514943 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h
@@ -20,13 +20,12 @@ extern void disable_TSC(void);
 
 static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
 {
-#ifndef CONFIG_X86_TSC
-	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TSC))
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_TSC) &&
+	    !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TSC))
 		return 0;
-#endif
-
 	return rdtsc();
 }
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
 
 extern struct system_counterval_t convert_art_to_tsc(u64 art);
 extern struct system_counterval_t convert_art_ns_to_tsc(u64 art_ns);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
index f78e2b3501a19..35f222aa66bfc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -382,6 +382,103 @@ do {									\
 
 #endif // CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_OUTPUT
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_TIED_OUTPUT
+#define __try_cmpxchg_user_asm(itype, ltype, _ptr, _pold, _new, label)	({ \
+	bool success;							\
+	__typeof__(_ptr) _old = (__typeof__(_ptr))(_pold);		\
+	__typeof__(*(_ptr)) __old = *_old;				\
+	__typeof__(*(_ptr)) __new = (_new);				\
+	asm_volatile_goto("\n"						\
+		     "1: " LOCK_PREFIX "cmpxchg"itype" %[new], %[ptr]\n"\
+		     _ASM_EXTABLE_UA(1b, %l[label])			\
+		     : CC_OUT(z) (success),				\
+		       [ptr] "+m" (*_ptr),				\
+		       [old] "+a" (__old)				\
+		     : [new] ltype (__new)				\
+		     : "memory"						\
+		     : label);						\
+	if (unlikely(!success))						\
+		*_old = __old;						\
+	likely(success);					})
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+#define __try_cmpxchg64_user_asm(_ptr, _pold, _new, label)	({	\
+	bool success;							\
+	__typeof__(_ptr) _old = (__typeof__(_ptr))(_pold);		\
+	__typeof__(*(_ptr)) __old = *_old;				\
+	__typeof__(*(_ptr)) __new = (_new);				\
+	asm_volatile_goto("\n"						\
+		     "1: " LOCK_PREFIX "cmpxchg8b %[ptr]\n"		\
+		     _ASM_EXTABLE_UA(1b, %l[label])			\
+		     : CC_OUT(z) (success),				\
+		       "+A" (__old),					\
+		       [ptr] "+m" (*_ptr)				\
+		     : "b" ((u32)__new),				\
+		       "c" ((u32)((u64)__new >> 32))			\
+		     : "memory"						\
+		     : label);						\
+	if (unlikely(!success))						\
+		*_old = __old;						\
+	likely(success);					})
+#endif // CONFIG_X86_32
+#else  // !CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_TIED_OUTPUT
+#define __try_cmpxchg_user_asm(itype, ltype, _ptr, _pold, _new, label)	({ \
+	int __err = 0;							\
+	bool success;							\
+	__typeof__(_ptr) _old = (__typeof__(_ptr))(_pold);		\
+	__typeof__(*(_ptr)) __old = *_old;				\
+	__typeof__(*(_ptr)) __new = (_new);				\
+	asm volatile("\n"						\
+		     "1: " LOCK_PREFIX "cmpxchg"itype" %[new], %[ptr]\n"\
+		     CC_SET(z)						\
+		     "2:\n"						\
+		     _ASM_EXTABLE_TYPE_REG(1b, 2b, EX_TYPE_EFAULT_REG,	\
+					   %[errout])			\
+		     : CC_OUT(z) (success),				\
+		       [errout] "+r" (__err),				\
+		       [ptr] "+m" (*_ptr),				\
+		       [old] "+a" (__old)				\
+		     : [new] ltype (__new)				\
+		     : "memory", "cc");					\
+	if (unlikely(__err))						\
+		goto label;						\
+	if (unlikely(!success))						\
+		*_old = __old;						\
+	likely(success);					})
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+/*
+ * Unlike the normal CMPXCHG, hardcode ECX for both success/fail and error.
+ * There are only six GPRs available and four (EAX, EBX, ECX, and EDX) are
+ * hardcoded by CMPXCHG8B, leaving only ESI and EDI.  If the compiler uses
+ * both ESI and EDI for the memory operand, compilation will fail if the error
+ * is an input+output as there will be no register available for input.
+ */
+#define __try_cmpxchg64_user_asm(_ptr, _pold, _new, label)	({	\
+	int __result;							\
+	__typeof__(_ptr) _old = (__typeof__(_ptr))(_pold);		\
+	__typeof__(*(_ptr)) __old = *_old;				\
+	__typeof__(*(_ptr)) __new = (_new);				\
+	asm volatile("\n"						\
+		     "1: " LOCK_PREFIX "cmpxchg8b %[ptr]\n"		\
+		     "mov $0, %%ecx\n\t"				\
+		     "setz %%cl\n"					\
+		     "2:\n"						\
+		     _ASM_EXTABLE_TYPE_REG(1b, 2b, EX_TYPE_EFAULT_REG, %%ecx) \
+		     : [result]"=c" (__result),				\
+		       "+A" (__old),					\
+		       [ptr] "+m" (*_ptr)				\
+		     : "b" ((u32)__new),				\
+		       "c" ((u32)((u64)__new >> 32))			\
+		     : "memory", "cc");					\
+	if (unlikely(__result < 0))					\
+		goto label;						\
+	if (unlikely(!__result))					\
+		*_old = __old;						\
+	likely(__result);					})
+#endif // CONFIG_X86_32
+#endif // CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_TIED_OUTPUT
+
 /* FIXME: this hack is definitely wrong -AK */
 struct __large_struct { unsigned long buf[100]; };
 #define __m(x) (*(struct __large_struct __user *)(x))
@@ -474,6 +571,51 @@ do {										\
 } while (0)
 #endif // CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_OUTPUT
 
+extern void __try_cmpxchg_user_wrong_size(void);
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_X86_32
+#define __try_cmpxchg64_user_asm(_ptr, _oldp, _nval, _label)		\
+	__try_cmpxchg_user_asm("q", "r", (_ptr), (_oldp), (_nval), _label)
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Force the pointer to u<size> to match the size expected by the asm helper.
+ * clang/LLVM compiles all cases and only discards the unused paths after
+ * processing errors, which breaks i386 if the pointer is an 8-byte value.
+ */
+#define unsafe_try_cmpxchg_user(_ptr, _oldp, _nval, _label) ({			\
+	bool __ret;								\
+	__chk_user_ptr(_ptr);							\
+	switch (sizeof(*(_ptr))) {						\
+	case 1:	__ret = __try_cmpxchg_user_asm("b", "q",			\
+					       (__force u8 *)(_ptr), (_oldp),	\
+					       (_nval), _label);		\
+		break;								\
+	case 2:	__ret = __try_cmpxchg_user_asm("w", "r",			\
+					       (__force u16 *)(_ptr), (_oldp),	\
+					       (_nval), _label);		\
+		break;								\
+	case 4:	__ret = __try_cmpxchg_user_asm("l", "r",			\
+					       (__force u32 *)(_ptr), (_oldp),	\
+					       (_nval), _label);		\
+		break;								\
+	case 8:	__ret = __try_cmpxchg64_user_asm((__force u64 *)(_ptr), (_oldp),\
+						 (_nval), _label);		\
+		break;								\
+	default: __try_cmpxchg_user_wrong_size();				\
+	}									\
+	__ret;						})
+
+/* "Returns" 0 on success, 1 on failure, -EFAULT if the access faults. */
+#define __try_cmpxchg_user(_ptr, _oldp, _nval, _label)	({		\
+	int __ret = -EFAULT;						\
+	__uaccess_begin_nospec();					\
+	__ret = !unsafe_try_cmpxchg_user(_ptr, _oldp, _nval, _label);	\
+_label:									\
+	__uaccess_end();						\
+	__ret;								\
+							})
+
 /*
  * We want the unsafe accessors to always be inlined and use
  * the error labels - thus the macro games.
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
index 7c63a1911fae9..3c24e6124d955 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
@@ -12,6 +12,92 @@
 #include "encls.h"
 #include "sgx.h"
 
+#define PCMDS_PER_PAGE (PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(struct sgx_pcmd))
+/*
+ * 32 PCMD entries share a PCMD page. PCMD_FIRST_MASK is used to
+ * determine the page index associated with the first PCMD entry
+ * within a PCMD page.
+ */
+#define PCMD_FIRST_MASK GENMASK(4, 0)
+
+/**
+ * reclaimer_writing_to_pcmd() - Query if any enclave page associated with
+ *                               a PCMD page is in process of being reclaimed.
+ * @encl:        Enclave to which PCMD page belongs
+ * @start_addr:  Address of enclave page using first entry within the PCMD page
+ *
+ * When an enclave page is reclaimed some Paging Crypto MetaData (PCMD) is
+ * stored. The PCMD data of a reclaimed enclave page contains enough
+ * information for the processor to verify the page at the time
+ * it is loaded back into the Enclave Page Cache (EPC).
+ *
+ * The backing storage to which enclave pages are reclaimed is laid out as
+ * follows:
+ * Encrypted enclave pages:SECS page:PCMD pages
+ *
+ * Each PCMD page contains the PCMD metadata of
+ * PAGE_SIZE/sizeof(struct sgx_pcmd) enclave pages.
+ *
+ * A PCMD page can only be truncated if it is (a) empty, and (b) not in the
+ * process of getting data (and thus soon being non-empty). (b) is tested with
+ * a check if an enclave page sharing the PCMD page is in the process of being
+ * reclaimed.
+ *
+ * The reclaimer sets the SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED flag when it
+ * intends to reclaim that enclave page - it means that the PCMD page
+ * associated with that enclave page is about to get some data and thus
+ * even if the PCMD page is empty, it should not be truncated.
+ *
+ * Context: Enclave mutex (&sgx_encl->lock) must be held.
+ * Return: 1 if the reclaimer is about to write to the PCMD page
+ *         0 if the reclaimer has no intention to write to the PCMD page
+ */
+static int reclaimer_writing_to_pcmd(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+				     unsigned long start_addr)
+{
+	int reclaimed = 0;
+	int i;
+
+	/*
+	 * PCMD_FIRST_MASK is based on number of PCMD entries within
+	 * PCMD page being 32.
+	 */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(PCMDS_PER_PAGE != 32);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PCMDS_PER_PAGE; i++) {
+		struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
+		unsigned long addr;
+
+		addr = start_addr + i * PAGE_SIZE;
+
+		/*
+		 * Stop when reaching the SECS page - it does not
+		 * have a page_array entry and its reclaim is
+		 * started and completed with enclave mutex held so
+		 * it does not use the SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED
+		 * flag.
+		 */
+		if (addr == encl->base + encl->size)
+			break;
+
+		entry = xa_load(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(addr));
+		if (!entry)
+			continue;
+
+		/*
+		 * VA page slot ID uses same bit as the flag so it is important
+		 * to ensure that the page is not already in backing store.
+		 */
+		if (entry->epc_page &&
+		    (entry->desc & SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED)) {
+			reclaimed = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return reclaimed;
+}
+
 /*
  * Calculate byte offset of a PCMD struct associated with an enclave page. PCMD's
  * follow right after the EPC data in the backing storage. In addition to the
@@ -47,6 +133,7 @@ static int __sgx_encl_eldu(struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page,
 	unsigned long va_offset = encl_page->desc & SGX_ENCL_PAGE_VA_OFFSET_MASK;
 	struct sgx_encl *encl = encl_page->encl;
 	pgoff_t page_index, page_pcmd_off;
+	unsigned long pcmd_first_page;
 	struct sgx_pageinfo pginfo;
 	struct sgx_backing b;
 	bool pcmd_page_empty;
@@ -58,6 +145,11 @@ static int __sgx_encl_eldu(struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page,
 	else
 		page_index = PFN_DOWN(encl->size);
 
+	/*
+	 * Address of enclave page using the first entry within the PCMD page.
+	 */
+	pcmd_first_page = PFN_PHYS(page_index & ~PCMD_FIRST_MASK) + encl->base;
+
 	page_pcmd_off = sgx_encl_get_backing_page_pcmd_offset(encl, page_index);
 
 	ret = sgx_encl_get_backing(encl, page_index, &b);
@@ -84,6 +176,7 @@ static int __sgx_encl_eldu(struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page,
 	}
 
 	memset(pcmd_page + b.pcmd_offset, 0, sizeof(struct sgx_pcmd));
+	set_page_dirty(b.pcmd);
 
 	/*
 	 * The area for the PCMD in the page was zeroed above.  Check if the
@@ -94,12 +187,20 @@ static int __sgx_encl_eldu(struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page,
 	kunmap_atomic(pcmd_page);
 	kunmap_atomic((void *)(unsigned long)pginfo.contents);
 
-	sgx_encl_put_backing(&b, false);
+	get_page(b.pcmd);
+	sgx_encl_put_backing(&b);
 
 	sgx_encl_truncate_backing_page(encl, page_index);
 
-	if (pcmd_page_empty)
+	if (pcmd_page_empty && !reclaimer_writing_to_pcmd(encl, pcmd_first_page)) {
 		sgx_encl_truncate_backing_page(encl, PFN_DOWN(page_pcmd_off));
+		pcmd_page = kmap_atomic(b.pcmd);
+		if (memchr_inv(pcmd_page, 0, PAGE_SIZE))
+			pr_warn("PCMD page not empty after truncate.\n");
+		kunmap_atomic(pcmd_page);
+	}
+
+	put_page(b.pcmd);
 
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -645,15 +746,9 @@ int sgx_encl_get_backing(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long page_index,
 /**
  * sgx_encl_put_backing() - Unpin the backing storage
  * @backing:	data for accessing backing storage for the page
- * @do_write:	mark pages dirty
  */
-void sgx_encl_put_backing(struct sgx_backing *backing, bool do_write)
+void sgx_encl_put_backing(struct sgx_backing *backing)
 {
-	if (do_write) {
-		set_page_dirty(backing->pcmd);
-		set_page_dirty(backing->contents);
-	}
-
 	put_page(backing->pcmd);
 	put_page(backing->contents);
 }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h
index fec43ca65065b..d44e7372151f0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ void sgx_encl_release(struct kref *ref);
 int sgx_encl_mm_add(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct mm_struct *mm);
 int sgx_encl_get_backing(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long page_index,
 			 struct sgx_backing *backing);
-void sgx_encl_put_backing(struct sgx_backing *backing, bool do_write);
+void sgx_encl_put_backing(struct sgx_backing *backing);
 int sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young(struct mm_struct *mm,
 				  struct sgx_encl_page *page);
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
index 8e4bc6453d263..ab4ec54bbdd94 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
@@ -191,6 +191,8 @@ static int __sgx_encl_ewb(struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page, void *va_slot,
 			  backing->pcmd_offset;
 
 	ret = __ewb(&pginfo, sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(epc_page), va_slot);
+	set_page_dirty(backing->pcmd);
+	set_page_dirty(backing->contents);
 
 	kunmap_atomic((void *)(unsigned long)(pginfo.metadata -
 					      backing->pcmd_offset));
@@ -308,6 +310,7 @@ static void sgx_reclaimer_write(struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page,
 	sgx_encl_ewb(epc_page, backing);
 	encl_page->epc_page = NULL;
 	encl->secs_child_cnt--;
+	sgx_encl_put_backing(backing);
 
 	if (!encl->secs_child_cnt && test_bit(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags)) {
 		ret = sgx_encl_get_backing(encl, PFN_DOWN(encl->size),
@@ -320,7 +323,7 @@ static void sgx_reclaimer_write(struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page,
 		sgx_encl_free_epc_page(encl->secs.epc_page);
 		encl->secs.epc_page = NULL;
 
-		sgx_encl_put_backing(&secs_backing, true);
+		sgx_encl_put_backing(&secs_backing);
 	}
 
 out:
@@ -379,11 +382,14 @@ static void sgx_reclaim_pages(void)
 			goto skip;
 
 		page_index = PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc - encl_page->encl->base);
+
+		mutex_lock(&encl_page->encl->lock);
 		ret = sgx_encl_get_backing(encl_page->encl, page_index, &backing[i]);
-		if (ret)
+		if (ret) {
+			mutex_unlock(&encl_page->encl->lock);
 			goto skip;
+		}
 
-		mutex_lock(&encl_page->encl->lock);
 		encl_page->desc |= SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED;
 		mutex_unlock(&encl_page->encl->lock);
 		continue;
@@ -411,7 +417,6 @@ skip:
 
 		encl_page = epc_page->owner;
 		sgx_reclaimer_write(epc_page, &backing[i]);
-		sgx_encl_put_backing(&backing[i], true);
 
 		kref_put(&encl_page->encl->refcount, sgx_encl_release);
 		epc_page->flags &= ~SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMER_TRACKED;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
index e28ab0ecc5378..0fdc807ae13f8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@
 #include <asm/traps.h>
 #include <asm/irq_regs.h>
 
+#include <uapi/asm/kvm.h>
+
 #include <linux/hardirq.h>
 #include <linux/pkeys.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
@@ -232,7 +234,20 @@ bool fpu_alloc_guest_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *gfpu)
 	gfpu->fpstate		= fpstate;
 	gfpu->xfeatures		= fpu_user_cfg.default_features;
 	gfpu->perm		= fpu_user_cfg.default_features;
-	gfpu->uabi_size		= fpu_user_cfg.default_size;
+
+	/*
+	 * KVM sets the FP+SSE bits in the XSAVE header when copying FPU state
+	 * to userspace, even when XSAVE is unsupported, so that restoring FPU
+	 * state on a different CPU that does support XSAVE can cleanly load
+	 * the incoming state using its natural XSAVE.  In other words, KVM's
+	 * uABI size may be larger than this host's default size.  Conversely,
+	 * the default size should never be larger than KVM's base uABI size;
+	 * all features that can expand the uABI size must be opt-in.
+	 */
+	gfpu->uabi_size		= sizeof(struct kvm_xsave);
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(fpu_user_cfg.default_size > gfpu->uabi_size))
+		gfpu->uabi_size = fpu_user_cfg.default_size;
+
 	fpu_init_guest_permissions(gfpu);
 
 	return true;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
index 8b1c45c9cda87..1a55bf700f926 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ void kvm_async_pf_task_wake(u32 token)
 {
 	u32 key = hash_32(token, KVM_TASK_SLEEP_HASHBITS);
 	struct kvm_task_sleep_head *b = &async_pf_sleepers[key];
-	struct kvm_task_sleep_node *n;
+	struct kvm_task_sleep_node *n, *dummy = NULL;
 
 	if (token == ~0) {
 		apf_task_wake_all();
@@ -203,28 +203,41 @@ again:
 	n = _find_apf_task(b, token);
 	if (!n) {
 		/*
-		 * async PF was not yet handled.
-		 * Add dummy entry for the token.
+		 * Async #PF not yet handled, add a dummy entry for the token.
+		 * Allocating the token must be down outside of the raw lock
+		 * as the allocator is preemptible on PREEMPT_RT kernels.
 		 */
-		n = kzalloc(sizeof(*n), GFP_ATOMIC);
-		if (!n) {
+		if (!dummy) {
+			raw_spin_unlock(&b->lock);
+			dummy = kzalloc(sizeof(*dummy), GFP_ATOMIC);
+
 			/*
-			 * Allocation failed! Busy wait while other cpu
-			 * handles async PF.
+			 * Continue looping on allocation failure, eventually
+			 * the async #PF will be handled and allocating a new
+			 * node will be unnecessary.
+			 */
+			if (!dummy)
+				cpu_relax();
+
+			/*
+			 * Recheck for async #PF completion before enqueueing
+			 * the dummy token to avoid duplicate list entries.
 			 */
-			raw_spin_unlock(&b->lock);
-			cpu_relax();
 			goto again;
 		}
-		n->token = token;
-		n->cpu = smp_processor_id();
-		init_swait_queue_head(&n->wq);
-		hlist_add_head(&n->link, &b->list);
+		dummy->token = token;
+		dummy->cpu = smp_processor_id();
+		init_swait_queue_head(&dummy->wq);
+		hlist_add_head(&dummy->link, &b->list);
+		dummy = NULL;
 	} else {
 		apf_task_wake_one(n);
 	}
 	raw_spin_unlock(&b->lock);
-	return;
+
+	/* A dummy token might be allocated and ultimately not used.  */
+	if (dummy)
+		kfree(dummy);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_async_pf_task_wake);
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index 45e1573f8f1d3..cf48ac96ceecb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -1843,17 +1843,14 @@ static void kvm_mmu_commit_zap_page(struct kvm *kvm,
 	  &(_kvm)->arch.mmu_page_hash[kvm_page_table_hashfn(_gfn)])	\
 		if ((_sp)->gfn != (_gfn) || (_sp)->role.direct) {} else
 
-static bool kvm_sync_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
+static int kvm_sync_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
 			 struct list_head *invalid_list)
 {
 	int ret = vcpu->arch.mmu->sync_page(vcpu, sp);
 
-	if (ret < 0) {
+	if (ret < 0)
 		kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page(vcpu->kvm, sp, invalid_list);
-		return false;
-	}
-
-	return !!ret;
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static bool kvm_mmu_remote_flush_or_zap(struct kvm *kvm,
@@ -1975,7 +1972,7 @@ static int mmu_sync_children(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 
 		for_each_sp(pages, sp, parents, i) {
 			kvm_unlink_unsync_page(vcpu->kvm, sp);
-			flush |= kvm_sync_page(vcpu, sp, &invalid_list);
+			flush |= kvm_sync_page(vcpu, sp, &invalid_list) > 0;
 			mmu_pages_clear_parents(&parents);
 		}
 		if (need_resched() || rwlock_needbreak(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock)) {
@@ -2016,6 +2013,7 @@ static struct kvm_mmu_page *kvm_mmu_get_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	struct hlist_head *sp_list;
 	unsigned quadrant;
 	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
+	int ret;
 	int collisions = 0;
 	LIST_HEAD(invalid_list);
 
@@ -2068,11 +2066,13 @@ static struct kvm_mmu_page *kvm_mmu_get_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 			 * If the sync fails, the page is zapped.  If so, break
 			 * in order to rebuild it.
 			 */
-			if (!kvm_sync_page(vcpu, sp, &invalid_list))
+			ret = kvm_sync_page(vcpu, sp, &invalid_list);
+			if (ret < 0)
 				break;
 
 			WARN_ON(!list_empty(&invalid_list));
-			kvm_flush_remote_tlbs(vcpu->kvm);
+			if (ret > 0)
+				kvm_flush_remote_tlbs(vcpu->kvm);
 		}
 
 		__clear_sp_write_flooding_count(sp);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
index 01fee5f67ac37..beb3ce8d94eb3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
@@ -144,42 +144,6 @@ static bool FNAME(is_rsvd_bits_set)(struct kvm_mmu *mmu, u64 gpte, int level)
 	       FNAME(is_bad_mt_xwr)(&mmu->guest_rsvd_check, gpte);
 }
 
-static int FNAME(cmpxchg_gpte)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
-			       pt_element_t __user *ptep_user, unsigned index,
-			       pt_element_t orig_pte, pt_element_t new_pte)
-{
-	signed char r;
-
-	if (!user_access_begin(ptep_user, sizeof(pt_element_t)))
-		return -EFAULT;
-
-#ifdef CMPXCHG
-	asm volatile("1:" LOCK_PREFIX CMPXCHG " %[new], %[ptr]\n"
-		     "setnz %b[r]\n"
-		     "2:"
-		     _ASM_EXTABLE_TYPE_REG(1b, 2b, EX_TYPE_EFAULT_REG, %k[r])
-		     : [ptr] "+m" (*ptep_user),
-		       [old] "+a" (orig_pte),
-		       [r] "=q" (r)
-		     : [new] "r" (new_pte)
-		     : "memory");
-#else
-	asm volatile("1:" LOCK_PREFIX "cmpxchg8b %[ptr]\n"
-		     "setnz %b[r]\n"
-		     "2:"
-		     _ASM_EXTABLE_TYPE_REG(1b, 2b, EX_TYPE_EFAULT_REG, %k[r])
-		     : [ptr] "+m" (*ptep_user),
-		       [old] "+A" (orig_pte),
-		       [r] "=q" (r)
-		     : [new_lo] "b" ((u32)new_pte),
-		       [new_hi] "c" ((u32)(new_pte >> 32))
-		     : "memory");
-#endif
-
-	user_access_end();
-	return r;
-}
-
 static bool FNAME(prefetch_invalid_gpte)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 				  struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, u64 *spte,
 				  u64 gpte)
@@ -278,7 +242,7 @@ static int FNAME(update_accessed_dirty_bits)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 		if (unlikely(!walker->pte_writable[level - 1]))
 			continue;
 
-		ret = FNAME(cmpxchg_gpte)(vcpu, mmu, ptep_user, index, orig_pte, pte);
+		ret = __try_cmpxchg_user(ptep_user, &orig_pte, pte, fault);
 		if (ret)
 			return ret;
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
index 96bab464967f2..1a9b60cb6bcb8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
@@ -819,9 +819,6 @@ int nested_svm_vmexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 	struct kvm_host_map map;
 	int rc;
 
-	/* Triple faults in L2 should never escape. */
-	WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT, vcpu));
-
 	rc = kvm_vcpu_map(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(svm->nested.vmcb12_gpa), &map);
 	if (rc) {
 		if (rc == -EINVAL)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 7c392873626fd..4b7d490c0b639 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -688,7 +688,7 @@ static int sev_launch_measure(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 		if (params.len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)
 			return -EINVAL;
 
-		blob = kmalloc(params.len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+		blob = kzalloc(params.len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
 		if (!blob)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 
@@ -808,7 +808,7 @@ static int __sev_dbg_decrypt_user(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long paddr,
 	if (!IS_ALIGNED(dst_paddr, 16) ||
 	    !IS_ALIGNED(paddr,     16) ||
 	    !IS_ALIGNED(size,      16)) {
-		tpage = (void *)alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+		tpage = (void *)alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
 		if (!tpage)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 
@@ -1094,7 +1094,7 @@ static int sev_get_attestation_report(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 		if (params.len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)
 			return -EINVAL;
 
-		blob = kmalloc(params.len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+		blob = kzalloc(params.len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
 		if (!blob)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 
@@ -1176,7 +1176,7 @@ static int sev_send_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	/* allocate the memory to hold the session data blob */
-	session_data = kmalloc(params.session_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	session_data = kzalloc(params.session_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
 	if (!session_data)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
@@ -1300,11 +1300,11 @@ static int sev_send_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 
 	/* allocate memory for header and transport buffer */
 	ret = -ENOMEM;
-	hdr = kmalloc(params.hdr_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	hdr = kzalloc(params.hdr_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
 	if (!hdr)
 		goto e_unpin;
 
-	trans_data = kmalloc(params.trans_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	trans_data = kzalloc(params.trans_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
 	if (!trans_data)
 		goto e_free_hdr;
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
index 856c875638833..880d0b0c9315b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
@@ -4518,9 +4518,6 @@ void nested_vmx_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 vm_exit_reason,
 	/* trying to cancel vmlaunch/vmresume is a bug */
 	WARN_ON_ONCE(vmx->nested.nested_run_pending);
 
-	/* Similarly, triple faults in L2 should never escape. */
-	WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT, vcpu));
-
 	if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES, vcpu)) {
 		/*
 		 * KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES is also used to map
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 610355b9ccceb..982df9c000d31 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -7856,7 +7856,7 @@ static unsigned int vmx_handle_intel_pt_intr(void)
 	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = kvm_get_running_vcpu();
 
 	/* '0' on failure so that the !PT case can use a RET0 static call. */
-	if (!kvm_arch_pmi_in_guest(vcpu))
+	if (!vcpu || !kvm_handling_nmi_from_guest(vcpu))
 		return 0;
 
 	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_PMI, vcpu);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 4790f0d7d40b8..39c571224ac28 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -7229,15 +7229,8 @@ static int emulator_write_emulated(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
 				   exception, &write_emultor);
 }
 
-#define CMPXCHG_TYPE(t, ptr, old, new) \
-	(cmpxchg((t *)(ptr), *(t *)(old), *(t *)(new)) == *(t *)(old))
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-#  define CMPXCHG64(ptr, old, new) CMPXCHG_TYPE(u64, ptr, old, new)
-#else
-#  define CMPXCHG64(ptr, old, new) \
-	(cmpxchg64((u64 *)(ptr), *(u64 *)(old), *(u64 *)(new)) == *(u64 *)(old))
-#endif
+#define emulator_try_cmpxchg_user(t, ptr, old, new) \
+	(__try_cmpxchg_user((t __user *)(ptr), (t *)(old), *(t *)(new), efault ## t))
 
 static int emulator_cmpxchg_emulated(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
 				     unsigned long addr,
@@ -7246,12 +7239,11 @@ static int emulator_cmpxchg_emulated(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
 				     unsigned int bytes,
 				     struct x86_exception *exception)
 {
-	struct kvm_host_map map;
 	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = emul_to_vcpu(ctxt);
 	u64 page_line_mask;
+	unsigned long hva;
 	gpa_t gpa;
-	char *kaddr;
-	bool exchanged;
+	int r;
 
 	/* guests cmpxchg8b have to be emulated atomically */
 	if (bytes > 8 || (bytes & (bytes - 1)))
@@ -7275,31 +7267,32 @@ static int emulator_cmpxchg_emulated(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
 	if (((gpa + bytes - 1) & page_line_mask) != (gpa & page_line_mask))
 		goto emul_write;
 
-	if (kvm_vcpu_map(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(gpa), &map))
+	hva = kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_hva(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(gpa));
+	if (kvm_is_error_hva(hva))
 		goto emul_write;
 
-	kaddr = map.hva + offset_in_page(gpa);
+	hva += offset_in_page(gpa);
 
 	switch (bytes) {
 	case 1:
-		exchanged = CMPXCHG_TYPE(u8, kaddr, old, new);
+		r = emulator_try_cmpxchg_user(u8, hva, old, new);
 		break;
 	case 2:
-		exchanged = CMPXCHG_TYPE(u16, kaddr, old, new);
+		r = emulator_try_cmpxchg_user(u16, hva, old, new);
 		break;
 	case 4:
-		exchanged = CMPXCHG_TYPE(u32, kaddr, old, new);
+		r = emulator_try_cmpxchg_user(u32, hva, old, new);
 		break;
 	case 8:
-		exchanged = CMPXCHG64(kaddr, old, new);
+		r = emulator_try_cmpxchg_user(u64, hva, old, new);
 		break;
 	default:
 		BUG();
 	}
 
-	kvm_vcpu_unmap(vcpu, &map, true);
-
-	if (!exchanged)
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto emul_write;
+	if (r)
 		return X86EMUL_CMPXCHG_FAILED;
 
 	kvm_page_track_write(vcpu, gpa, new, bytes);
@@ -8251,7 +8244,7 @@ int kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_skip_emulated_instruction);
 
-static bool kvm_vcpu_check_breakpoint(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int *r)
+static bool kvm_vcpu_check_code_breakpoint(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int *r)
 {
 	if (unlikely(vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP) &&
 	    (vcpu->arch.guest_debug_dr7 & DR7_BP_EN_MASK)) {
@@ -8320,25 +8313,23 @@ static bool is_vmware_backdoor_opcode(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
 }
 
 /*
- * Decode to be emulated instruction. Return EMULATION_OK if success.
+ * Decode an instruction for emulation.  The caller is responsible for handling
+ * code breakpoints.  Note, manually detecting code breakpoints is unnecessary
+ * (and wrong) when emulating on an intercepted fault-like exception[*], as
+ * code breakpoints have higher priority and thus have already been done by
+ * hardware.
+ *
+ * [*] Except #MC, which is higher priority, but KVM should never emulate in
+ *     response to a machine check.
  */
 int x86_decode_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emulation_type,
 				    void *insn, int insn_len)
 {
-	int r = EMULATION_OK;
 	struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt = vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt;
+	int r;
 
 	init_emulate_ctxt(vcpu);
 
-	/*
-	 * We will reenter on the same instruction since we do not set
-	 * complete_userspace_io. This does not handle watchpoints yet,
-	 * those would be handled in the emulate_ops.
-	 */
-	if (!(emulation_type & EMULTYPE_SKIP) &&
-	    kvm_vcpu_check_breakpoint(vcpu, &r))
-		return r;
-
 	r = x86_decode_insn(ctxt, insn, insn_len, emulation_type);
 
 	trace_kvm_emulate_insn_start(vcpu);
@@ -8371,6 +8362,15 @@ int x86_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,
 	if (!(emulation_type & EMULTYPE_NO_DECODE)) {
 		kvm_clear_exception_queue(vcpu);
 
+		/*
+		 * Return immediately if RIP hits a code breakpoint, such #DBs
+		 * are fault-like and are higher priority than any faults on
+		 * the code fetch itself.
+		 */
+		if (!(emulation_type & EMULTYPE_SKIP) &&
+		    kvm_vcpu_check_code_breakpoint(vcpu, &r))
+			return r;
+
 		r = x86_decode_emulated_instruction(vcpu, emulation_type,
 						    insn, insn_len);
 		if (r != EMULATION_OK)  {
@@ -11747,20 +11747,15 @@ static void kvm_unload_vcpu_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	vcpu_put(vcpu);
 }
 
-static void kvm_free_vcpus(struct kvm *kvm)
+static void kvm_unload_vcpu_mmus(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
 	unsigned long i;
 	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
 
-	/*
-	 * Unpin any mmu pages first.
-	 */
 	kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
 		kvm_clear_async_pf_completion_queue(vcpu);
 		kvm_unload_vcpu_mmu(vcpu);
 	}
-
-	kvm_destroy_vcpus(kvm);
 }
 
 void kvm_arch_sync_events(struct kvm *kvm)
@@ -11866,11 +11861,12 @@ void kvm_arch_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
 		__x86_set_memory_region(kvm, TSS_PRIVATE_MEMSLOT, 0, 0);
 		mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
 	}
+	kvm_unload_vcpu_mmus(kvm);
 	static_call_cond(kvm_x86_vm_destroy)(kvm);
 	kvm_free_msr_filter(srcu_dereference_check(kvm->arch.msr_filter, &kvm->srcu, 1));
 	kvm_pic_destroy(kvm);
 	kvm_ioapic_destroy(kvm);
-	kvm_free_vcpus(kvm);
+	kvm_destroy_vcpus(kvm);
 	kvfree(rcu_dereference_check(kvm->arch.apic_map, 1));
 	kfree(srcu_dereference_check(kvm->arch.pmu_event_filter, &kvm->srcu, 1));
 	kvm_mmu_uninit_vm(kvm);
diff --git a/arch/xtensa/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/xtensa/include/asm/timex.h
index 233ec75e60c69..3f2462f2d0270 100644
--- a/arch/xtensa/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/xtensa/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -29,10 +29,6 @@
 
 extern unsigned long ccount_freq;
 
-typedef unsigned long long cycles_t;
-
-#define get_cycles()	(0)
-
 void local_timer_setup(unsigned cpu);
 
 /*
@@ -59,4 +55,6 @@ static inline void set_linux_timer (unsigned long ccompare)
 	xtensa_set_sr(ccompare, SREG_CCOMPARE + LINUX_TIMER);
 }
 
+#include <asm-generic/timex.h>
+
 #endif	/* _XTENSA_TIMEX_H */
diff --git a/crypto/ecrdsa.c b/crypto/ecrdsa.c
index b32ffcaad9adf..f3c6b5e15e75b 100644
--- a/crypto/ecrdsa.c
+++ b/crypto/ecrdsa.c
@@ -113,15 +113,15 @@ static int ecrdsa_verify(struct akcipher_request *req)
 
 	/* Step 1: verify that 0 < r < q, 0 < s < q */
 	if (vli_is_zero(r, ndigits) ||
-	    vli_cmp(r, ctx->curve->n, ndigits) == 1 ||
+	    vli_cmp(r, ctx->curve->n, ndigits) >= 0 ||
 	    vli_is_zero(s, ndigits) ||
-	    vli_cmp(s, ctx->curve->n, ndigits) == 1)
+	    vli_cmp(s, ctx->curve->n, ndigits) >= 0)
 		return -EKEYREJECTED;
 
 	/* Step 2: calculate hash (h) of the message (passed as input) */
 	/* Step 3: calculate e = h \mod q */
 	vli_from_le64(e, digest, ndigits);
-	if (vli_cmp(e, ctx->curve->n, ndigits) == 1)
+	if (vli_cmp(e, ctx->curve->n, ndigits) >= 0)
 		vli_sub(e, e, ctx->curve->n, ndigits);
 	if (vli_is_zero(e, ndigits))
 		e[0] = 1;
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static int ecrdsa_verify(struct akcipher_request *req)
 	/* Step 6: calculate point C = z_1P + z_2Q, and R = x_c \mod q */
 	ecc_point_mult_shamir(&cc, z1, &ctx->curve->g, z2, &ctx->pub_key,
 			      ctx->curve);
-	if (vli_cmp(cc.x, ctx->curve->n, ndigits) == 1)
+	if (vli_cmp(cc.x, ctx->curve->n, ndigits) >= 0)
 		vli_sub(cc.x, cc.x, ctx->curve->n, ndigits);
 
 	/* Step 7: if R == r signature is valid */
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/sysfs.c b/drivers/acpi/sysfs.c
index a4b638bea6f16..cc2fe0618178e 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/sysfs.c
@@ -415,19 +415,30 @@ static ssize_t acpi_data_show(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
 			      loff_t offset, size_t count)
 {
 	struct acpi_data_attr *data_attr;
-	void *base;
-	ssize_t rc;
+	void __iomem *base;
+	ssize_t size;
 
 	data_attr = container_of(bin_attr, struct acpi_data_attr, attr);
+	size = data_attr->attr.size;
+
+	if (offset < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (offset >= size)
+		return 0;
 
-	base = acpi_os_map_memory(data_attr->addr, data_attr->attr.size);
+	if (count > size - offset)
+		count = size - offset;
+
+	base = acpi_os_map_iomem(data_attr->addr, size);
 	if (!base)
 		return -ENOMEM;
-	rc = memory_read_from_buffer(buf, count, &offset, base,
-				     data_attr->attr.size);
-	acpi_os_unmap_memory(base, data_attr->attr.size);
 
-	return rc;
+	memcpy_fromio(buf, base + offset, count);
+
+	acpi_os_unmap_iomem(base, size);
+
+	return count;
 }
 
 static int acpi_bert_data_init(void *th, struct acpi_data_attr *data_attr)
diff --git a/drivers/bluetooth/hci_qca.c b/drivers/bluetooth/hci_qca.c
index f6e91fb432a3b..eab34e24d9446 100644
--- a/drivers/bluetooth/hci_qca.c
+++ b/drivers/bluetooth/hci_qca.c
@@ -696,9 +696,9 @@ static int qca_close(struct hci_uart *hu)
 	skb_queue_purge(&qca->tx_wait_q);
 	skb_queue_purge(&qca->txq);
 	skb_queue_purge(&qca->rx_memdump_q);
-	del_timer(&qca->tx_idle_timer);
-	del_timer(&qca->wake_retrans_timer);
 	destroy_workqueue(qca->workqueue);
+	del_timer_sync(&qca->tx_idle_timer);
+	del_timer_sync(&qca->wake_retrans_timer);
 	qca->hu = NULL;
 
 	kfree_skb(qca->rx_skb);
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 4c9adb4f3d5d7..7a66eec08e373 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -15,14 +15,12 @@
  *   - Sysctl interface.
  *
  * The high level overview is that there is one input pool, into which
- * various pieces of data are hashed. Some of that data is then "credited" as
- * having a certain number of bits of entropy. When enough bits of entropy are
- * available, the hash is finalized and handed as a key to a stream cipher that
- * expands it indefinitely for various consumers. This key is periodically
- * refreshed as the various entropy collectors, described below, add data to the
- * input pool and credit it. There is currently no Fortuna-like scheduler
- * involved, which can lead to malicious entropy sources causing a premature
- * reseed, and the entropy estimates are, at best, conservative guesses.
+ * various pieces of data are hashed. Prior to initialization, some of that
+ * data is then "credited" as having a certain number of bits of entropy.
+ * When enough bits of entropy are available, the hash is finalized and
+ * handed as a key to a stream cipher that expands it indefinitely for
+ * various consumers. This key is periodically refreshed as the various
+ * entropy collectors, described below, add data to the input pool.
  */
 
 #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
@@ -53,6 +51,7 @@
 #include <linux/completion.h>
 #include <linux/uuid.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/siphash.h>
 #include <crypto/chacha.h>
 #include <crypto/blake2s.h>
 #include <asm/processor.h>
@@ -71,27 +70,27 @@
  *********************************************************************/
 
 /*
- * crng_init =  0 --> Uninitialized
- *		1 --> Initialized
- *		2 --> Initialized from input_pool
- *
  * crng_init is protected by base_crng->lock, and only increases
- * its value (from 0->1->2).
+ * its value (from empty->early->ready).
  */
-static int crng_init = 0;
-#define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 1))
-/* Various types of waiters for crng_init->2 transition. */
+static enum {
+	CRNG_EMPTY = 0, /* Little to no entropy collected */
+	CRNG_EARLY = 1, /* At least POOL_EARLY_BITS collected */
+	CRNG_READY = 2  /* Fully initialized with POOL_READY_BITS collected */
+} crng_init __read_mostly = CRNG_EMPTY;
+static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(crng_is_ready);
+#define crng_ready() (static_branch_likely(&crng_is_ready) || crng_init >= CRNG_READY)
+/* Various types of waiters for crng_init->CRNG_READY transition. */
 static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait);
 static struct fasync_struct *fasync;
 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_chain_lock);
 static RAW_NOTIFIER_HEAD(random_ready_chain);
 
 /* Control how we warn userspace. */
-static struct ratelimit_state unseeded_warning =
-	RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT("warn_unseeded_randomness", HZ, 3);
 static struct ratelimit_state urandom_warning =
 	RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT("warn_urandom_randomness", HZ, 3);
-static int ratelimit_disable __read_mostly;
+static int ratelimit_disable __read_mostly =
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM);
 module_param_named(ratelimit_disable, ratelimit_disable, int, 0644);
 MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Disable random ratelimit suppression");
 
@@ -110,6 +109,11 @@ bool rng_is_initialized(void)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(rng_is_initialized);
 
+static void __cold crng_set_ready(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+	static_branch_enable(&crng_is_ready);
+}
+
 /* Used by wait_for_random_bytes(), and considered an entropy collector, below. */
 static void try_to_generate_entropy(void);
 
@@ -144,7 +148,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_random_bytes);
  * returns: 0 if callback is successfully added
  *	    -EALREADY if pool is already initialised (callback not called)
  */
-int register_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
+int __cold register_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 	int ret = -EALREADY;
@@ -162,7 +166,7 @@ int register_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
 /*
  * Delete a previously registered readiness callback function.
  */
-int unregister_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
+int __cold unregister_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 	int ret;
@@ -173,7 +177,7 @@ int unregister_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
 	return ret;
 }
 
-static void process_random_ready_list(void)
+static void __cold process_random_ready_list(void)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 
@@ -182,28 +186,10 @@ static void process_random_ready_list(void)
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags);
 }
 
-#define warn_unseeded_randomness(previous) \
-	_warn_unseeded_randomness(__func__, (void *)_RET_IP_, (previous))
-
-static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller, void **previous)
-{
-#ifdef CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
-	const bool print_once = false;
-#else
-	static bool print_once __read_mostly;
-#endif
-
-	if (print_once || crng_ready() ||
-	    (previous && (caller == READ_ONCE(*previous))))
-		return;
-	WRITE_ONCE(*previous, caller);
-#ifndef CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
-	print_once = true;
-#endif
-	if (__ratelimit(&unseeded_warning))
-		printk_deferred(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s called from %pS with crng_init=%d\n",
-				func_name, caller, crng_init);
-}
+#define warn_unseeded_randomness() \
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM) && !crng_ready()) \
+		printk_deferred(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s called from %pS with crng_init=%d\n", \
+				__func__, (void *)_RET_IP_, crng_init)
 
 
 /*********************************************************************
@@ -216,7 +202,7 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller, void
  *
  * There are a few exported interfaces for use by other drivers:
  *
- *	void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
+ *	void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len)
  *	u32 get_random_u32()
  *	u64 get_random_u64()
  *	unsigned int get_random_int()
@@ -232,8 +218,8 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller, void
  *********************************************************************/
 
 enum {
-	CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL = 300 * HZ,
-	CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH = 2 * CHACHA_KEY_SIZE
+	CRNG_RESEED_START_INTERVAL = HZ,
+	CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL = 60 * HZ
 };
 
 static struct {
@@ -256,24 +242,17 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct crng, crngs) = {
 	.lock = INIT_LOCAL_LOCK(crngs.lock),
 };
 
-/* Used by crng_reseed() to extract a new seed from the input pool. */
-static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes, bool force);
+/* Used by crng_reseed() and crng_make_state() to extract a new seed from the input pool. */
+static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len);
 
-/*
- * This extracts a new crng key from the input pool, but only if there is a
- * sufficient amount of entropy available or force is true, in order to
- * mitigate bruteforcing of newly added bits.
- */
-static void crng_reseed(bool force)
+/* This extracts a new crng key from the input pool. */
+static void crng_reseed(void)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 	unsigned long next_gen;
 	u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE];
-	bool finalize_init = false;
 
-	/* Only reseed if we can, to prevent brute forcing a small amount of new bits. */
-	if (!drain_entropy(key, sizeof(key), force))
-		return;
+	extract_entropy(key, sizeof(key));
 
 	/*
 	 * We copy the new key into the base_crng, overwriting the old one,
@@ -288,28 +267,10 @@ static void crng_reseed(bool force)
 		++next_gen;
 	WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.generation, next_gen);
 	WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.birth, jiffies);
-	if (!crng_ready()) {
-		crng_init = 2;
-		finalize_init = true;
-	}
+	if (!static_branch_likely(&crng_is_ready))
+		crng_init = CRNG_READY;
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
 	memzero_explicit(key, sizeof(key));
-	if (finalize_init) {
-		process_random_ready_list();
-		wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
-		kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
-		pr_notice("crng init done\n");
-		if (unseeded_warning.missed) {
-			pr_notice("%d get_random_xx warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n",
-				  unseeded_warning.missed);
-			unseeded_warning.missed = 0;
-		}
-		if (urandom_warning.missed) {
-			pr_notice("%d urandom warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n",
-				  urandom_warning.missed);
-			urandom_warning.missed = 0;
-		}
-	}
 }
 
 /*
@@ -345,10 +306,10 @@ static void crng_fast_key_erasure(u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE],
 }
 
 /*
- * Return whether the crng seed is considered to be sufficiently
- * old that a reseeding might be attempted. This happens if the last
- * reseeding was CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL ago, or during early boot, at
- * an interval proportional to the uptime.
+ * Return whether the crng seed is considered to be sufficiently old
+ * that a reseeding is needed. This happens if the last reseeding
+ * was CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL ago, or during early boot, at an interval
+ * proportional to the uptime.
  */
 static bool crng_has_old_seed(void)
 {
@@ -360,10 +321,10 @@ static bool crng_has_old_seed(void)
 		if (uptime >= CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL / HZ * 2)
 			WRITE_ONCE(early_boot, false);
 		else
-			interval = max_t(unsigned int, 5 * HZ,
+			interval = max_t(unsigned int, CRNG_RESEED_START_INTERVAL,
 					 (unsigned int)uptime / 2 * HZ);
 	}
-	return time_after(jiffies, READ_ONCE(base_crng.birth) + interval);
+	return time_is_before_jiffies(READ_ONCE(base_crng.birth) + interval);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -382,28 +343,31 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS],
 	/*
 	 * For the fast path, we check whether we're ready, unlocked first, and
 	 * then re-check once locked later. In the case where we're really not
-	 * ready, we do fast key erasure with the base_crng directly, because
-	 * this is what crng_pre_init_inject() mutates during early init.
+	 * ready, we do fast key erasure with the base_crng directly, extracting
+	 * when crng_init is CRNG_EMPTY.
 	 */
 	if (!crng_ready()) {
 		bool ready;
 
 		spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags);
 		ready = crng_ready();
-		if (!ready)
+		if (!ready) {
+			if (crng_init == CRNG_EMPTY)
+				extract_entropy(base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
 			crng_fast_key_erasure(base_crng.key, chacha_state,
 					      random_data, random_data_len);
+		}
 		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
 		if (!ready)
 			return;
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * If the base_crng is old enough, we try to reseed, which in turn
-	 * bumps the generation counter that we check below.
+	 * If the base_crng is old enough, we reseed, which in turn bumps the
+	 * generation counter that we check below.
 	 */
 	if (unlikely(crng_has_old_seed()))
-		crng_reseed(false);
+		crng_reseed();
 
 	local_lock_irqsave(&crngs.lock, flags);
 	crng = raw_cpu_ptr(&crngs);
@@ -433,68 +397,24 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS],
 	local_unlock_irqrestore(&crngs.lock, flags);
 }
 
-/*
- * This function is for crng_init == 0 only. It loads entropy directly
- * into the crng's key, without going through the input pool. It is,
- * generally speaking, not very safe, but we use this only at early
- * boot time when it's better to have something there rather than
- * nothing.
- *
- * If account is set, then the crng_init_cnt counter is incremented.
- * This shouldn't be set by functions like add_device_randomness(),
- * where we can't trust the buffer passed to it is guaranteed to be
- * unpredictable (so it might not have any entropy at all).
- */
-static void crng_pre_init_inject(const void *input, size_t len, bool account)
-{
-	static int crng_init_cnt = 0;
-	struct blake2s_state hash;
-	unsigned long flags;
-
-	blake2s_init(&hash, sizeof(base_crng.key));
-
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags);
-	if (crng_init != 0) {
-		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
-		return;
-	}
-
-	blake2s_update(&hash, base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
-	blake2s_update(&hash, input, len);
-	blake2s_final(&hash, base_crng.key);
-
-	if (account) {
-		crng_init_cnt += min_t(size_t, len, CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH - crng_init_cnt);
-		if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) {
-			++base_crng.generation;
-			crng_init = 1;
-		}
-	}
-
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
-
-	if (crng_init == 1)
-		pr_notice("fast init done\n");
-}
-
-static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
+static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len)
 {
 	u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS];
 	u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE];
-	size_t len;
+	size_t first_block_len;
 
-	if (!nbytes)
+	if (!len)
 		return;
 
-	len = min_t(size_t, 32, nbytes);
-	crng_make_state(chacha_state, buf, len);
-	nbytes -= len;
-	buf += len;
+	first_block_len = min_t(size_t, 32, len);
+	crng_make_state(chacha_state, buf, first_block_len);
+	len -= first_block_len;
+	buf += first_block_len;
 
-	while (nbytes) {
-		if (nbytes < CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+	while (len) {
+		if (len < CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) {
 			chacha20_block(chacha_state, tmp);
-			memcpy(buf, tmp, nbytes);
+			memcpy(buf, tmp, len);
 			memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
 			break;
 		}
@@ -502,7 +422,7 @@ static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
 		chacha20_block(chacha_state, buf);
 		if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0))
 			++chacha_state[13];
-		nbytes -= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
+		len -= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
 		buf += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
 	}
 
@@ -519,22 +439,20 @@ static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
  * wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once
  * at any point prior.
  */
-void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
+void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len)
 {
-	static void *previous;
-
-	warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous);
-	_get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes);
+	warn_unseeded_randomness();
+	_get_random_bytes(buf, len);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
 
-static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
+static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(struct iov_iter *iter)
 {
-	size_t len, left, ret = 0;
 	u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS];
-	u8 output[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE];
+	u8 block[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE];
+	size_t ret = 0, copied;
 
-	if (!nbytes)
+	if (unlikely(!iov_iter_count(iter)))
 		return 0;
 
 	/*
@@ -548,30 +466,22 @@ static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
 	 * use chacha_state after, so we can simply return those bytes to
 	 * the user directly.
 	 */
-	if (nbytes <= CHACHA_KEY_SIZE) {
-		ret = nbytes - copy_to_user(buf, &chacha_state[4], nbytes);
+	if (iov_iter_count(iter) <= CHACHA_KEY_SIZE) {
+		ret = copy_to_iter(&chacha_state[4], CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, iter);
 		goto out_zero_chacha;
 	}
 
 	for (;;) {
-		chacha20_block(chacha_state, output);
+		chacha20_block(chacha_state, block);
 		if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0))
 			++chacha_state[13];
 
-		len = min_t(size_t, nbytes, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE);
-		left = copy_to_user(buf, output, len);
-		if (left) {
-			ret += len - left;
-			break;
-		}
-
-		buf += len;
-		ret += len;
-		nbytes -= len;
-		if (!nbytes)
+		copied = copy_to_iter(block, sizeof(block), iter);
+		ret += copied;
+		if (!iov_iter_count(iter) || copied != sizeof(block))
 			break;
 
-		BUILD_BUG_ON(PAGE_SIZE % CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE != 0);
+		BUILD_BUG_ON(PAGE_SIZE % sizeof(block) != 0);
 		if (ret % PAGE_SIZE == 0) {
 			if (signal_pending(current))
 				break;
@@ -579,7 +489,7 @@ static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
 		}
 	}
 
-	memzero_explicit(output, sizeof(output));
+	memzero_explicit(block, sizeof(block));
 out_zero_chacha:
 	memzero_explicit(chacha_state, sizeof(chacha_state));
 	return ret ? ret : -EFAULT;
@@ -591,98 +501,69 @@ out_zero_chacha:
  * provided by this function is okay, the function wait_for_random_bytes()
  * should be called and return 0 at least once at any point prior.
  */
-struct batched_entropy {
-	union {
-		/*
-		 * We make this 1.5x a ChaCha block, so that we get the
-		 * remaining 32 bytes from fast key erasure, plus one full
-		 * block from the detached ChaCha state. We can increase
-		 * the size of this later if needed so long as we keep the
-		 * formula of (integer_blocks + 0.5) * CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE.
-		 */
-		u64 entropy_u64[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 3 / (2 * sizeof(u64))];
-		u32 entropy_u32[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 3 / (2 * sizeof(u32))];
-	};
-	local_lock_t lock;
-	unsigned long generation;
-	unsigned int position;
-};
-
 
-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64) = {
-	.lock = INIT_LOCAL_LOCK(batched_entropy_u64.lock),
-	.position = UINT_MAX
-};
-
-u64 get_random_u64(void)
-{
-	u64 ret;
-	unsigned long flags;
-	struct batched_entropy *batch;
-	static void *previous;
-	unsigned long next_gen;
-
-	warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous);
-
-	local_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy_u64.lock, flags);
-	batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64);
-
-	next_gen = READ_ONCE(base_crng.generation);
-	if (batch->position >= ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u64) ||
-	    next_gen != batch->generation) {
-		_get_random_bytes(batch->entropy_u64, sizeof(batch->entropy_u64));
-		batch->position = 0;
-		batch->generation = next_gen;
-	}
-
-	ret = batch->entropy_u64[batch->position];
-	batch->entropy_u64[batch->position] = 0;
-	++batch->position;
-	local_unlock_irqrestore(&batched_entropy_u64.lock, flags);
-	return ret;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u64);
-
-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u32) = {
-	.lock = INIT_LOCAL_LOCK(batched_entropy_u32.lock),
-	.position = UINT_MAX
-};
-
-u32 get_random_u32(void)
-{
-	u32 ret;
-	unsigned long flags;
-	struct batched_entropy *batch;
-	static void *previous;
-	unsigned long next_gen;
-
-	warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous);
-
-	local_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy_u32.lock, flags);
-	batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32);
-
-	next_gen = READ_ONCE(base_crng.generation);
-	if (batch->position >= ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u32) ||
-	    next_gen != batch->generation) {
-		_get_random_bytes(batch->entropy_u32, sizeof(batch->entropy_u32));
-		batch->position = 0;
-		batch->generation = next_gen;
-	}
-
-	ret = batch->entropy_u32[batch->position];
-	batch->entropy_u32[batch->position] = 0;
-	++batch->position;
-	local_unlock_irqrestore(&batched_entropy_u32.lock, flags);
-	return ret;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u32);
+#define DEFINE_BATCHED_ENTROPY(type)						\
+struct batch_ ##type {								\
+	/*									\
+	 * We make this 1.5x a ChaCha block, so that we get the			\
+	 * remaining 32 bytes from fast key erasure, plus one full		\
+	 * block from the detached ChaCha state. We can increase		\
+	 * the size of this later if needed so long as we keep the		\
+	 * formula of (integer_blocks + 0.5) * CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE.		\
+	 */									\
+	type entropy[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 3 / (2 * sizeof(type))];		\
+	local_lock_t lock;							\
+	unsigned long generation;						\
+	unsigned int position;							\
+};										\
+										\
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batch_ ##type, batched_entropy_ ##type) = {	\
+	.lock = INIT_LOCAL_LOCK(batched_entropy_ ##type.lock),			\
+	.position = UINT_MAX							\
+};										\
+										\
+type get_random_ ##type(void)							\
+{										\
+	type ret;								\
+	unsigned long flags;							\
+	struct batch_ ##type *batch;						\
+	unsigned long next_gen;							\
+										\
+	warn_unseeded_randomness();						\
+										\
+	if  (!crng_ready()) {							\
+		_get_random_bytes(&ret, sizeof(ret));				\
+		return ret;							\
+	}									\
+										\
+	local_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy_ ##type.lock, flags);		\
+	batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_##type);				\
+										\
+	next_gen = READ_ONCE(base_crng.generation);				\
+	if (batch->position >= ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy) ||			\
+	    next_gen != batch->generation) {					\
+		_get_random_bytes(batch->entropy, sizeof(batch->entropy));	\
+		batch->position = 0;						\
+		batch->generation = next_gen;					\
+	}									\
+										\
+	ret = batch->entropy[batch->position];					\
+	batch->entropy[batch->position] = 0;					\
+	++batch->position;							\
+	local_unlock_irqrestore(&batched_entropy_ ##type.lock, flags);		\
+	return ret;								\
+}										\
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_ ##type);
+
+DEFINE_BATCHED_ENTROPY(u64)
+DEFINE_BATCHED_ENTROPY(u32)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
 /*
  * This function is called when the CPU is coming up, with entry
  * CPUHP_RANDOM_PREPARE, which comes before CPUHP_WORKQUEUE_PREP.
  */
-int random_prepare_cpu(unsigned int cpu)
+int __cold random_prepare_cpu(unsigned int cpu)
 {
 	/*
 	 * When the cpu comes back online, immediately invalidate both
@@ -696,62 +577,30 @@ int random_prepare_cpu(unsigned int cpu)
 }
 #endif
 
-/**
- * randomize_page - Generate a random, page aligned address
- * @start:	The smallest acceptable address the caller will take.
- * @range:	The size of the area, starting at @start, within which the
- *		random address must fall.
- *
- * If @start + @range would overflow, @range is capped.
- *
- * NOTE: Historical use of randomize_range, which this replaces, presumed that
- * @start was already page aligned.  We now align it regardless.
- *
- * Return: A page aligned address within [start, start + range).  On error,
- * @start is returned.
- */
-unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range)
-{
-	if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(start)) {
-		range -= PAGE_ALIGN(start) - start;
-		start = PAGE_ALIGN(start);
-	}
-
-	if (start > ULONG_MAX - range)
-		range = ULONG_MAX - start;
-
-	range >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
-
-	if (range == 0)
-		return start;
-
-	return start + (get_random_long() % range << PAGE_SHIFT);
-}
-
 /*
  * This function will use the architecture-specific hardware random
  * number generator if it is available. It is not recommended for
  * use. Use get_random_bytes() instead. It returns the number of
  * bytes filled in.
  */
-size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
+size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t len)
 {
-	size_t left = nbytes;
+	size_t left = len;
 	u8 *p = buf;
 
 	while (left) {
 		unsigned long v;
-		size_t chunk = min_t(size_t, left, sizeof(unsigned long));
+		size_t block_len = min_t(size_t, left, sizeof(unsigned long));
 
 		if (!arch_get_random_long(&v))
 			break;
 
-		memcpy(p, &v, chunk);
-		p += chunk;
-		left -= chunk;
+		memcpy(p, &v, block_len);
+		p += block_len;
+		left -= block_len;
 	}
 
-	return nbytes - left;
+	return len - left;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch);
 
@@ -762,33 +611,28 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch);
  *
  * Callers may add entropy via:
  *
- *     static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, size_t nbytes)
+ *     static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *buf, size_t len)
  *
  * After which, if added entropy should be credited:
  *
- *     static void credit_entropy_bits(size_t nbits)
+ *     static void credit_init_bits(size_t bits)
  *
- * Finally, extract entropy via these two, with the latter one
- * setting the entropy count to zero and extracting only if there
- * is POOL_MIN_BITS entropy credited prior or force is true:
+ * Finally, extract entropy via:
  *
- *     static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
- *     static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes, bool force)
+ *     static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len)
  *
  **********************************************************************/
 
 enum {
 	POOL_BITS = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE * 8,
-	POOL_MIN_BITS = POOL_BITS /* No point in settling for less. */
+	POOL_READY_BITS = POOL_BITS, /* When crng_init->CRNG_READY */
+	POOL_EARLY_BITS = POOL_READY_BITS / 2 /* When crng_init->CRNG_EARLY */
 };
 
-/* For notifying userspace should write into /dev/random. */
-static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_write_wait);
-
 static struct {
 	struct blake2s_state hash;
 	spinlock_t lock;
-	unsigned int entropy_count;
+	unsigned int init_bits;
 } input_pool = {
 	.hash.h = { BLAKE2S_IV0 ^ (0x01010000 | BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE),
 		    BLAKE2S_IV1, BLAKE2S_IV2, BLAKE2S_IV3, BLAKE2S_IV4,
@@ -797,48 +641,30 @@ static struct {
 	.lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(input_pool.lock),
 };
 
-static void _mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, size_t nbytes)
+static void _mix_pool_bytes(const void *buf, size_t len)
 {
-	blake2s_update(&input_pool.hash, in, nbytes);
+	blake2s_update(&input_pool.hash, buf, len);
 }
 
 /*
- * This function adds bytes into the entropy "pool".  It does not
- * update the entropy estimate.  The caller should call
- * credit_entropy_bits if this is appropriate.
+ * This function adds bytes into the input pool. It does not
+ * update the initialization bit counter; the caller should call
+ * credit_init_bits if this is appropriate.
  */
-static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, size_t nbytes)
+static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *buf, size_t len)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
-	_mix_pool_bytes(in, nbytes);
+	_mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
 }
 
-static void credit_entropy_bits(size_t nbits)
-{
-	unsigned int entropy_count, orig, add;
-
-	if (!nbits)
-		return;
-
-	add = min_t(size_t, nbits, POOL_BITS);
-
-	do {
-		orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count);
-		entropy_count = min_t(unsigned int, POOL_BITS, orig + add);
-	} while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig);
-
-	if (!crng_ready() && entropy_count >= POOL_MIN_BITS)
-		crng_reseed(false);
-}
-
 /*
  * This is an HKDF-like construction for using the hashed collected entropy
  * as a PRF key, that's then expanded block-by-block.
  */
-static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
+static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 	u8 seed[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE], next_key[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE];
@@ -867,12 +693,12 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
 	memzero_explicit(next_key, sizeof(next_key));
 
-	while (nbytes) {
-		i = min_t(size_t, nbytes, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+	while (len) {
+		i = min_t(size_t, len, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
 		/* output = HASHPRF(seed, RDSEED || ++counter) */
 		++block.counter;
 		blake2s(buf, (u8 *)&block, seed, i, sizeof(block), sizeof(seed));
-		nbytes -= i;
+		len -= i;
 		buf += i;
 	}
 
@@ -880,23 +706,43 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
 	memzero_explicit(&block, sizeof(block));
 }
 
-/*
- * First we make sure we have POOL_MIN_BITS of entropy in the pool unless force
- * is true, and then we set the entropy count to zero (but don't actually touch
- * any data). Only then can we extract a new key with extract_entropy().
- */
-static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes, bool force)
+#define credit_init_bits(bits) if (!crng_ready()) _credit_init_bits(bits)
+
+static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits)
 {
-	unsigned int entropy_count;
+	static struct execute_work set_ready;
+	unsigned int new, orig, add;
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	if (!bits)
+		return;
+
+	add = min_t(size_t, bits, POOL_BITS);
+
 	do {
-		entropy_count = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count);
-		if (!force && entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS)
-			return false;
-	} while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, entropy_count, 0) != entropy_count);
-	extract_entropy(buf, nbytes);
-	wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait);
-	kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT);
-	return true;
+		orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.init_bits);
+		new = min_t(unsigned int, POOL_BITS, orig + add);
+	} while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.init_bits, orig, new) != orig);
+
+	if (orig < POOL_READY_BITS && new >= POOL_READY_BITS) {
+		crng_reseed(); /* Sets crng_init to CRNG_READY under base_crng.lock. */
+		execute_in_process_context(crng_set_ready, &set_ready);
+		process_random_ready_list();
+		wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
+		kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
+		pr_notice("crng init done\n");
+		if (urandom_warning.missed)
+			pr_notice("%d urandom warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n",
+				  urandom_warning.missed);
+	} else if (orig < POOL_EARLY_BITS && new >= POOL_EARLY_BITS) {
+		spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags);
+		/* Check if crng_init is CRNG_EMPTY, to avoid race with crng_reseed(). */
+		if (crng_init == CRNG_EMPTY) {
+			extract_entropy(base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
+			crng_init = CRNG_EARLY;
+		}
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
+	}
 }
 
 
@@ -907,15 +753,13 @@ static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes, bool force)
  * The following exported functions are used for pushing entropy into
  * the above entropy accumulation routines:
  *
- *	void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size);
- *	void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
- *	                          unsigned int value);
- *	void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk);
- *	void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count,
- *					size_t entropy);
- *	void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size);
- *	void add_vmfork_randomness(const void *unique_vm_id, size_t size);
+ *	void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
+ *	void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy);
+ *	void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
+ *	void add_vmfork_randomness(const void *unique_vm_id, size_t len);
  *	void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq);
+ *	void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, unsigned int value);
+ *	void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk);
  *
  * add_device_randomness() adds data to the input pool that
  * is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly even per boot).
@@ -925,26 +769,13 @@ static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes, bool force)
  * that might otherwise be identical and have very little entropy
  * available to them (particularly common in the embedded world).
  *
- * add_input_randomness() uses the input layer interrupt timing, as well
- * as the event type information from the hardware.
- *
- * add_disk_randomness() uses what amounts to the seek time of block
- * layer request events, on a per-disk_devt basis, as input to the
- * entropy pool. Note that high-speed solid state drives with very low
- * seek times do not make for good sources of entropy, as their seek
- * times are usually fairly consistent.
- *
- * The above two routines try to estimate how many bits of entropy
- * to credit. They do this by keeping track of the first and second
- * order deltas of the event timings.
- *
  * add_hwgenerator_randomness() is for true hardware RNGs, and will credit
  * entropy as specified by the caller. If the entropy pool is full it will
  * block until more entropy is needed.
  *
- * add_bootloader_randomness() is the same as add_hwgenerator_randomness() or
- * add_device_randomness(), depending on whether or not the configuration
- * option CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set.
+ * add_bootloader_randomness() is called by bootloader drivers, such as EFI
+ * and device tree, and credits its input depending on whether or not the
+ * configuration option CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set.
  *
  * add_vmfork_randomness() adds a unique (but not necessarily secret) ID
  * representing the current instance of a VM to the pool, without crediting,
@@ -955,6 +786,19 @@ static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes, bool force)
  * as inputs, it feeds the input pool roughly once a second or after 64
  * interrupts, crediting 1 bit of entropy for whichever comes first.
  *
+ * add_input_randomness() uses the input layer interrupt timing, as well
+ * as the event type information from the hardware.
+ *
+ * add_disk_randomness() uses what amounts to the seek time of block
+ * layer request events, on a per-disk_devt basis, as input to the
+ * entropy pool. Note that high-speed solid state drives with very low
+ * seek times do not make for good sources of entropy, as their seek
+ * times are usually fairly consistent.
+ *
+ * The last two routines try to estimate how many bits of entropy
+ * to credit. They do this by keeping track of the first and second
+ * order deltas of the event timings.
+ *
  **********************************************************************/
 
 static bool trust_cpu __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU);
@@ -972,46 +816,42 @@ early_param("random.trust_bootloader", parse_trust_bootloader);
 
 /*
  * The first collection of entropy occurs at system boot while interrupts
- * are still turned off. Here we push in RDSEED, a timestamp, and utsname().
- * Depending on the above configuration knob, RDSEED may be considered
- * sufficient for initialization. Note that much earlier setup may already
- * have pushed entropy into the input pool by the time we get here.
+ * are still turned off. Here we push in latent entropy, RDSEED, a timestamp,
+ * utsname(), and the command line. Depending on the above configuration knob,
+ * RDSEED may be considered sufficient for initialization. Note that much
+ * earlier setup may already have pushed entropy into the input pool by the
+ * time we get here.
  */
-int __init rand_initialize(void)
+int __init random_init(const char *command_line)
 {
-	size_t i;
 	ktime_t now = ktime_get_real();
-	bool arch_init = true;
-	unsigned long rv;
+	unsigned int i, arch_bytes;
+	unsigned long entropy;
 
 #if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN)
 	static const u8 compiletime_seed[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE] __initconst __latent_entropy;
 	_mix_pool_bytes(compiletime_seed, sizeof(compiletime_seed));
 #endif
 
-	for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; i += sizeof(rv)) {
-		if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&rv) &&
-		    !arch_get_random_long_early(&rv)) {
-			rv = random_get_entropy();
-			arch_init = false;
+	for (i = 0, arch_bytes = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	     i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; i += sizeof(entropy)) {
+		if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&entropy) &&
+		    !arch_get_random_long_early(&entropy)) {
+			entropy = random_get_entropy();
+			arch_bytes -= sizeof(entropy);
 		}
-		_mix_pool_bytes(&rv, sizeof(rv));
+		_mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
 	}
 	_mix_pool_bytes(&now, sizeof(now));
 	_mix_pool_bytes(utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname())));
+	_mix_pool_bytes(command_line, strlen(command_line));
+	add_latent_entropy();
 
-	extract_entropy(base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
-	++base_crng.generation;
-
-	if (arch_init && trust_cpu && !crng_ready()) {
-		crng_init = 2;
-		pr_notice("crng init done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n");
-	}
+	if (crng_ready())
+		crng_reseed();
+	else if (trust_cpu)
+		credit_init_bits(arch_bytes * 8);
 
-	if (ratelimit_disable) {
-		urandom_warning.interval = 0;
-		unseeded_warning.interval = 0;
-	}
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -1023,164 +863,46 @@ int __init rand_initialize(void)
  * the entropy pool having similar initial state across largely
  * identical devices.
  */
-void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size)
+void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len)
 {
-	unsigned long cycles = random_get_entropy();
-	unsigned long flags, now = jiffies;
-
-	if (crng_init == 0 && size)
-		crng_pre_init_inject(buf, size, false);
+	unsigned long entropy = random_get_entropy();
+	unsigned long flags;
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
-	_mix_pool_bytes(&cycles, sizeof(cycles));
-	_mix_pool_bytes(&now, sizeof(now));
-	_mix_pool_bytes(buf, size);
+	_mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
+	_mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_device_randomness);
 
-/* There is one of these per entropy source */
-struct timer_rand_state {
-	unsigned long last_time;
-	long last_delta, last_delta2;
-};
-
-/*
- * This function adds entropy to the entropy "pool" by using timing
- * delays.  It uses the timer_rand_state structure to make an estimate
- * of how many bits of entropy this call has added to the pool.
- *
- * The number "num" is also added to the pool - it should somehow describe
- * the type of event which just happened.  This is currently 0-255 for
- * keyboard scan codes, and 256 upwards for interrupts.
- */
-static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned int num)
-{
-	unsigned long cycles = random_get_entropy(), now = jiffies, flags;
-	long delta, delta2, delta3;
-
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
-	_mix_pool_bytes(&cycles, sizeof(cycles));
-	_mix_pool_bytes(&now, sizeof(now));
-	_mix_pool_bytes(&num, sizeof(num));
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
-
-	/*
-	 * Calculate number of bits of randomness we probably added.
-	 * We take into account the first, second and third-order deltas
-	 * in order to make our estimate.
-	 */
-	delta = now - READ_ONCE(state->last_time);
-	WRITE_ONCE(state->last_time, now);
-
-	delta2 = delta - READ_ONCE(state->last_delta);
-	WRITE_ONCE(state->last_delta, delta);
-
-	delta3 = delta2 - READ_ONCE(state->last_delta2);
-	WRITE_ONCE(state->last_delta2, delta2);
-
-	if (delta < 0)
-		delta = -delta;
-	if (delta2 < 0)
-		delta2 = -delta2;
-	if (delta3 < 0)
-		delta3 = -delta3;
-	if (delta > delta2)
-		delta = delta2;
-	if (delta > delta3)
-		delta = delta3;
-
-	/*
-	 * delta is now minimum absolute delta.
-	 * Round down by 1 bit on general principles,
-	 * and limit entropy estimate to 12 bits.
-	 */
-	credit_entropy_bits(min_t(unsigned int, fls(delta >> 1), 11));
-}
-
-void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
-			  unsigned int value)
-{
-	static unsigned char last_value;
-	static struct timer_rand_state input_timer_state = { INITIAL_JIFFIES };
-
-	/* Ignore autorepeat and the like. */
-	if (value == last_value)
-		return;
-
-	last_value = value;
-	add_timer_randomness(&input_timer_state,
-			     (type << 4) ^ code ^ (code >> 4) ^ value);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_input_randomness);
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
-void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk)
-{
-	if (!disk || !disk->random)
-		return;
-	/* First major is 1, so we get >= 0x200 here. */
-	add_timer_randomness(disk->random, 0x100 + disk_devt(disk));
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness);
-
-void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
-{
-	struct timer_rand_state *state;
-
-	/*
-	 * If kzalloc returns null, we just won't use that entropy
-	 * source.
-	 */
-	state = kzalloc(sizeof(struct timer_rand_state), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (state) {
-		state->last_time = INITIAL_JIFFIES;
-		disk->random = state;
-	}
-}
-#endif
-
 /*
  * Interface for in-kernel drivers of true hardware RNGs.
  * Those devices may produce endless random bits and will be throttled
  * when our pool is full.
  */
-void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count,
-				size_t entropy)
+void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy)
 {
-	if (unlikely(crng_init == 0 && entropy < POOL_MIN_BITS)) {
-		crng_pre_init_inject(buffer, count, true);
-		mix_pool_bytes(buffer, count);
-		return;
-	}
+	mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
+	credit_init_bits(entropy);
 
 	/*
-	 * Throttle writing if we're above the trickle threshold.
-	 * We'll be woken up again once below POOL_MIN_BITS, when
-	 * the calling thread is about to terminate, or once
-	 * CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL has elapsed.
+	 * Throttle writing to once every CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL, unless
+	 * we're not yet initialized.
 	 */
-	wait_event_interruptible_timeout(random_write_wait,
-			!system_wq || kthread_should_stop() ||
-			input_pool.entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS,
-			CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL);
-	mix_pool_bytes(buffer, count);
-	credit_entropy_bits(entropy);
+	if (!kthread_should_stop() && crng_ready())
+		schedule_timeout_interruptible(CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness);
 
 /*
- * Handle random seed passed by bootloader.
- * If the seed is trustworthy, it would be regarded as hardware RNGs. Otherwise
- * it would be regarded as device data.
- * The decision is controlled by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER.
+ * Handle random seed passed by bootloader, and credit it if
+ * CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set.
  */
-void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size)
+void __cold add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len)
 {
+	mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
 	if (trust_bootloader)
-		add_hwgenerator_randomness(buf, size, size * 8);
-	else
-		add_device_randomness(buf, size);
+		credit_init_bits(len * 8);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_bootloader_randomness);
 
@@ -1192,11 +914,11 @@ static BLOCKING_NOTIFIER_HEAD(vmfork_chain);
  * don't credit it, but we do immediately force a reseed after so
  * that it's used by the crng posthaste.
  */
-void add_vmfork_randomness(const void *unique_vm_id, size_t size)
+void __cold add_vmfork_randomness(const void *unique_vm_id, size_t len)
 {
-	add_device_randomness(unique_vm_id, size);
+	add_device_randomness(unique_vm_id, len);
 	if (crng_ready()) {
-		crng_reseed(true);
+		crng_reseed();
 		pr_notice("crng reseeded due to virtual machine fork\n");
 	}
 	blocking_notifier_call_chain(&vmfork_chain, 0, NULL);
@@ -1205,13 +927,13 @@ void add_vmfork_randomness(const void *unique_vm_id, size_t size)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_vmfork_randomness);
 #endif
 
-int register_random_vmfork_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
+int __cold register_random_vmfork_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
 {
 	return blocking_notifier_chain_register(&vmfork_chain, nb);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(register_random_vmfork_notifier);
 
-int unregister_random_vmfork_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
+int __cold unregister_random_vmfork_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
 {
 	return blocking_notifier_chain_unregister(&vmfork_chain, nb);
 }
@@ -1223,17 +945,15 @@ struct fast_pool {
 	unsigned long pool[4];
 	unsigned long last;
 	unsigned int count;
-	u16 reg_idx;
 };
 
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct fast_pool, irq_randomness) = {
 #ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
-	/* SipHash constants */
-	.pool = { 0x736f6d6570736575UL, 0x646f72616e646f6dUL,
-		  0x6c7967656e657261UL, 0x7465646279746573UL }
+#define FASTMIX_PERM SIPHASH_PERMUTATION
+	.pool = { SIPHASH_CONST_0, SIPHASH_CONST_1, SIPHASH_CONST_2, SIPHASH_CONST_3 }
 #else
-	/* HalfSipHash constants */
-	.pool = { 0, 0, 0x6c796765U, 0x74656462U }
+#define FASTMIX_PERM HSIPHASH_PERMUTATION
+	.pool = { HSIPHASH_CONST_0, HSIPHASH_CONST_1, HSIPHASH_CONST_2, HSIPHASH_CONST_3 }
 #endif
 };
 
@@ -1241,27 +961,16 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct fast_pool, irq_randomness) = {
  * This is [Half]SipHash-1-x, starting from an empty key. Because
  * the key is fixed, it assumes that its inputs are non-malicious,
  * and therefore this has no security on its own. s represents the
- * 128 or 256-bit SipHash state, while v represents a 128-bit input.
+ * four-word SipHash state, while v represents a two-word input.
  */
-static void fast_mix(unsigned long s[4], const unsigned long *v)
+static void fast_mix(unsigned long s[4], unsigned long v1, unsigned long v2)
 {
-	size_t i;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < 16 / sizeof(long); ++i) {
-		s[3] ^= v[i];
-#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
-		s[0] += s[1]; s[1] = rol64(s[1], 13); s[1] ^= s[0]; s[0] = rol64(s[0], 32);
-		s[2] += s[3]; s[3] = rol64(s[3], 16); s[3] ^= s[2];
-		s[0] += s[3]; s[3] = rol64(s[3], 21); s[3] ^= s[0];
-		s[2] += s[1]; s[1] = rol64(s[1], 17); s[1] ^= s[2]; s[2] = rol64(s[2], 32);
-#else
-		s[0] += s[1]; s[1] = rol32(s[1],  5); s[1] ^= s[0]; s[0] = rol32(s[0], 16);
-		s[2] += s[3]; s[3] = rol32(s[3],  8); s[3] ^= s[2];
-		s[0] += s[3]; s[3] = rol32(s[3],  7); s[3] ^= s[0];
-		s[2] += s[1]; s[1] = rol32(s[1], 13); s[1] ^= s[2]; s[2] = rol32(s[2], 16);
-#endif
-		s[0] ^= v[i];
-	}
+	s[3] ^= v1;
+	FASTMIX_PERM(s[0], s[1], s[2], s[3]);
+	s[0] ^= v1;
+	s[3] ^= v2;
+	FASTMIX_PERM(s[0], s[1], s[2], s[3]);
+	s[0] ^= v2;
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
@@ -1269,7 +978,7 @@ static void fast_mix(unsigned long s[4], const unsigned long *v)
  * This function is called when the CPU has just come online, with
  * entry CPUHP_AP_RANDOM_ONLINE, just after CPUHP_AP_WORKQUEUE_ONLINE.
  */
-int random_online_cpu(unsigned int cpu)
+int __cold random_online_cpu(unsigned int cpu)
 {
 	/*
 	 * During CPU shutdown and before CPU onlining, add_interrupt_
@@ -1287,33 +996,18 @@ int random_online_cpu(unsigned int cpu)
 }
 #endif
 
-static unsigned long get_reg(struct fast_pool *f, struct pt_regs *regs)
-{
-	unsigned long *ptr = (unsigned long *)regs;
-	unsigned int idx;
-
-	if (regs == NULL)
-		return 0;
-	idx = READ_ONCE(f->reg_idx);
-	if (idx >= sizeof(struct pt_regs) / sizeof(unsigned long))
-		idx = 0;
-	ptr += idx++;
-	WRITE_ONCE(f->reg_idx, idx);
-	return *ptr;
-}
-
 static void mix_interrupt_randomness(struct work_struct *work)
 {
 	struct fast_pool *fast_pool = container_of(work, struct fast_pool, mix);
 	/*
-	 * The size of the copied stack pool is explicitly 16 bytes so that we
-	 * tax mix_pool_byte()'s compression function the same amount on all
-	 * platforms. This means on 64-bit we copy half the pool into this,
-	 * while on 32-bit we copy all of it. The entropy is supposed to be
-	 * sufficiently dispersed between bits that in the sponge-like
-	 * half case, on average we don't wind up "losing" some.
+	 * The size of the copied stack pool is explicitly 2 longs so that we
+	 * only ever ingest half of the siphash output each time, retaining
+	 * the other half as the next "key" that carries over. The entropy is
+	 * supposed to be sufficiently dispersed between bits so on average
+	 * we don't wind up "losing" some.
 	 */
-	u8 pool[16];
+	unsigned long pool[2];
+	unsigned int count;
 
 	/* Check to see if we're running on the wrong CPU due to hotplug. */
 	local_irq_disable();
@@ -1327,17 +1021,13 @@ static void mix_interrupt_randomness(struct work_struct *work)
 	 * consistent view, before we reenable irqs again.
 	 */
 	memcpy(pool, fast_pool->pool, sizeof(pool));
+	count = fast_pool->count;
 	fast_pool->count = 0;
 	fast_pool->last = jiffies;
 	local_irq_enable();
 
-	if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) {
-		crng_pre_init_inject(pool, sizeof(pool), true);
-		mix_pool_bytes(pool, sizeof(pool));
-	} else {
-		mix_pool_bytes(pool, sizeof(pool));
-		credit_entropy_bits(1);
-	}
+	mix_pool_bytes(pool, sizeof(pool));
+	credit_init_bits(max(1u, (count & U16_MAX) / 64));
 
 	memzero_explicit(pool, sizeof(pool));
 }
@@ -1345,37 +1035,19 @@ static void mix_interrupt_randomness(struct work_struct *work)
 void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)
 {
 	enum { MIX_INFLIGHT = 1U << 31 };
-	unsigned long cycles = random_get_entropy(), now = jiffies;
+	unsigned long entropy = random_get_entropy();
 	struct fast_pool *fast_pool = this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness);
 	struct pt_regs *regs = get_irq_regs();
 	unsigned int new_count;
-	union {
-		u32 u32[4];
-		u64 u64[2];
-		unsigned long longs[16 / sizeof(long)];
-	} irq_data;
-
-	if (cycles == 0)
-		cycles = get_reg(fast_pool, regs);
-
-	if (sizeof(unsigned long) == 8) {
-		irq_data.u64[0] = cycles ^ rol64(now, 32) ^ irq;
-		irq_data.u64[1] = regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_;
-	} else {
-		irq_data.u32[0] = cycles ^ irq;
-		irq_data.u32[1] = now;
-		irq_data.u32[2] = regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_;
-		irq_data.u32[3] = get_reg(fast_pool, regs);
-	}
 
-	fast_mix(fast_pool->pool, irq_data.longs);
+	fast_mix(fast_pool->pool, entropy,
+		 (regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_) ^ swab(irq));
 	new_count = ++fast_pool->count;
 
 	if (new_count & MIX_INFLIGHT)
 		return;
 
-	if (new_count < 64 && (!time_after(now, fast_pool->last + HZ) ||
-			       unlikely(crng_init == 0)))
+	if (new_count < 64 && !time_is_before_jiffies(fast_pool->last + HZ))
 		return;
 
 	if (unlikely(!fast_pool->mix.func))
@@ -1385,6 +1057,126 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_interrupt_randomness);
 
+/* There is one of these per entropy source */
+struct timer_rand_state {
+	unsigned long last_time;
+	long last_delta, last_delta2;
+};
+
+/*
+ * This function adds entropy to the entropy "pool" by using timing
+ * delays. It uses the timer_rand_state structure to make an estimate
+ * of how many bits of entropy this call has added to the pool. The
+ * value "num" is also added to the pool; it should somehow describe
+ * the type of event that just happened.
+ */
+static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned int num)
+{
+	unsigned long entropy = random_get_entropy(), now = jiffies, flags;
+	long delta, delta2, delta3;
+	unsigned int bits;
+
+	/*
+	 * If we're in a hard IRQ, add_interrupt_randomness() will be called
+	 * sometime after, so mix into the fast pool.
+	 */
+	if (in_hardirq()) {
+		fast_mix(this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness)->pool, entropy, num);
+	} else {
+		spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+		_mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
+		_mix_pool_bytes(&num, sizeof(num));
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+	}
+
+	if (crng_ready())
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Calculate number of bits of randomness we probably added.
+	 * We take into account the first, second and third-order deltas
+	 * in order to make our estimate.
+	 */
+	delta = now - READ_ONCE(state->last_time);
+	WRITE_ONCE(state->last_time, now);
+
+	delta2 = delta - READ_ONCE(state->last_delta);
+	WRITE_ONCE(state->last_delta, delta);
+
+	delta3 = delta2 - READ_ONCE(state->last_delta2);
+	WRITE_ONCE(state->last_delta2, delta2);
+
+	if (delta < 0)
+		delta = -delta;
+	if (delta2 < 0)
+		delta2 = -delta2;
+	if (delta3 < 0)
+		delta3 = -delta3;
+	if (delta > delta2)
+		delta = delta2;
+	if (delta > delta3)
+		delta = delta3;
+
+	/*
+	 * delta is now minimum absolute delta. Round down by 1 bit
+	 * on general principles, and limit entropy estimate to 11 bits.
+	 */
+	bits = min(fls(delta >> 1), 11);
+
+	/*
+	 * As mentioned above, if we're in a hard IRQ, add_interrupt_randomness()
+	 * will run after this, which uses a different crediting scheme of 1 bit
+	 * per every 64 interrupts. In order to let that function do accounting
+	 * close to the one in this function, we credit a full 64/64 bit per bit,
+	 * and then subtract one to account for the extra one added.
+	 */
+	if (in_hardirq())
+		this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness)->count += max(1u, bits * 64) - 1;
+	else
+		_credit_init_bits(bits);
+}
+
+void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, unsigned int value)
+{
+	static unsigned char last_value;
+	static struct timer_rand_state input_timer_state = { INITIAL_JIFFIES };
+
+	/* Ignore autorepeat and the like. */
+	if (value == last_value)
+		return;
+
+	last_value = value;
+	add_timer_randomness(&input_timer_state,
+			     (type << 4) ^ code ^ (code >> 4) ^ value);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_input_randomness);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
+void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk)
+{
+	if (!disk || !disk->random)
+		return;
+	/* First major is 1, so we get >= 0x200 here. */
+	add_timer_randomness(disk->random, 0x100 + disk_devt(disk));
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness);
+
+void __cold rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
+{
+	struct timer_rand_state *state;
+
+	/*
+	 * If kzalloc returns null, we just won't use that entropy
+	 * source.
+	 */
+	state = kzalloc(sizeof(struct timer_rand_state), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (state) {
+		state->last_time = INITIAL_JIFFIES;
+		disk->random = state;
+	}
+}
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Each time the timer fires, we expect that we got an unpredictable
  * jump in the cycle counter. Even if the timer is running on another
@@ -1398,40 +1190,40 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_interrupt_randomness);
  *
  * So the re-arming always happens in the entropy loop itself.
  */
-static void entropy_timer(struct timer_list *t)
+static void __cold entropy_timer(struct timer_list *t)
 {
-	credit_entropy_bits(1);
+	credit_init_bits(1);
 }
 
 /*
  * If we have an actual cycle counter, see if we can
  * generate enough entropy with timing noise
  */
-static void try_to_generate_entropy(void)
+static void __cold try_to_generate_entropy(void)
 {
 	struct {
-		unsigned long cycles;
+		unsigned long entropy;
 		struct timer_list timer;
 	} stack;
 
-	stack.cycles = random_get_entropy();
+	stack.entropy = random_get_entropy();
 
 	/* Slow counter - or none. Don't even bother */
-	if (stack.cycles == random_get_entropy())
+	if (stack.entropy == random_get_entropy())
 		return;
 
 	timer_setup_on_stack(&stack.timer, entropy_timer, 0);
 	while (!crng_ready() && !signal_pending(current)) {
 		if (!timer_pending(&stack.timer))
 			mod_timer(&stack.timer, jiffies + 1);
-		mix_pool_bytes(&stack.cycles, sizeof(stack.cycles));
+		mix_pool_bytes(&stack.entropy, sizeof(stack.entropy));
 		schedule();
-		stack.cycles = random_get_entropy();
+		stack.entropy = random_get_entropy();
 	}
 
 	del_timer_sync(&stack.timer);
 	destroy_timer_on_stack(&stack.timer);
-	mix_pool_bytes(&stack.cycles, sizeof(stack.cycles));
+	mix_pool_bytes(&stack.entropy, sizeof(stack.entropy));
 }
 
 
@@ -1463,9 +1255,12 @@ static void try_to_generate_entropy(void)
  *
  **********************************************************************/
 
-SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, unsigned int,
-		flags)
+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, ubuf, size_t, len, unsigned int, flags)
 {
+	struct iov_iter iter;
+	struct iovec iov;
+	int ret;
+
 	if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK | GRND_RANDOM | GRND_INSECURE))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -1476,72 +1271,60 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, unsigned int,
 	if ((flags & (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM)) == (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (count > INT_MAX)
-		count = INT_MAX;
-
-	if (!(flags & GRND_INSECURE) && !crng_ready()) {
-		int ret;
-
+	if (!crng_ready() && !(flags & GRND_INSECURE)) {
 		if (flags & GRND_NONBLOCK)
 			return -EAGAIN;
 		ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
 		if (unlikely(ret))
 			return ret;
 	}
-	return get_random_bytes_user(buf, count);
+
+	ret = import_single_range(READ, ubuf, len, &iov, &iter);
+	if (unlikely(ret))
+		return ret;
+	return get_random_bytes_user(&iter);
 }
 
 static __poll_t random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
 {
-	__poll_t mask;
-
 	poll_wait(file, &crng_init_wait, wait);
-	poll_wait(file, &random_write_wait, wait);
-	mask = 0;
-	if (crng_ready())
-		mask |= EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM;
-	if (input_pool.entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS)
-		mask |= EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM;
-	return mask;
+	return crng_ready() ? EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM : EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM;
 }
 
-static int write_pool(const char __user *ubuf, size_t count)
+static ssize_t write_pool_user(struct iov_iter *iter)
 {
-	size_t len;
-	int ret = 0;
 	u8 block[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE];
+	ssize_t ret = 0;
+	size_t copied;
 
-	while (count) {
-		len = min(count, sizeof(block));
-		if (copy_from_user(block, ubuf, len)) {
-			ret = -EFAULT;
-			goto out;
+	if (unlikely(!iov_iter_count(iter)))
+		return 0;
+
+	for (;;) {
+		copied = copy_from_iter(block, sizeof(block), iter);
+		ret += copied;
+		mix_pool_bytes(block, copied);
+		if (!iov_iter_count(iter) || copied != sizeof(block))
+			break;
+
+		BUILD_BUG_ON(PAGE_SIZE % sizeof(block) != 0);
+		if (ret % PAGE_SIZE == 0) {
+			if (signal_pending(current))
+				break;
+			cond_resched();
 		}
-		count -= len;
-		ubuf += len;
-		mix_pool_bytes(block, len);
-		cond_resched();
 	}
 
-out:
 	memzero_explicit(block, sizeof(block));
-	return ret;
+	return ret ? ret : -EFAULT;
 }
 
-static ssize_t random_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
-			    size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+static ssize_t random_write_iter(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct iov_iter *iter)
 {
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = write_pool(buffer, count);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-
-	return (ssize_t)count;
+	return write_pool_user(iter);
 }
 
-static ssize_t urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes,
-			    loff_t *ppos)
+static ssize_t urandom_read_iter(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct iov_iter *iter)
 {
 	static int maxwarn = 10;
 
@@ -1552,37 +1335,38 @@ static ssize_t urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes,
 	if (!crng_ready())
 		try_to_generate_entropy();
 
-	if (!crng_ready() && maxwarn > 0) {
-		maxwarn--;
-		if (__ratelimit(&urandom_warning))
-			pr_notice("%s: uninitialized urandom read (%zd bytes read)\n",
-				  current->comm, nbytes);
+	if (!crng_ready()) {
+		if (!ratelimit_disable && maxwarn <= 0)
+			++urandom_warning.missed;
+		else if (ratelimit_disable || __ratelimit(&urandom_warning)) {
+			--maxwarn;
+			pr_notice("%s: uninitialized urandom read (%zu bytes read)\n",
+				  current->comm, iov_iter_count(iter));
+		}
 	}
 
-	return get_random_bytes_user(buf, nbytes);
+	return get_random_bytes_user(iter);
 }
 
-static ssize_t random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes,
-			   loff_t *ppos)
+static ssize_t random_read_iter(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct iov_iter *iter)
 {
 	int ret;
 
 	ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
 	if (ret != 0)
 		return ret;
-	return get_random_bytes_user(buf, nbytes);
+	return get_random_bytes_user(iter);
 }
 
 static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 {
-	int size, ent_count;
 	int __user *p = (int __user *)arg;
-	int retval;
+	int ent_count;
 
 	switch (cmd) {
 	case RNDGETENTCNT:
 		/* Inherently racy, no point locking. */
-		if (put_user(input_pool.entropy_count, p))
+		if (put_user(input_pool.init_bits, p))
 			return -EFAULT;
 		return 0;
 	case RNDADDTOENTCNT:
@@ -1592,41 +1376,46 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 			return -EFAULT;
 		if (ent_count < 0)
 			return -EINVAL;
-		credit_entropy_bits(ent_count);
+		credit_init_bits(ent_count);
 		return 0;
-	case RNDADDENTROPY:
+	case RNDADDENTROPY: {
+		struct iov_iter iter;
+		struct iovec iov;
+		ssize_t ret;
+		int len;
+
 		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 			return -EPERM;
 		if (get_user(ent_count, p++))
 			return -EFAULT;
 		if (ent_count < 0)
 			return -EINVAL;
-		if (get_user(size, p++))
+		if (get_user(len, p++))
 			return -EFAULT;
-		retval = write_pool((const char __user *)p, size);
-		if (retval < 0)
-			return retval;
-		credit_entropy_bits(ent_count);
+		ret = import_single_range(WRITE, p, len, &iov, &iter);
+		if (unlikely(ret))
+			return ret;
+		ret = write_pool_user(&iter);
+		if (unlikely(ret < 0))
+			return ret;
+		/* Since we're crediting, enforce that it was all written into the pool. */
+		if (unlikely(ret != len))
+			return -EFAULT;
+		credit_init_bits(ent_count);
 		return 0;
+	}
 	case RNDZAPENTCNT:
 	case RNDCLEARPOOL:
-		/*
-		 * Clear the entropy pool counters. We no longer clear
-		 * the entropy pool, as that's silly.
-		 */
+		/* No longer has any effect. */
 		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 			return -EPERM;
-		if (xchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, 0) >= POOL_MIN_BITS) {
-			wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait);
-			kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT);
-		}
 		return 0;
 	case RNDRESEEDCRNG:
 		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 			return -EPERM;
 		if (!crng_ready())
 			return -ENODATA;
-		crng_reseed(false);
+		crng_reseed();
 		return 0;
 	default:
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -1639,22 +1428,26 @@ static int random_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on)
 }
 
 const struct file_operations random_fops = {
-	.read = random_read,
-	.write = random_write,
+	.read_iter = random_read_iter,
+	.write_iter = random_write_iter,
 	.poll = random_poll,
 	.unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl,
 	.compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl,
 	.fasync = random_fasync,
 	.llseek = noop_llseek,
+	.splice_read = generic_file_splice_read,
+	.splice_write = iter_file_splice_write,
 };
 
 const struct file_operations urandom_fops = {
-	.read = urandom_read,
-	.write = random_write,
+	.read_iter = urandom_read_iter,
+	.write_iter = random_write_iter,
 	.unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl,
 	.compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl,
 	.fasync = random_fasync,
 	.llseek = noop_llseek,
+	.splice_read = generic_file_splice_read,
+	.splice_write = iter_file_splice_write,
 };
 
 
@@ -1678,7 +1471,7 @@ const struct file_operations urandom_fops = {
  *
  * - write_wakeup_threshold - the amount of entropy in the input pool
  *   below which write polls to /dev/random will unblock, requesting
- *   more entropy, tied to the POOL_MIN_BITS constant. It is writable
+ *   more entropy, tied to the POOL_READY_BITS constant. It is writable
  *   to avoid breaking old userspaces, but writing to it does not
  *   change any behavior of the RNG.
  *
@@ -1693,7 +1486,7 @@ const struct file_operations urandom_fops = {
 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
 
 static int sysctl_random_min_urandom_seed = CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL / HZ;
-static int sysctl_random_write_wakeup_bits = POOL_MIN_BITS;
+static int sysctl_random_write_wakeup_bits = POOL_READY_BITS;
 static int sysctl_poolsize = POOL_BITS;
 static u8 sysctl_bootid[UUID_SIZE];
 
@@ -1702,7 +1495,7 @@ static u8 sysctl_bootid[UUID_SIZE];
  * UUID. The difference is in whether table->data is NULL; if it is,
  * then a new UUID is generated and returned to the user.
  */
-static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buffer,
+static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buf,
 			size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
 {
 	u8 tmp_uuid[UUID_SIZE], *uuid;
@@ -1729,14 +1522,14 @@ static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buffer,
 	}
 
 	snprintf(uuid_string, sizeof(uuid_string), "%pU", uuid);
-	return proc_dostring(&fake_table, 0, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+	return proc_dostring(&fake_table, 0, buf, lenp, ppos);
 }
 
 /* The same as proc_dointvec, but writes don't change anything. */
-static int proc_do_rointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buffer,
+static int proc_do_rointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buf,
 			    size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
 {
-	return write ? 0 : proc_dointvec(table, 0, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+	return write ? 0 : proc_dointvec(table, 0, buf, lenp, ppos);
 }
 
 static struct ctl_table random_table[] = {
@@ -1749,7 +1542,7 @@ static struct ctl_table random_table[] = {
 	},
 	{
 		.procname	= "entropy_avail",
-		.data		= &input_pool.entropy_count,
+		.data		= &input_pool.init_bits,
 		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
 		.mode		= 0444,
 		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec,
@@ -1783,8 +1576,8 @@ static struct ctl_table random_table[] = {
 };
 
 /*
- * rand_initialize() is called before sysctl_init(),
- * so we cannot call register_sysctl_init() in rand_initialize()
+ * random_init() is called before sysctl_init(),
+ * so we cannot call register_sysctl_init() in random_init()
  */
 static int __init random_sysctls_init(void)
 {
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
index 4704fa553098b..04a3e23a4afc7 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
@@ -400,7 +400,16 @@ ssize_t tpm2_get_tpm_pt(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 property_id,  u32 *value,
 	if (!rc) {
 		out = (struct tpm2_get_cap_out *)
 			&buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE];
-		*value = be32_to_cpu(out->value);
+		/*
+		 * To prevent failing boot up of some systems, Infineon TPM2.0
+		 * returns SUCCESS on TPM2_Startup in field upgrade mode. Also
+		 * the TPM2_Getcapability command returns a zero length list
+		 * in field upgrade mode.
+		 */
+		if (be32_to_cpu(out->property_cnt) > 0)
+			*value = be32_to_cpu(out->value);
+		else
+			rc = -ENODATA;
 	}
 	tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
 	return rc;
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c
index 3af4c07a9342f..d3989b257f422 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c
@@ -681,6 +681,7 @@ static int tpm_ibmvtpm_probe(struct vio_dev *vio_dev,
 	if (!wait_event_timeout(ibmvtpm->crq_queue.wq,
 				ibmvtpm->rtce_buf != NULL,
 				HZ)) {
+		rc = -ENODEV;
 		dev_err(dev, "CRQ response timed out\n");
 		goto init_irq_cleanup;
 	}
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
index ca0361b2dbb07..f87aa2169e5f5 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
@@ -609,6 +609,13 @@ static bool check_version(struct fsl_mc_version *mc_version, u32 major,
 }
 #endif
 
+static bool needs_entropy_delay_adjustment(void)
+{
+	if (of_machine_is_compatible("fsl,imx6sx"))
+		return true;
+	return false;
+}
+
 /* Probe routine for CAAM top (controller) level */
 static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 {
@@ -855,6 +862,8 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 			 * Also, if a handle was instantiated, do not change
 			 * the TRNG parameters.
 			 */
+			if (needs_entropy_delay_adjustment())
+				ent_delay = 12000;
 			if (!(ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init || inst_handles)) {
 				dev_info(dev,
 					 "Entropy delay = %u\n",
@@ -871,6 +880,15 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 			 */
 			ret = instantiate_rng(dev, inst_handles,
 					      gen_sk);
+			/*
+			 * Entropy delay is determined via TRNG characterization.
+			 * TRNG characterization is run across different voltages
+			 * and temperatures.
+			 * If worst case value for ent_dly is identified,
+			 * the loop can be skipped for that platform.
+			 */
+			if (needs_entropy_delay_adjustment())
+				break;
 			if (ret == -EAGAIN)
 				/*
 				 * if here, the loop will rerun,
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_accel_devices.h b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_accel_devices.h
index a03c6cf723312..dfa7ee41c5e9c 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_accel_devices.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_accel_devices.h
@@ -152,9 +152,9 @@ struct adf_pfvf_ops {
 	int (*enable_comms)(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev);
 	u32 (*get_pf2vf_offset)(u32 i);
 	u32 (*get_vf2pf_offset)(u32 i);
-	u32 (*get_vf2pf_sources)(void __iomem *pmisc_addr);
 	void (*enable_vf2pf_interrupts)(void __iomem *pmisc_addr, u32 vf_mask);
 	void (*disable_vf2pf_interrupts)(void __iomem *pmisc_addr, u32 vf_mask);
+	u32 (*disable_pending_vf2pf_interrupts)(void __iomem *pmisc_addr);
 	int (*send_msg)(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev, struct pfvf_message msg,
 			u32 pfvf_offset, struct mutex *csr_lock);
 	struct pfvf_message (*recv_msg)(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev,
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_gen2_pfvf.c b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_gen2_pfvf.c
index 1a9072aac2ca9..def4cc8e1039a 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_gen2_pfvf.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_gen2_pfvf.c
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #include "adf_pfvf_utils.h"
 
  /* VF2PF interrupts */
+#define ADF_GEN2_VF_MSK			0xFFFF
 #define ADF_GEN2_ERR_REG_VF2PF(vf_src)	(((vf_src) & 0x01FFFE00) >> 9)
 #define ADF_GEN2_ERR_MSK_VF2PF(vf_mask)	(((vf_mask) & 0xFFFF) << 9)
 
@@ -50,23 +51,6 @@ static u32 adf_gen2_vf_get_pfvf_offset(u32 i)
 	return ADF_GEN2_VF_PF2VF_OFFSET;
 }
 
-static u32 adf_gen2_get_vf2pf_sources(void __iomem *pmisc_addr)
-{
-	u32 errsou3, errmsk3, vf_int_mask;
-
-	/* Get the interrupt sources triggered by VFs */
-	errsou3 = ADF_CSR_RD(pmisc_addr, ADF_GEN2_ERRSOU3);
-	vf_int_mask = ADF_GEN2_ERR_REG_VF2PF(errsou3);
-
-	/* To avoid adding duplicate entries to work queue, clear
-	 * vf_int_mask_sets bits that are already masked in ERRMSK register.
-	 */
-	errmsk3 = ADF_CSR_RD(pmisc_addr, ADF_GEN2_ERRMSK3);
-	vf_int_mask &= ~ADF_GEN2_ERR_REG_VF2PF(errmsk3);
-
-	return vf_int_mask;
-}
-
 static void adf_gen2_enable_vf2pf_interrupts(void __iomem *pmisc_addr,
 					     u32 vf_mask)
 {
@@ -89,6 +73,44 @@ static void adf_gen2_disable_vf2pf_interrupts(void __iomem *pmisc_addr,
 	}
 }
 
+static u32 adf_gen2_disable_pending_vf2pf_interrupts(void __iomem *pmisc_addr)
+{
+	u32 sources, disabled, pending;
+	u32 errsou3, errmsk3;
+
+	/* Get the interrupt sources triggered by VFs */
+	errsou3 = ADF_CSR_RD(pmisc_addr, ADF_GEN2_ERRSOU3);
+	sources = ADF_GEN2_ERR_REG_VF2PF(errsou3);
+
+	if (!sources)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Get the already disabled interrupts */
+	errmsk3 = ADF_CSR_RD(pmisc_addr, ADF_GEN2_ERRMSK3);
+	disabled = ADF_GEN2_ERR_REG_VF2PF(errmsk3);
+
+	pending = sources & ~disabled;
+	if (!pending)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Due to HW limitations, when disabling the interrupts, we can't
+	 * just disable the requested sources, as this would lead to missed
+	 * interrupts if ERRSOU3 changes just before writing to ERRMSK3.
+	 * To work around it, disable all and re-enable only the sources that
+	 * are not in vf_mask and were not already disabled. Re-enabling will
+	 * trigger a new interrupt for the sources that have changed in the
+	 * meantime, if any.
+	 */
+	errmsk3 |= ADF_GEN2_ERR_MSK_VF2PF(ADF_GEN2_VF_MSK);
+	ADF_CSR_WR(pmisc_addr, ADF_GEN2_ERRMSK3, errmsk3);
+
+	errmsk3 &= ADF_GEN2_ERR_MSK_VF2PF(sources | disabled);
+	ADF_CSR_WR(pmisc_addr, ADF_GEN2_ERRMSK3, errmsk3);
+
+	/* Return the sources of the (new) interrupt(s) */
+	return pending;
+}
+
 static u32 gen2_csr_get_int_bit(enum gen2_csr_pos offset)
 {
 	return ADF_PFVF_INT << offset;
@@ -362,9 +384,9 @@ void adf_gen2_init_pf_pfvf_ops(struct adf_pfvf_ops *pfvf_ops)
 	pfvf_ops->enable_comms = adf_enable_pf2vf_comms;
 	pfvf_ops->get_pf2vf_offset = adf_gen2_pf_get_pfvf_offset;
 	pfvf_ops->get_vf2pf_offset = adf_gen2_pf_get_pfvf_offset;
-	pfvf_ops->get_vf2pf_sources = adf_gen2_get_vf2pf_sources;
 	pfvf_ops->enable_vf2pf_interrupts = adf_gen2_enable_vf2pf_interrupts;
 	pfvf_ops->disable_vf2pf_interrupts = adf_gen2_disable_vf2pf_interrupts;
+	pfvf_ops->disable_pending_vf2pf_interrupts = adf_gen2_disable_pending_vf2pf_interrupts;
 	pfvf_ops->send_msg = adf_gen2_pf2vf_send;
 	pfvf_ops->recv_msg = adf_gen2_vf2pf_recv;
 }
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_gen4_pfvf.c b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_gen4_pfvf.c
index d80d493a77568..40fdab857f959 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_gen4_pfvf.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_gen4_pfvf.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 /* VF2PF interrupt source registers */
 #define ADF_4XXX_VM2PF_SOU		0x41A180
 #define ADF_4XXX_VM2PF_MSK		0x41A1C0
+#define ADF_GEN4_VF_MSK			0xFFFF
 
 #define ADF_PFVF_GEN4_MSGTYPE_SHIFT	2
 #define ADF_PFVF_GEN4_MSGTYPE_MASK	0x3F
@@ -36,16 +37,6 @@ static u32 adf_gen4_pf_get_vf2pf_offset(u32 i)
 	return ADF_4XXX_VM2PF_OFFSET(i);
 }
 
-static u32 adf_gen4_get_vf2pf_sources(void __iomem *pmisc_addr)
-{
-	u32 sou, mask;
-
-	sou = ADF_CSR_RD(pmisc_addr, ADF_4XXX_VM2PF_SOU);
-	mask = ADF_CSR_RD(pmisc_addr, ADF_4XXX_VM2PF_MSK);
-
-	return sou & ~mask;
-}
-
 static void adf_gen4_enable_vf2pf_interrupts(void __iomem *pmisc_addr,
 					     u32 vf_mask)
 {
@@ -64,6 +55,37 @@ static void adf_gen4_disable_vf2pf_interrupts(void __iomem *pmisc_addr,
 	ADF_CSR_WR(pmisc_addr, ADF_4XXX_VM2PF_MSK, val);
 }
 
+static u32 adf_gen4_disable_pending_vf2pf_interrupts(void __iomem *pmisc_addr)
+{
+	u32 sources, disabled, pending;
+
+	/* Get the interrupt sources triggered by VFs */
+	sources = ADF_CSR_RD(pmisc_addr, ADF_4XXX_VM2PF_SOU);
+	if (!sources)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Get the already disabled interrupts */
+	disabled = ADF_CSR_RD(pmisc_addr, ADF_4XXX_VM2PF_MSK);
+
+	pending = sources & ~disabled;
+	if (!pending)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Due to HW limitations, when disabling the interrupts, we can't
+	 * just disable the requested sources, as this would lead to missed
+	 * interrupts if VM2PF_SOU changes just before writing to VM2PF_MSK.
+	 * To work around it, disable all and re-enable only the sources that
+	 * are not in vf_mask and were not already disabled. Re-enabling will
+	 * trigger a new interrupt for the sources that have changed in the
+	 * meantime, if any.
+	 */
+	ADF_CSR_WR(pmisc_addr, ADF_4XXX_VM2PF_MSK, ADF_GEN4_VF_MSK);
+	ADF_CSR_WR(pmisc_addr, ADF_4XXX_VM2PF_MSK, disabled | sources);
+
+	/* Return the sources of the (new) interrupt(s) */
+	return pending;
+}
+
 static int adf_gen4_pfvf_send(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev,
 			      struct pfvf_message msg, u32 pfvf_offset,
 			      struct mutex *csr_lock)
@@ -115,9 +137,9 @@ void adf_gen4_init_pf_pfvf_ops(struct adf_pfvf_ops *pfvf_ops)
 	pfvf_ops->enable_comms = adf_enable_pf2vf_comms;
 	pfvf_ops->get_pf2vf_offset = adf_gen4_pf_get_pf2vf_offset;
 	pfvf_ops->get_vf2pf_offset = adf_gen4_pf_get_vf2pf_offset;
-	pfvf_ops->get_vf2pf_sources = adf_gen4_get_vf2pf_sources;
 	pfvf_ops->enable_vf2pf_interrupts = adf_gen4_enable_vf2pf_interrupts;
 	pfvf_ops->disable_vf2pf_interrupts = adf_gen4_disable_vf2pf_interrupts;
+	pfvf_ops->disable_pending_vf2pf_interrupts = adf_gen4_disable_pending_vf2pf_interrupts;
 	pfvf_ops->send_msg = adf_gen4_pfvf_send;
 	pfvf_ops->recv_msg = adf_gen4_pfvf_recv;
 }
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_isr.c b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_isr.c
index a35149f8bf1ee..23f7fff32c642 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_isr.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_isr.c
@@ -76,32 +76,29 @@ void adf_disable_vf2pf_interrupts(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev, u32 vf_mask)
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&accel_dev->pf.vf2pf_ints_lock, flags);
 }
 
-static void adf_disable_vf2pf_interrupts_irq(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev,
-					     u32 vf_mask)
+static u32 adf_disable_pending_vf2pf_interrupts(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev)
 {
 	void __iomem *pmisc_addr = adf_get_pmisc_base(accel_dev);
+	u32 pending;
 
 	spin_lock(&accel_dev->pf.vf2pf_ints_lock);
-	GET_PFVF_OPS(accel_dev)->disable_vf2pf_interrupts(pmisc_addr, vf_mask);
+	pending = GET_PFVF_OPS(accel_dev)->disable_pending_vf2pf_interrupts(pmisc_addr);
 	spin_unlock(&accel_dev->pf.vf2pf_ints_lock);
+
+	return pending;
 }
 
 static bool adf_handle_vf2pf_int(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev)
 {
-	void __iomem *pmisc_addr = adf_get_pmisc_base(accel_dev);
 	bool irq_handled = false;
 	unsigned long vf_mask;
 
-	/* Get the interrupt sources triggered by VFs */
-	vf_mask = GET_PFVF_OPS(accel_dev)->get_vf2pf_sources(pmisc_addr);
-
+	/* Get the interrupt sources triggered by VFs, except for those already disabled */
+	vf_mask = adf_disable_pending_vf2pf_interrupts(accel_dev);
 	if (vf_mask) {
 		struct adf_accel_vf_info *vf_info;
 		int i;
 
-		/* Disable VF2PF interrupts for VFs with pending ints */
-		adf_disable_vf2pf_interrupts_irq(accel_dev, vf_mask);
-
 		/*
 		 * Handle VF2PF interrupt unless the VF is malicious and
 		 * is attempting to flood the host OS with VF2PF interrupts.
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_dh895xcc/adf_dh895xcc_hw_data.c b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_dh895xcc/adf_dh895xcc_hw_data.c
index 09599fe4d2f3f..1e7bed8b011fe 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_dh895xcc/adf_dh895xcc_hw_data.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_dh895xcc/adf_dh895xcc_hw_data.c
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@
 #include "adf_dh895xcc_hw_data.h"
 #include "icp_qat_hw.h"
 
+#define ADF_DH895XCC_VF_MSK	0xFFFFFFFF
+
 /* Worker thread to service arbiter mappings */
 static const u32 thrd_to_arb_map[ADF_DH895XCC_MAX_ACCELENGINES] = {
 	0x12222AAA, 0x11666666, 0x12222AAA, 0x11666666,
@@ -114,29 +116,6 @@ static void adf_enable_ints(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev)
 		   ADF_DH895XCC_SMIA1_MASK);
 }
 
-static u32 get_vf2pf_sources(void __iomem *pmisc_bar)
-{
-	u32 errsou3, errmsk3, errsou5, errmsk5, vf_int_mask;
-
-	/* Get the interrupt sources triggered by VFs */
-	errsou3 = ADF_CSR_RD(pmisc_bar, ADF_GEN2_ERRSOU3);
-	vf_int_mask = ADF_DH895XCC_ERR_REG_VF2PF_L(errsou3);
-
-	/* To avoid adding duplicate entries to work queue, clear
-	 * vf_int_mask_sets bits that are already masked in ERRMSK register.
-	 */
-	errmsk3 = ADF_CSR_RD(pmisc_bar, ADF_GEN2_ERRMSK3);
-	vf_int_mask &= ~ADF_DH895XCC_ERR_REG_VF2PF_L(errmsk3);
-
-	/* Do the same for ERRSOU5 */
-	errsou5 = ADF_CSR_RD(pmisc_bar, ADF_GEN2_ERRSOU5);
-	errmsk5 = ADF_CSR_RD(pmisc_bar, ADF_GEN2_ERRMSK5);
-	vf_int_mask |= ADF_DH895XCC_ERR_REG_VF2PF_U(errsou5);
-	vf_int_mask &= ~ADF_DH895XCC_ERR_REG_VF2PF_U(errmsk5);
-
-	return vf_int_mask;
-}
-
 static void enable_vf2pf_interrupts(void __iomem *pmisc_addr, u32 vf_mask)
 {
 	/* Enable VF2PF Messaging Ints - VFs 0 through 15 per vf_mask[15:0] */
@@ -150,7 +129,6 @@ static void enable_vf2pf_interrupts(void __iomem *pmisc_addr, u32 vf_mask)
 	if (vf_mask >> 16) {
 		u32 val = ADF_CSR_RD(pmisc_addr, ADF_GEN2_ERRMSK5)
 			  & ~ADF_DH895XCC_ERR_MSK_VF2PF_U(vf_mask);
-
 		ADF_CSR_WR(pmisc_addr, ADF_GEN2_ERRMSK5, val);
 	}
 }
@@ -173,6 +151,54 @@ static void disable_vf2pf_interrupts(void __iomem *pmisc_addr, u32 vf_mask)
 	}
 }
 
+static u32 disable_pending_vf2pf_interrupts(void __iomem *pmisc_addr)
+{
+	u32 sources, pending, disabled;
+	u32 errsou3, errmsk3;
+	u32 errsou5, errmsk5;
+
+	/* Get the interrupt sources triggered by VFs */
+	errsou3 = ADF_CSR_RD(pmisc_addr, ADF_GEN2_ERRSOU3);
+	errsou5 = ADF_CSR_RD(pmisc_addr, ADF_GEN2_ERRSOU5);
+	sources = ADF_DH895XCC_ERR_REG_VF2PF_L(errsou3)
+		  | ADF_DH895XCC_ERR_REG_VF2PF_U(errsou5);
+
+	if (!sources)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Get the already disabled interrupts */
+	errmsk3 = ADF_CSR_RD(pmisc_addr, ADF_GEN2_ERRMSK3);
+	errmsk5 = ADF_CSR_RD(pmisc_addr, ADF_GEN2_ERRMSK5);
+	disabled = ADF_DH895XCC_ERR_REG_VF2PF_L(errmsk3)
+		   | ADF_DH895XCC_ERR_REG_VF2PF_U(errmsk5);
+
+	pending = sources & ~disabled;
+	if (!pending)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Due to HW limitations, when disabling the interrupts, we can't
+	 * just disable the requested sources, as this would lead to missed
+	 * interrupts if sources changes just before writing to ERRMSK3 and
+	 * ERRMSK5.
+	 * To work around it, disable all and re-enable only the sources that
+	 * are not in vf_mask and were not already disabled. Re-enabling will
+	 * trigger a new interrupt for the sources that have changed in the
+	 * meantime, if any.
+	 */
+	errmsk3 |= ADF_DH895XCC_ERR_MSK_VF2PF_L(ADF_DH895XCC_VF_MSK);
+	errmsk5 |= ADF_DH895XCC_ERR_MSK_VF2PF_U(ADF_DH895XCC_VF_MSK);
+	ADF_CSR_WR(pmisc_addr, ADF_GEN2_ERRMSK3, errmsk3);
+	ADF_CSR_WR(pmisc_addr, ADF_GEN2_ERRMSK5, errmsk5);
+
+	errmsk3 &= ADF_DH895XCC_ERR_MSK_VF2PF_L(sources | disabled);
+	errmsk5 &= ADF_DH895XCC_ERR_MSK_VF2PF_U(sources | disabled);
+	ADF_CSR_WR(pmisc_addr, ADF_GEN2_ERRMSK3, errmsk3);
+	ADF_CSR_WR(pmisc_addr, ADF_GEN2_ERRMSK5, errmsk5);
+
+	/* Return the sources of the (new) interrupt(s) */
+	return pending;
+}
+
 static void configure_iov_threads(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev, bool enable)
 {
 	adf_gen2_cfg_iov_thds(accel_dev, enable,
@@ -220,9 +246,9 @@ void adf_init_hw_data_dh895xcc(struct adf_hw_device_data *hw_data)
 	hw_data->disable_iov = adf_disable_sriov;
 
 	adf_gen2_init_pf_pfvf_ops(&hw_data->pfvf_ops);
-	hw_data->pfvf_ops.get_vf2pf_sources = get_vf2pf_sources;
 	hw_data->pfvf_ops.enable_vf2pf_interrupts = enable_vf2pf_interrupts;
 	hw_data->pfvf_ops.disable_vf2pf_interrupts = disable_vf2pf_interrupts;
+	hw_data->pfvf_ops.disable_pending_vf2pf_interrupts = disable_pending_vf2pf_interrupts;
 	adf_gen2_init_hw_csr_ops(&hw_data->csr_ops);
 }
 
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_pm.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_pm.c
index 9333f732cda8e..5167d63010b99 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_pm.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_pm.c
@@ -2859,7 +2859,7 @@ static void ilk_compute_wm_level(const struct drm_i915_private *dev_priv,
 }
 
 static void intel_read_wm_latency(struct drm_i915_private *dev_priv,
-				  u16 wm[8])
+				  u16 wm[])
 {
 	struct intel_uncore *uncore = &dev_priv->uncore;
 
diff --git a/drivers/hid/amd-sfh-hid/amd_sfh_client.c b/drivers/hid/amd-sfh-hid/amd_sfh_client.c
index c5de0ec4f9d03..444acd9e2cd6a 100644
--- a/drivers/hid/amd-sfh-hid/amd_sfh_client.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/amd-sfh-hid/amd_sfh_client.c
@@ -227,6 +227,17 @@ int amd_sfh_hid_client_init(struct amd_mp2_dev *privdata)
 		dev_dbg(dev, "sid 0x%x status 0x%x\n",
 			cl_data->sensor_idx[i], cl_data->sensor_sts[i]);
 	}
+	if (privdata->mp2_ops->discovery_status &&
+	    privdata->mp2_ops->discovery_status(privdata) == 0) {
+		amd_sfh_hid_client_deinit(privdata);
+		for (i = 0; i < cl_data->num_hid_devices; i++) {
+			devm_kfree(dev, cl_data->feature_report[i]);
+			devm_kfree(dev, in_data->input_report[i]);
+			devm_kfree(dev, cl_data->report_descr[i]);
+		}
+		dev_warn(dev, "Failed to discover, sensors not enabled\n");
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	}
 	schedule_delayed_work(&cl_data->work_buffer, msecs_to_jiffies(AMD_SFH_IDLE_LOOP));
 	return 0;
 
diff --git a/drivers/hid/amd-sfh-hid/amd_sfh_pcie.c b/drivers/hid/amd-sfh-hid/amd_sfh_pcie.c
index 6b5fd90b0bd1b..e18a4efd8839e 100644
--- a/drivers/hid/amd-sfh-hid/amd_sfh_pcie.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/amd-sfh-hid/amd_sfh_pcie.c
@@ -130,6 +130,12 @@ static int amd_sfh_irq_init_v2(struct amd_mp2_dev *privdata)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int amd_sfh_dis_sts_v2(struct amd_mp2_dev *privdata)
+{
+	return (readl(privdata->mmio + AMD_P2C_MSG(1)) &
+		      SENSOR_DISCOVERY_STATUS_MASK) >> SENSOR_DISCOVERY_STATUS_SHIFT;
+}
+
 void amd_start_sensor(struct amd_mp2_dev *privdata, struct amd_mp2_sensor_info info)
 {
 	union sfh_cmd_param cmd_param;
@@ -245,6 +251,7 @@ static const struct amd_mp2_ops amd_sfh_ops_v2 = {
 	.response = amd_sfh_wait_response_v2,
 	.clear_intr = amd_sfh_clear_intr_v2,
 	.init_intr = amd_sfh_irq_init_v2,
+	.discovery_status = amd_sfh_dis_sts_v2,
 };
 
 static const struct amd_mp2_ops amd_sfh_ops = {
diff --git a/drivers/hid/amd-sfh-hid/amd_sfh_pcie.h b/drivers/hid/amd-sfh-hid/amd_sfh_pcie.h
index 97b99861fae25..9aa88a91ac8d1 100644
--- a/drivers/hid/amd-sfh-hid/amd_sfh_pcie.h
+++ b/drivers/hid/amd-sfh-hid/amd_sfh_pcie.h
@@ -39,6 +39,9 @@
 
 #define AMD_SFH_IDLE_LOOP	200
 
+#define SENSOR_DISCOVERY_STATUS_MASK		GENMASK(5, 3)
+#define SENSOR_DISCOVERY_STATUS_SHIFT		3
+
 /* SFH Command register */
 union sfh_cmd_base {
 	u32 ul;
@@ -143,5 +146,6 @@ struct amd_mp2_ops {
 	 int (*response)(struct amd_mp2_dev *mp2, u8 sid, u32 sensor_sts);
 	 void (*clear_intr)(struct amd_mp2_dev *privdata);
 	 int (*init_intr)(struct amd_mp2_dev *privdata);
+	 int (*discovery_status)(struct amd_mp2_dev *privdata);
 };
 #endif
diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h b/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h
index 053853a891c50..c297c63f3ec5c 100644
--- a/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h
@@ -768,6 +768,7 @@
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_LENOVO_X1_COVER	0x6085
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_LENOVO_X1_TAB	0x60a3
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_LENOVO_X1_TAB3	0x60b5
+#define USB_DEVICE_ID_LENOVO_X12_TAB	0x60fe
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_LENOVO_OPTICAL_USB_MOUSE_600E	0x600e
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_LENOVO_PIXART_USB_MOUSE_608D	0x608d
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_LENOVO_PIXART_USB_MOUSE_6019	0x6019
diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-multitouch.c b/drivers/hid/hid-multitouch.c
index 99eabfb4145b5..6bb3890b0f2c9 100644
--- a/drivers/hid/hid-multitouch.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-multitouch.c
@@ -2034,6 +2034,12 @@ static const struct hid_device_id mt_devices[] = {
 			   USB_VENDOR_ID_LENOVO,
 			   USB_DEVICE_ID_LENOVO_X1_TAB3) },
 
+	/* Lenovo X12 TAB Gen 1 */
+	{ .driver_data = MT_CLS_WIN_8_FORCE_MULTI_INPUT,
+		HID_DEVICE(BUS_USB, HID_GROUP_MULTITOUCH_WIN_8,
+			   USB_VENDOR_ID_LENOVO,
+			   USB_DEVICE_ID_LENOVO_X12_TAB) },
+
 	/* MosArt panels */
 	{ .driver_data = MT_CLS_CONFIDENCE_MINUS_ONE,
 		MT_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ASUS,
@@ -2178,6 +2184,9 @@ static const struct hid_device_id mt_devices[] = {
 	{ .driver_data = MT_CLS_GOOGLE,
 		HID_DEVICE(HID_BUS_ANY, HID_GROUP_ANY, USB_VENDOR_ID_GOOGLE,
 			USB_DEVICE_ID_GOOGLE_TOUCH_ROSE) },
+	{ .driver_data = MT_CLS_GOOGLE,
+		HID_DEVICE(BUS_USB, HID_GROUP_MULTITOUCH_WIN_8, USB_VENDOR_ID_GOOGLE,
+			USB_DEVICE_ID_GOOGLE_WHISKERS) },
 
 	/* Generic MT device */
 	{ HID_DEVICE(HID_BUS_ANY, HID_GROUP_MULTITOUCH, HID_ANY_ID, HID_ANY_ID) },
diff --git a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-ismt.c b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-ismt.c
index c16157ee8c520..6078fa0c0d488 100644
--- a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-ismt.c
+++ b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-ismt.c
@@ -528,6 +528,9 @@ static int ismt_access(struct i2c_adapter *adap, u16 addr,
 
 	case I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_PROC_CALL:
 		dev_dbg(dev, "I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_PROC_CALL\n");
+		if (data->block[0] > I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
 		dma_size = I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX;
 		desc->tgtaddr_rw = ISMT_DESC_ADDR_RW(addr, 1);
 		desc->wr_len_cmd = data->block[0] + 1;
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
index fb80539865d7c..159c6806c19b8 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
@@ -3439,6 +3439,11 @@ static int crypt_map(struct dm_target *ti, struct bio *bio)
 	return DM_MAPIO_SUBMITTED;
 }
 
+static char hex2asc(unsigned char c)
+{
+	return c + '0' + ((unsigned)(9 - c) >> 4 & 0x27);
+}
+
 static void crypt_status(struct dm_target *ti, status_type_t type,
 			 unsigned status_flags, char *result, unsigned maxlen)
 {
@@ -3457,9 +3462,12 @@ static void crypt_status(struct dm_target *ti, status_type_t type,
 		if (cc->key_size > 0) {
 			if (cc->key_string)
 				DMEMIT(":%u:%s", cc->key_size, cc->key_string);
-			else
-				for (i = 0; i < cc->key_size; i++)
-					DMEMIT("%02x", cc->key[i]);
+			else {
+				for (i = 0; i < cc->key_size; i++) {
+					DMEMIT("%c%c", hex2asc(cc->key[i] >> 4),
+					       hex2asc(cc->key[i] & 0xf));
+				}
+			}
 		} else
 			DMEMIT("-");
 
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-integrity.c b/drivers/md/dm-integrity.c
index 36ae30b73a6e0..3d5a0ce123c90 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-integrity.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-integrity.c
@@ -4494,8 +4494,6 @@ try_smaller_buffer:
 	}
 
 	if (should_write_sb) {
-		int r;
-
 		init_journal(ic, 0, ic->journal_sections, 0);
 		r = dm_integrity_failed(ic);
 		if (unlikely(r)) {
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-stats.c b/drivers/md/dm-stats.c
index 0e039a8c0bf2e..a3f2050b9c9b4 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-stats.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-stats.c
@@ -225,6 +225,7 @@ void dm_stats_cleanup(struct dm_stats *stats)
 				       atomic_read(&shared->in_flight[READ]),
 				       atomic_read(&shared->in_flight[WRITE]));
 			}
+			cond_resched();
 		}
 		dm_stat_free(&s->rcu_head);
 	}
@@ -330,6 +331,7 @@ static int dm_stats_create(struct dm_stats *stats, sector_t start, sector_t end,
 	for (ni = 0; ni < n_entries; ni++) {
 		atomic_set(&s->stat_shared[ni].in_flight[READ], 0);
 		atomic_set(&s->stat_shared[ni].in_flight[WRITE], 0);
+		cond_resched();
 	}
 
 	if (s->n_histogram_entries) {
@@ -342,6 +344,7 @@ static int dm_stats_create(struct dm_stats *stats, sector_t start, sector_t end,
 		for (ni = 0; ni < n_entries; ni++) {
 			s->stat_shared[ni].tmp.histogram = hi;
 			hi += s->n_histogram_entries + 1;
+			cond_resched();
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -362,6 +365,7 @@ static int dm_stats_create(struct dm_stats *stats, sector_t start, sector_t end,
 			for (ni = 0; ni < n_entries; ni++) {
 				p[ni].histogram = hi;
 				hi += s->n_histogram_entries + 1;
+				cond_resched();
 			}
 		}
 	}
@@ -497,6 +501,7 @@ static int dm_stats_list(struct dm_stats *stats, const char *program,
 			}
 			DMEMIT("\n");
 		}
+		cond_resched();
 	}
 	mutex_unlock(&stats->mutex);
 
@@ -774,6 +779,7 @@ static void __dm_stat_clear(struct dm_stat *s, size_t idx_start, size_t idx_end,
 				local_irq_enable();
 			}
 		}
+		cond_resched();
 	}
 }
 
@@ -889,6 +895,8 @@ static int dm_stats_print(struct dm_stats *stats, int id,
 
 		if (unlikely(sz + 1 >= maxlen))
 			goto buffer_overflow;
+
+		cond_resched();
 	}
 
 	if (clear)
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c b/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c
index 80133aae0db37..d6dbd47492a85 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c
@@ -1312,6 +1312,7 @@ bad:
 
 static struct target_type verity_target = {
 	.name		= "verity",
+	.features	= DM_TARGET_IMMUTABLE,
 	.version	= {1, 8, 0},
 	.module		= THIS_MODULE,
 	.ctr		= verity_ctr,
diff --git a/drivers/md/raid5.c b/drivers/md/raid5.c
index 351d341a1ffa4..d6ce5a09fd358 100644
--- a/drivers/md/raid5.c
+++ b/drivers/md/raid5.c
@@ -686,17 +686,17 @@ int raid5_calc_degraded(struct r5conf *conf)
 	return degraded;
 }
 
-static int has_failed(struct r5conf *conf)
+static bool has_failed(struct r5conf *conf)
 {
-	int degraded;
+	int degraded = conf->mddev->degraded;
 
-	if (conf->mddev->reshape_position == MaxSector)
-		return conf->mddev->degraded > conf->max_degraded;
+	if (test_bit(MD_BROKEN, &conf->mddev->flags))
+		return true;
 
-	degraded = raid5_calc_degraded(conf);
-	if (degraded > conf->max_degraded)
-		return 1;
-	return 0;
+	if (conf->mddev->reshape_position != MaxSector)
+		degraded = raid5_calc_degraded(conf);
+
+	return degraded > conf->max_degraded;
 }
 
 struct stripe_head *
@@ -2863,34 +2863,31 @@ static void raid5_error(struct mddev *mddev, struct md_rdev *rdev)
 	unsigned long flags;
 	pr_debug("raid456: error called\n");
 
+	pr_crit("md/raid:%s: Disk failure on %s, disabling device.\n",
+		mdname(mddev), bdevname(rdev->bdev, b));
+
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&conf->device_lock, flags);
+	set_bit(Faulty, &rdev->flags);
+	clear_bit(In_sync, &rdev->flags);
+	mddev->degraded = raid5_calc_degraded(conf);
 
-	if (test_bit(In_sync, &rdev->flags) &&
-	    mddev->degraded == conf->max_degraded) {
-		/*
-		 * Don't allow to achieve failed state
-		 * Don't try to recover this device
-		 */
+	if (has_failed(conf)) {
+		set_bit(MD_BROKEN, &conf->mddev->flags);
 		conf->recovery_disabled = mddev->recovery_disabled;
-		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&conf->device_lock, flags);
-		return;
+
+		pr_crit("md/raid:%s: Cannot continue operation (%d/%d failed).\n",
+			mdname(mddev), mddev->degraded, conf->raid_disks);
+	} else {
+		pr_crit("md/raid:%s: Operation continuing on %d devices.\n",
+			mdname(mddev), conf->raid_disks - mddev->degraded);
 	}
 
-	set_bit(Faulty, &rdev->flags);
-	clear_bit(In_sync, &rdev->flags);
-	mddev->degraded = raid5_calc_degraded(conf);
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&conf->device_lock, flags);
 	set_bit(MD_RECOVERY_INTR, &mddev->recovery);
 
 	set_bit(Blocked, &rdev->flags);
 	set_mask_bits(&mddev->sb_flags, 0,
 		      BIT(MD_SB_CHANGE_DEVS) | BIT(MD_SB_CHANGE_PENDING));
-	pr_crit("md/raid:%s: Disk failure on %s, disabling device.\n"
-		"md/raid:%s: Operation continuing on %d devices.\n",
-		mdname(mddev),
-		bdevname(rdev->bdev, b),
-		mdname(mddev),
-		conf->raid_disks - mddev->degraded);
 	r5c_update_on_rdev_error(mddev, rdev);
 }
 
diff --git a/drivers/media/i2c/imx412.c b/drivers/media/i2c/imx412.c
index be3f6ea555597..84279a6808730 100644
--- a/drivers/media/i2c/imx412.c
+++ b/drivers/media/i2c/imx412.c
@@ -1011,7 +1011,7 @@ static int imx412_power_on(struct device *dev)
 	struct imx412 *imx412 = to_imx412(sd);
 	int ret;
 
-	gpiod_set_value_cansleep(imx412->reset_gpio, 1);
+	gpiod_set_value_cansleep(imx412->reset_gpio, 0);
 
 	ret = clk_prepare_enable(imx412->inclk);
 	if (ret) {
@@ -1024,7 +1024,7 @@ static int imx412_power_on(struct device *dev)
 	return 0;
 
 error_reset:
-	gpiod_set_value_cansleep(imx412->reset_gpio, 0);
+	gpiod_set_value_cansleep(imx412->reset_gpio, 1);
 
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -1040,10 +1040,10 @@ static int imx412_power_off(struct device *dev)
 	struct v4l2_subdev *sd = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
 	struct imx412 *imx412 = to_imx412(sd);
 
-	gpiod_set_value_cansleep(imx412->reset_gpio, 0);
-
 	clk_disable_unprepare(imx412->inclk);
 
+	gpiod_set_value_cansleep(imx412->reset_gpio, 1);
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
diff --git a/drivers/net/ipa/ipa_endpoint.c b/drivers/net/ipa/ipa_endpoint.c
index cea7b2e2ce969..53764f3c0c7e4 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ipa/ipa_endpoint.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ipa/ipa_endpoint.c
@@ -130,9 +130,10 @@ static bool ipa_endpoint_data_valid_one(struct ipa *ipa, u32 count,
 		 */
 		if (data->endpoint.config.aggregation) {
 			limit += SZ_1K * aggr_byte_limit_max(ipa->version);
-			if (buffer_size > limit) {
+			if (buffer_size - NET_SKB_PAD > limit) {
 				dev_err(dev, "RX buffer size too large for aggregated RX endpoint %u (%u > %u)\n",
-					data->endpoint_id, buffer_size, limit);
+					data->endpoint_id,
+					buffer_size - NET_SKB_PAD, limit);
 
 				return false;
 			}
@@ -739,6 +740,7 @@ static void ipa_endpoint_init_aggr(struct ipa_endpoint *endpoint)
 	if (endpoint->data->aggregation) {
 		if (!endpoint->toward_ipa) {
 			const struct ipa_endpoint_rx_data *rx_data;
+			u32 buffer_size;
 			bool close_eof;
 			u32 limit;
 
@@ -746,7 +748,8 @@ static void ipa_endpoint_init_aggr(struct ipa_endpoint *endpoint)
 			val |= u32_encode_bits(IPA_ENABLE_AGGR, AGGR_EN_FMASK);
 			val |= u32_encode_bits(IPA_GENERIC, AGGR_TYPE_FMASK);
 
-			limit = ipa_aggr_size_kb(rx_data->buffer_size);
+			buffer_size = rx_data->buffer_size;
+			limit = ipa_aggr_size_kb(buffer_size - NET_SKB_PAD);
 			val |= aggr_byte_limit_encoded(version, limit);
 
 			limit = IPA_AGGR_TIME_LIMIT;
diff --git a/fs/exfat/balloc.c b/fs/exfat/balloc.c
index 03f1423071749..9f42f25fab920 100644
--- a/fs/exfat/balloc.c
+++ b/fs/exfat/balloc.c
@@ -148,7 +148,9 @@ int exfat_set_bitmap(struct inode *inode, unsigned int clu, bool sync)
 	struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
 	struct exfat_sb_info *sbi = EXFAT_SB(sb);
 
-	WARN_ON(clu < EXFAT_FIRST_CLUSTER);
+	if (!is_valid_cluster(sbi, clu))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	ent_idx = CLUSTER_TO_BITMAP_ENT(clu);
 	i = BITMAP_OFFSET_SECTOR_INDEX(sb, ent_idx);
 	b = BITMAP_OFFSET_BIT_IN_SECTOR(sb, ent_idx);
@@ -166,7 +168,9 @@ void exfat_clear_bitmap(struct inode *inode, unsigned int clu, bool sync)
 	struct exfat_sb_info *sbi = EXFAT_SB(sb);
 	struct exfat_mount_options *opts = &sbi->options;
 
-	WARN_ON(clu < EXFAT_FIRST_CLUSTER);
+	if (!is_valid_cluster(sbi, clu))
+		return;
+
 	ent_idx = CLUSTER_TO_BITMAP_ENT(clu);
 	i = BITMAP_OFFSET_SECTOR_INDEX(sb, ent_idx);
 	b = BITMAP_OFFSET_BIT_IN_SECTOR(sb, ent_idx);
diff --git a/fs/exfat/exfat_fs.h b/fs/exfat/exfat_fs.h
index c6800b8809203..42d06c68d5c5e 100644
--- a/fs/exfat/exfat_fs.h
+++ b/fs/exfat/exfat_fs.h
@@ -381,6 +381,12 @@ static inline int exfat_sector_to_cluster(struct exfat_sb_info *sbi,
 		EXFAT_RESERVED_CLUSTERS;
 }
 
+static inline bool is_valid_cluster(struct exfat_sb_info *sbi,
+		unsigned int clus)
+{
+	return clus >= EXFAT_FIRST_CLUSTER && clus < sbi->num_clusters;
+}
+
 /* super.c */
 int exfat_set_volume_dirty(struct super_block *sb);
 int exfat_clear_volume_dirty(struct super_block *sb);
diff --git a/fs/exfat/fatent.c b/fs/exfat/fatent.c
index a3464e56a7e16..421c273531049 100644
--- a/fs/exfat/fatent.c
+++ b/fs/exfat/fatent.c
@@ -81,12 +81,6 @@ int exfat_ent_set(struct super_block *sb, unsigned int loc,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline bool is_valid_cluster(struct exfat_sb_info *sbi,
-		unsigned int clus)
-{
-	return clus >= EXFAT_FIRST_CLUSTER && clus < sbi->num_clusters;
-}
-
 int exfat_ent_get(struct super_block *sb, unsigned int loc,
 		unsigned int *content)
 {
diff --git a/fs/nfs/internal.h b/fs/nfs/internal.h
index 7eefa16ed381b..8f8cd6e2d4dbc 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/internal.h
+++ b/fs/nfs/internal.h
@@ -841,6 +841,7 @@ static inline bool nfs_error_is_fatal_on_server(int err)
 	case 0:
 	case -ERESTARTSYS:
 	case -EINTR:
+	case -ENOMEM:
 		return false;
 	}
 	return nfs_error_is_fatal(err);
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
index 234e852fcdfad..d6e1f95ccfd8a 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
@@ -7330,16 +7330,12 @@ nfsd4_release_lockowner(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
 		if (sop->so_is_open_owner || !same_owner_str(sop, owner))
 			continue;
 
-		/* see if there are still any locks associated with it */
-		lo = lockowner(sop);
-		list_for_each_entry(stp, &sop->so_stateids, st_perstateowner) {
-			if (check_for_locks(stp->st_stid.sc_file, lo)) {
-				status = nfserr_locks_held;
-				spin_unlock(&clp->cl_lock);
-				return status;
-			}
+		if (atomic_read(&sop->so_count) != 1) {
+			spin_unlock(&clp->cl_lock);
+			return nfserr_locks_held;
 		}
 
+		lo = lockowner(sop);
 		nfs4_get_stateowner(sop);
 		break;
 	}
diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/super.c b/fs/ntfs3/super.c
index 278dcf5024102..b2b54c4553f91 100644
--- a/fs/ntfs3/super.c
+++ b/fs/ntfs3/super.c
@@ -668,9 +668,11 @@ static u32 format_size_gb(const u64 bytes, u32 *mb)
 
 static u32 true_sectors_per_clst(const struct NTFS_BOOT *boot)
 {
-	return boot->sectors_per_clusters <= 0x80
-		       ? boot->sectors_per_clusters
-		       : (1u << (0 - boot->sectors_per_clusters));
+	if (boot->sectors_per_clusters <= 0x80)
+		return boot->sectors_per_clusters;
+	if (boot->sectors_per_clusters >= 0xf4) /* limit shift to 2MB max */
+		return 1U << (0 - boot->sectors_per_clusters);
+	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -713,6 +715,8 @@ static int ntfs_init_from_boot(struct super_block *sb, u32 sector_size,
 
 	/* cluster size: 512, 1K, 2K, 4K, ... 2M */
 	sct_per_clst = true_sectors_per_clst(boot);
+	if ((int)sct_per_clst < 0)
+		goto out;
 	if (!is_power_of_2(sct_per_clst))
 		goto out;
 
diff --git a/fs/pipe.c b/fs/pipe.c
index e140ea150bbb1..74ae9fafd25a1 100644
--- a/fs/pipe.c
+++ b/fs/pipe.c
@@ -653,7 +653,7 @@ pipe_poll(struct file *filp, poll_table *wait)
 	unsigned int head, tail;
 
 	/* Epoll has some historical nasty semantics, this enables them */
-	pipe->poll_usage = 1;
+	WRITE_ONCE(pipe->poll_usage, true);
 
 	/*
 	 * Reading pipe state only -- no need for acquiring the semaphore.
@@ -1245,30 +1245,33 @@ unsigned int round_pipe_size(unsigned long size)
 
 /*
  * Resize the pipe ring to a number of slots.
+ *
+ * Note the pipe can be reduced in capacity, but only if the current
+ * occupancy doesn't exceed nr_slots; if it does, EBUSY will be
+ * returned instead.
  */
 int pipe_resize_ring(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, unsigned int nr_slots)
 {
 	struct pipe_buffer *bufs;
 	unsigned int head, tail, mask, n;
 
-	/*
-	 * We can shrink the pipe, if arg is greater than the ring occupancy.
-	 * Since we don't expect a lot of shrink+grow operations, just free and
-	 * allocate again like we would do for growing.  If the pipe currently
-	 * contains more buffers than arg, then return busy.
-	 */
-	mask = pipe->ring_size - 1;
-	head = pipe->head;
-	tail = pipe->tail;
-	n = pipe_occupancy(pipe->head, pipe->tail);
-	if (nr_slots < n)
-		return -EBUSY;
-
 	bufs = kcalloc(nr_slots, sizeof(*bufs),
 		       GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_NOWARN);
 	if (unlikely(!bufs))
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
+	spin_lock_irq(&pipe->rd_wait.lock);
+	mask = pipe->ring_size - 1;
+	head = pipe->head;
+	tail = pipe->tail;
+
+	n = pipe_occupancy(head, tail);
+	if (nr_slots < n) {
+		spin_unlock_irq(&pipe->rd_wait.lock);
+		kfree(bufs);
+		return -EBUSY;
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * The pipe array wraps around, so just start the new one at zero
 	 * and adjust the indices.
@@ -1300,6 +1303,8 @@ int pipe_resize_ring(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, unsigned int nr_slots)
 	pipe->tail = tail;
 	pipe->head = head;
 
+	spin_unlock_irq(&pipe->rd_wait.lock);
+
 	/* This might have made more room for writers */
 	wake_up_interruptible(&pipe->wr_wait);
 	return 0;
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_local_storage.h b/include/linux/bpf_local_storage.h
index 493e632584970..7ea18d4da84b8 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf_local_storage.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf_local_storage.h
@@ -143,9 +143,9 @@ void bpf_selem_link_storage_nolock(struct bpf_local_storage *local_storage,
 
 bool bpf_selem_unlink_storage_nolock(struct bpf_local_storage *local_storage,
 				     struct bpf_local_storage_elem *selem,
-				     bool uncharge_omem);
+				     bool uncharge_omem, bool use_trace_rcu);
 
-void bpf_selem_unlink(struct bpf_local_storage_elem *selem);
+void bpf_selem_unlink(struct bpf_local_storage_elem *selem, bool use_trace_rcu);
 
 void bpf_selem_link_map(struct bpf_local_storage_map *smap,
 			struct bpf_local_storage_elem *selem);
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index 9f44254af8ce9..b0183450e484b 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -2677,6 +2677,7 @@ extern int install_special_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm,
 				   unsigned long flags, struct page **pages);
 
 unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top);
+unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range);
 
 extern unsigned long get_unmapped_area(struct file *, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long);
 
diff --git a/include/linux/pipe_fs_i.h b/include/linux/pipe_fs_i.h
index c00c618ef290d..cb0fd633a6106 100644
--- a/include/linux/pipe_fs_i.h
+++ b/include/linux/pipe_fs_i.h
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ struct pipe_inode_info {
 	unsigned int files;
 	unsigned int r_counter;
 	unsigned int w_counter;
-	unsigned int poll_usage;
+	bool poll_usage;
 	struct page *tmp_page;
 	struct fasync_struct *fasync_readers;
 	struct fasync_struct *fasync_writers;
diff --git a/include/linux/prandom.h b/include/linux/prandom.h
index 056d31317e499..a4aadd2dc153e 100644
--- a/include/linux/prandom.h
+++ b/include/linux/prandom.h
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/percpu.h>
+#include <linux/siphash.h>
 
 u32 prandom_u32(void);
 void prandom_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
@@ -27,15 +28,10 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, net_rand_noise);
  * The core SipHash round function.  Each line can be executed in
  * parallel given enough CPU resources.
  */
-#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) ( \
-	v0 += v1, v1 = rol64(v1, 13),  v2 += v3, v3 = rol64(v3, 16), \
-	v1 ^= v0, v0 = rol64(v0, 32),  v3 ^= v2,                     \
-	v0 += v3, v3 = rol64(v3, 21),  v2 += v1, v1 = rol64(v1, 17), \
-	v3 ^= v0,                      v1 ^= v2, v2 = rol64(v2, 32)  \
-)
+#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) SIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3)
 
-#define PRND_K0 (0x736f6d6570736575 ^ 0x6c7967656e657261)
-#define PRND_K1 (0x646f72616e646f6d ^ 0x7465646279746573)
+#define PRND_K0 (SIPHASH_CONST_0 ^ SIPHASH_CONST_2)
+#define PRND_K1 (SIPHASH_CONST_1 ^ SIPHASH_CONST_3)
 
 #elif BITS_PER_LONG == 32
 /*
@@ -43,14 +39,9 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, net_rand_noise);
  * This is weaker, but 32-bit machines are not used for high-traffic
  * applications, so there is less output for an attacker to analyze.
  */
-#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) ( \
-	v0 += v1, v1 = rol32(v1,  5),  v2 += v3, v3 = rol32(v3,  8), \
-	v1 ^= v0, v0 = rol32(v0, 16),  v3 ^= v2,                     \
-	v0 += v3, v3 = rol32(v3,  7),  v2 += v1, v1 = rol32(v1, 13), \
-	v3 ^= v0,                      v1 ^= v2, v2 = rol32(v2, 16)  \
-)
-#define PRND_K0 0x6c796765
-#define PRND_K1 0x74656462
+#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) HSIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3)
+#define PRND_K0 (HSIPHASH_CONST_0 ^ HSIPHASH_CONST_2)
+#define PRND_K1 (HSIPHASH_CONST_1 ^ HSIPHASH_CONST_3)
 
 #else
 #error Unsupported BITS_PER_LONG
diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h
index f673fbb838b35..4364de2300be6 100644
--- a/include/linux/random.h
+++ b/include/linux/random.h
@@ -12,45 +12,33 @@
 
 struct notifier_block;
 
-extern void add_device_randomness(const void *, size_t);
-extern void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *, size_t);
+void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
+void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
+void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
+			  unsigned int value) __latent_entropy;
+void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) __latent_entropy;
+void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy);
 
 #if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN) && !defined(__CHECKER__)
 static inline void add_latent_entropy(void)
 {
-	add_device_randomness((const void *)&latent_entropy,
-			      sizeof(latent_entropy));
+	add_device_randomness((const void *)&latent_entropy, sizeof(latent_entropy));
 }
 #else
-static inline void add_latent_entropy(void) {}
+static inline void add_latent_entropy(void) { }
 #endif
 
-extern void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
-				 unsigned int value) __latent_entropy;
-extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) __latent_entropy;
-extern void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count,
-				       size_t entropy);
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMGENID)
-extern void add_vmfork_randomness(const void *unique_vm_id, size_t size);
-extern int register_random_vmfork_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb);
-extern int unregister_random_vmfork_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb);
+void add_vmfork_randomness(const void *unique_vm_id, size_t len);
+int register_random_vmfork_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb);
+int unregister_random_vmfork_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb);
 #else
 static inline int register_random_vmfork_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb) { return 0; }
 static inline int unregister_random_vmfork_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb) { return 0; }
 #endif
 
-extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
-extern int wait_for_random_bytes(void);
-extern int __init rand_initialize(void);
-extern bool rng_is_initialized(void);
-extern int register_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb);
-extern int unregister_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb);
-extern size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
-
-#ifndef MODULE
-extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
-#endif
-
+void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len);
+size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t len);
 u32 get_random_u32(void);
 u64 get_random_u64(void);
 static inline unsigned int get_random_int(void)
@@ -82,11 +70,15 @@ static inline unsigned long get_random_long(void)
 
 static inline unsigned long get_random_canary(void)
 {
-	unsigned long val = get_random_long();
-
-	return val & CANARY_MASK;
+	return get_random_long() & CANARY_MASK;
 }
 
+int __init random_init(const char *command_line);
+bool rng_is_initialized(void);
+int wait_for_random_bytes(void);
+int register_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb);
+int unregister_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb);
+
 /* Calls wait_for_random_bytes() and then calls get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes).
  * Returns the result of the call to wait_for_random_bytes. */
 static inline int get_random_bytes_wait(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
@@ -96,22 +88,20 @@ static inline int get_random_bytes_wait(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
 	return ret;
 }
 
-#define declare_get_random_var_wait(var) \
-	static inline int get_random_ ## var ## _wait(var *out) { \
+#define declare_get_random_var_wait(name, ret_type) \
+	static inline int get_random_ ## name ## _wait(ret_type *out) { \
 		int ret = wait_for_random_bytes(); \
 		if (unlikely(ret)) \
 			return ret; \
-		*out = get_random_ ## var(); \
+		*out = get_random_ ## name(); \
 		return 0; \
 	}
-declare_get_random_var_wait(u32)
-declare_get_random_var_wait(u64)
-declare_get_random_var_wait(int)
-declare_get_random_var_wait(long)
+declare_get_random_var_wait(u32, u32)
+declare_get_random_var_wait(u64, u32)
+declare_get_random_var_wait(int, unsigned int)
+declare_get_random_var_wait(long, unsigned long)
 #undef declare_get_random_var
 
-unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range);
-
 /*
  * This is designed to be standalone for just prandom
  * users, but for now we include it from <linux/random.h>
@@ -122,22 +112,10 @@ unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range);
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM
 # include <asm/archrandom.h>
 #else
-static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v)
-{
-	return false;
-}
-static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v)
-{
-	return false;
-}
-static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v)
-{
-	return false;
-}
-static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v)
-{
-	return false;
-}
+static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v) { return false; }
+static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v) { return false; }
+static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v) { return false; }
+static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v) { return false; }
 #endif
 
 /*
@@ -161,8 +139,12 @@ static inline bool __init arch_get_random_long_early(unsigned long *v)
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
-extern int random_prepare_cpu(unsigned int cpu);
-extern int random_online_cpu(unsigned int cpu);
+int random_prepare_cpu(unsigned int cpu);
+int random_online_cpu(unsigned int cpu);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef MODULE
+extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
 #endif
 
 #endif /* _LINUX_RANDOM_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 25b3ef71f495e..7fc4e9f49f542 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -121,10 +121,12 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
 	LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS,
 	LOCKDOWN_XMON_WR,
 	LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER,
+	LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL,
 	LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX,
 	LOCKDOWN_KCORE,
 	LOCKDOWN_KPROBES,
 	LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL,
+	LOCKDOWN_DBG_READ_KERNEL,
 	LOCKDOWN_PERF,
 	LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS,
 	LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW,
diff --git a/include/linux/siphash.h b/include/linux/siphash.h
index cce8a9acc76cb..3af1428da5597 100644
--- a/include/linux/siphash.h
+++ b/include/linux/siphash.h
@@ -138,4 +138,32 @@ static inline u32 hsiphash(const void *data, size_t len,
 	return ___hsiphash_aligned(data, len, key);
 }
 
+/*
+ * These macros expose the raw SipHash and HalfSipHash permutations.
+ * Do not use them directly! If you think you have a use for them,
+ * be sure to CC the maintainer of this file explaining why.
+ */
+
+#define SIPHASH_PERMUTATION(a, b, c, d) ( \
+	(a) += (b), (b) = rol64((b), 13), (b) ^= (a), (a) = rol64((a), 32), \
+	(c) += (d), (d) = rol64((d), 16), (d) ^= (c), \
+	(a) += (d), (d) = rol64((d), 21), (d) ^= (a), \
+	(c) += (b), (b) = rol64((b), 17), (b) ^= (c), (c) = rol64((c), 32))
+
+#define SIPHASH_CONST_0 0x736f6d6570736575ULL
+#define SIPHASH_CONST_1 0x646f72616e646f6dULL
+#define SIPHASH_CONST_2 0x6c7967656e657261ULL
+#define SIPHASH_CONST_3 0x7465646279746573ULL
+
+#define HSIPHASH_PERMUTATION(a, b, c, d) ( \
+	(a) += (b), (b) = rol32((b), 5), (b) ^= (a), (a) = rol32((a), 16), \
+	(c) += (d), (d) = rol32((d), 8), (d) ^= (c), \
+	(a) += (d), (d) = rol32((d), 7), (d) ^= (a), \
+	(c) += (b), (b) = rol32((b), 13), (b) ^= (c), (c) = rol32((c), 16))
+
+#define HSIPHASH_CONST_0 0U
+#define HSIPHASH_CONST_1 0U
+#define HSIPHASH_CONST_2 0x6c796765U
+#define HSIPHASH_CONST_3 0x74656462U
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_SIPHASH_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/timex.h b/include/linux/timex.h
index 5745c90c88005..3871b06bd302c 100644
--- a/include/linux/timex.h
+++ b/include/linux/timex.h
@@ -62,6 +62,8 @@
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/param.h>
 
+unsigned long random_get_entropy_fallback(void);
+
 #include <asm/timex.h>
 
 #ifndef random_get_entropy
@@ -74,8 +76,14 @@
  *
  * By default we use get_cycles() for this purpose, but individual
  * architectures may override this in their asm/timex.h header file.
+ * If a given arch does not have get_cycles(), then we fallback to
+ * using random_get_entropy_fallback().
  */
+#ifdef get_cycles
 #define random_get_entropy()	((unsigned long)get_cycles())
+#else
+#define random_get_entropy()	random_get_entropy_fallback()
+#endif
 #endif
 
 /*
diff --git a/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.h b/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.h
index 13807ea94cd2b..2d524782f53b7 100644
--- a/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.h
+++ b/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.h
@@ -58,8 +58,13 @@ static inline int nf_conntrack_confirm(struct sk_buff *skb)
 	int ret = NF_ACCEPT;
 
 	if (ct) {
-		if (!nf_ct_is_confirmed(ct))
+		if (!nf_ct_is_confirmed(ct)) {
 			ret = __nf_conntrack_confirm(skb);
+
+			if (ret == NF_ACCEPT)
+				ct = (struct nf_conn *)skb_nfct(skb);
+		}
+
 		if (likely(ret == NF_ACCEPT))
 			nf_ct_deliver_cached_events(ct);
 	}
diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
index 98182c3c2c4b3..f057c49f1d9d8 100644
--- a/init/main.c
+++ b/init/main.c
@@ -1035,21 +1035,18 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init __no_sanitize_address start_kernel(void)
 	softirq_init();
 	timekeeping_init();
 	kfence_init();
+	time_init();
 
 	/*
 	 * For best initial stack canary entropy, prepare it after:
 	 * - setup_arch() for any UEFI RNG entropy and boot cmdline access
-	 * - timekeeping_init() for ktime entropy used in rand_initialize()
-	 * - rand_initialize() to get any arch-specific entropy like RDRAND
-	 * - add_latent_entropy() to get any latent entropy
-	 * - adding command line entropy
+	 * - timekeeping_init() for ktime entropy used in random_init()
+	 * - time_init() for making random_get_entropy() work on some platforms
+	 * - random_init() to initialize the RNG from from early entropy sources
 	 */
-	rand_initialize();
-	add_latent_entropy();
-	add_device_randomness(command_line, strlen(command_line));
+	random_init(command_line);
 	boot_init_stack_canary();
 
-	time_init();
 	perf_event_init();
 	profile_init();
 	call_function_init();
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_inode_storage.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_inode_storage.c
index 96be8d518885c..10424a1cda51d 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_inode_storage.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_inode_storage.c
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ void bpf_inode_storage_free(struct inode *inode)
 		 */
 		bpf_selem_unlink_map(selem);
 		free_inode_storage = bpf_selem_unlink_storage_nolock(
-			local_storage, selem, false);
+			local_storage, selem, false, false);
 	}
 	raw_spin_unlock_bh(&local_storage->lock);
 	rcu_read_unlock();
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ static int inode_storage_delete(struct inode *inode, struct bpf_map *map)
 	if (!sdata)
 		return -ENOENT;
 
-	bpf_selem_unlink(SELEM(sdata));
+	bpf_selem_unlink(SELEM(sdata), true);
 
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c
index 01aa2b51ec4df..8ce40fd869f6a 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ static void bpf_selem_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
  */
 bool bpf_selem_unlink_storage_nolock(struct bpf_local_storage *local_storage,
 				     struct bpf_local_storage_elem *selem,
-				     bool uncharge_mem)
+				     bool uncharge_mem, bool use_trace_rcu)
 {
 	struct bpf_local_storage_map *smap;
 	bool free_local_storage;
@@ -150,11 +150,16 @@ bool bpf_selem_unlink_storage_nolock(struct bpf_local_storage *local_storage,
 	    SDATA(selem))
 		RCU_INIT_POINTER(local_storage->cache[smap->cache_idx], NULL);
 
-	call_rcu_tasks_trace(&selem->rcu, bpf_selem_free_rcu);
+	if (use_trace_rcu)
+		call_rcu_tasks_trace(&selem->rcu, bpf_selem_free_rcu);
+	else
+		kfree_rcu(selem, rcu);
+
 	return free_local_storage;
 }
 
-static void __bpf_selem_unlink_storage(struct bpf_local_storage_elem *selem)
+static void __bpf_selem_unlink_storage(struct bpf_local_storage_elem *selem,
+				       bool use_trace_rcu)
 {
 	struct bpf_local_storage *local_storage;
 	bool free_local_storage = false;
@@ -169,12 +174,16 @@ static void __bpf_selem_unlink_storage(struct bpf_local_storage_elem *selem)
 	raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&local_storage->lock, flags);
 	if (likely(selem_linked_to_storage(selem)))
 		free_local_storage = bpf_selem_unlink_storage_nolock(
-			local_storage, selem, true);
+			local_storage, selem, true, use_trace_rcu);
 	raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&local_storage->lock, flags);
 
-	if (free_local_storage)
-		call_rcu_tasks_trace(&local_storage->rcu,
+	if (free_local_storage) {
+		if (use_trace_rcu)
+			call_rcu_tasks_trace(&local_storage->rcu,
 				     bpf_local_storage_free_rcu);
+		else
+			kfree_rcu(local_storage, rcu);
+	}
 }
 
 void bpf_selem_link_storage_nolock(struct bpf_local_storage *local_storage,
@@ -214,14 +223,14 @@ void bpf_selem_link_map(struct bpf_local_storage_map *smap,
 	raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&b->lock, flags);
 }
 
-void bpf_selem_unlink(struct bpf_local_storage_elem *selem)
+void bpf_selem_unlink(struct bpf_local_storage_elem *selem, bool use_trace_rcu)
 {
 	/* Always unlink from map before unlinking from local_storage
 	 * because selem will be freed after successfully unlinked from
 	 * the local_storage.
 	 */
 	bpf_selem_unlink_map(selem);
-	__bpf_selem_unlink_storage(selem);
+	__bpf_selem_unlink_storage(selem, use_trace_rcu);
 }
 
 struct bpf_local_storage_data *
@@ -466,7 +475,7 @@ bpf_local_storage_update(void *owner, struct bpf_local_storage_map *smap,
 	if (old_sdata) {
 		bpf_selem_unlink_map(SELEM(old_sdata));
 		bpf_selem_unlink_storage_nolock(local_storage, SELEM(old_sdata),
-						false);
+						false, true);
 	}
 
 unlock:
@@ -548,7 +557,7 @@ void bpf_local_storage_map_free(struct bpf_local_storage_map *smap,
 				migrate_disable();
 				__this_cpu_inc(*busy_counter);
 			}
-			bpf_selem_unlink(selem);
+			bpf_selem_unlink(selem, false);
 			if (busy_counter) {
 				__this_cpu_dec(*busy_counter);
 				migrate_enable();
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_task_storage.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_task_storage.c
index 6638a0ecc3d21..57904263a710f 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_task_storage.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_task_storage.c
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ void bpf_task_storage_free(struct task_struct *task)
 		 */
 		bpf_selem_unlink_map(selem);
 		free_task_storage = bpf_selem_unlink_storage_nolock(
-			local_storage, selem, false);
+			local_storage, selem, false, false);
 	}
 	raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&local_storage->lock, flags);
 	bpf_task_storage_unlock();
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ static int task_storage_delete(struct task_struct *task, struct bpf_map *map)
 	if (!sdata)
 		return -ENOENT;
 
-	bpf_selem_unlink(SELEM(sdata));
+	bpf_selem_unlink(SELEM(sdata), true);
 
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
index 13e9dbeeedf36..05e701f0da81d 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
@@ -873,7 +873,7 @@ static size_t select_bpf_prog_pack_size(void)
 	return size;
 }
 
-static struct bpf_prog_pack *alloc_new_pack(void)
+static struct bpf_prog_pack *alloc_new_pack(bpf_jit_fill_hole_t bpf_fill_ill_insns)
 {
 	struct bpf_prog_pack *pack;
 
@@ -886,6 +886,7 @@ static struct bpf_prog_pack *alloc_new_pack(void)
 		kfree(pack);
 		return NULL;
 	}
+	bpf_fill_ill_insns(pack->ptr, bpf_prog_pack_size);
 	bitmap_zero(pack->bitmap, bpf_prog_pack_size / BPF_PROG_CHUNK_SIZE);
 	list_add_tail(&pack->list, &pack_list);
 
@@ -895,7 +896,7 @@ static struct bpf_prog_pack *alloc_new_pack(void)
 	return pack;
 }
 
-static void *bpf_prog_pack_alloc(u32 size)
+static void *bpf_prog_pack_alloc(u32 size, bpf_jit_fill_hole_t bpf_fill_ill_insns)
 {
 	unsigned int nbits = BPF_PROG_SIZE_TO_NBITS(size);
 	struct bpf_prog_pack *pack;
@@ -910,6 +911,7 @@ static void *bpf_prog_pack_alloc(u32 size)
 		size = round_up(size, PAGE_SIZE);
 		ptr = module_alloc(size);
 		if (ptr) {
+			bpf_fill_ill_insns(ptr, size);
 			set_vm_flush_reset_perms(ptr);
 			set_memory_ro((unsigned long)ptr, size / PAGE_SIZE);
 			set_memory_x((unsigned long)ptr, size / PAGE_SIZE);
@@ -923,7 +925,7 @@ static void *bpf_prog_pack_alloc(u32 size)
 			goto found_free_area;
 	}
 
-	pack = alloc_new_pack();
+	pack = alloc_new_pack(bpf_fill_ill_insns);
 	if (!pack)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -1102,7 +1104,7 @@ bpf_jit_binary_pack_alloc(unsigned int proglen, u8 **image_ptr,
 
 	if (bpf_jit_charge_modmem(size))
 		return NULL;
-	ro_header = bpf_prog_pack_alloc(size);
+	ro_header = bpf_prog_pack_alloc(size, bpf_fill_ill_insns);
 	if (!ro_header) {
 		bpf_jit_uncharge_modmem(size);
 		return NULL;
@@ -1434,6 +1436,16 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_jit_blind_constants(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 	insn = clone->insnsi;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
+		if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) {
+			/* ld_imm64 with an address of bpf subprog is not
+			 * a user controlled constant. Don't randomize it,
+			 * since it will conflict with jit_subprogs() logic.
+			 */
+			insn++;
+			i++;
+			continue;
+		}
+
 		/* We temporarily need to hold the original ld64 insn
 		 * so that we can still access the first part in the
 		 * second blinding run.
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c b/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c
index 34725bfa1e97b..5c6c96d0e634d 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c
@@ -100,7 +100,6 @@ static struct bpf_map *stack_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
 		return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG);
 
 	cost = n_buckets * sizeof(struct stack_map_bucket *) + sizeof(*smap);
-	cost += n_buckets * (value_size + sizeof(struct stack_map_bucket));
 	smap = bpf_map_area_alloc(cost, bpf_map_attr_numa_node(attr));
 	if (!smap)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c b/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c
index ada97751ae1b2..5d8bfb5ef239d 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c
@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ int bpf_trampoline_link_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog, struct bpf_trampoline *tr)
 {
 	enum bpf_tramp_prog_type kind;
 	int err = 0;
-	int cnt;
+	int cnt = 0, i;
 
 	kind = bpf_attach_type_to_tramp(prog);
 	mutex_lock(&tr->mutex);
@@ -422,7 +422,10 @@ int bpf_trampoline_link_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog, struct bpf_trampoline *tr)
 		err = -EBUSY;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	cnt = tr->progs_cnt[BPF_TRAMP_FENTRY] + tr->progs_cnt[BPF_TRAMP_FEXIT];
+
+	for (i = 0; i < BPF_TRAMP_MAX; i++)
+		cnt += tr->progs_cnt[i];
+
 	if (kind == BPF_TRAMP_REPLACE) {
 		/* Cannot attach extension if fentry/fexit are in use. */
 		if (cnt) {
@@ -500,16 +503,19 @@ out:
 
 void bpf_trampoline_put(struct bpf_trampoline *tr)
 {
+	int i;
+
 	if (!tr)
 		return;
 	mutex_lock(&trampoline_mutex);
 	if (!refcount_dec_and_test(&tr->refcnt))
 		goto out;
 	WARN_ON_ONCE(mutex_is_locked(&tr->mutex));
-	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!hlist_empty(&tr->progs_hlist[BPF_TRAMP_FENTRY])))
-		goto out;
-	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!hlist_empty(&tr->progs_hlist[BPF_TRAMP_FEXIT])))
-		goto out;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < BPF_TRAMP_MAX; i++)
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!hlist_empty(&tr->progs_hlist[i])))
+			goto out;
+
 	/* This code will be executed even when the last bpf_tramp_image
 	 * is alive. All progs are detached from the trampoline and the
 	 * trampoline image is patched with jmp into epilogue to skip
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index d175b70067b30..9c1a02b82ecd0 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -4861,6 +4861,11 @@ static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
 		return check_packet_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size,
 					   zero_size_allowed);
 	case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY:
+		if (meta && meta->raw_mode) {
+			verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", regno,
+				reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
+			return -EACCES;
+		}
 		return check_mem_region_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size,
 					       reg->map_ptr->key_size, false);
 	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
@@ -4871,13 +4876,23 @@ static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
 		return check_map_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size,
 					zero_size_allowed);
 	case PTR_TO_MEM:
+		if (type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type)) {
+			if (meta && meta->raw_mode) {
+				verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", regno,
+					reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
+				return -EACCES;
+			}
+		}
 		return check_mem_region_access(env, regno, reg->off,
 					       access_size, reg->mem_size,
 					       zero_size_allowed);
 	case PTR_TO_BUF:
 		if (type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type)) {
-			if (meta && meta->raw_mode)
+			if (meta && meta->raw_mode) {
+				verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", regno,
+					reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
 				return -EACCES;
+			}
 
 			max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdonly_access;
 		} else {
@@ -4919,8 +4934,7 @@ static int check_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	 * out. Only upper bounds can be learned because retval is an
 	 * int type and negative retvals are allowed.
 	 */
-	if (meta)
-		meta->msize_max_value = reg->umax_value;
+	meta->msize_max_value = reg->umax_value;
 
 	/* The register is SCALAR_VALUE; the access check
 	 * happens using its boundaries.
@@ -4963,24 +4977,33 @@ static int check_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 int check_mem_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
 		   u32 regno, u32 mem_size)
 {
+	bool may_be_null = type_may_be_null(reg->type);
+	struct bpf_reg_state saved_reg;
+	struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta;
+	int err;
+
 	if (register_is_null(reg))
 		return 0;
 
-	if (type_may_be_null(reg->type)) {
-		/* Assuming that the register contains a value check if the memory
-		 * access is safe. Temporarily save and restore the register's state as
-		 * the conversion shouldn't be visible to a caller.
-		 */
-		const struct bpf_reg_state saved_reg = *reg;
-		int rv;
-
+	memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta));
+	/* Assuming that the register contains a value check if the memory
+	 * access is safe. Temporarily save and restore the register's state as
+	 * the conversion shouldn't be visible to a caller.
+	 */
+	if (may_be_null) {
+		saved_reg = *reg;
 		mark_ptr_not_null_reg(reg);
-		rv = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, mem_size, true, NULL);
-		*reg = saved_reg;
-		return rv;
 	}
 
-	return check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, mem_size, true, NULL);
+	err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, mem_size, true, &meta);
+	/* Check access for BPF_WRITE */
+	meta.raw_mode = true;
+	err = err ?: check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, mem_size, true, &meta);
+
+	if (may_be_null)
+		*reg = saved_reg;
+
+	return err;
 }
 
 int check_kfunc_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
@@ -4989,16 +5012,22 @@ int check_kfunc_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state
 	struct bpf_reg_state *mem_reg = &cur_regs(env)[regno - 1];
 	bool may_be_null = type_may_be_null(mem_reg->type);
 	struct bpf_reg_state saved_reg;
+	struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta;
 	int err;
 
 	WARN_ON_ONCE(regno < BPF_REG_2 || regno > BPF_REG_5);
 
+	memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta));
+
 	if (may_be_null) {
 		saved_reg = *mem_reg;
 		mark_ptr_not_null_reg(mem_reg);
 	}
 
-	err = check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, true, NULL);
+	err = check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, true, &meta);
+	/* Check access for BPF_WRITE */
+	meta.raw_mode = true;
+	err = err ?: check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, true, &meta);
 
 	if (may_be_null)
 		*mem_reg = saved_reg;
diff --git a/kernel/debug/debug_core.c b/kernel/debug/debug_core.c
index da06a5553835b..7beceb447211d 100644
--- a/kernel/debug/debug_core.c
+++ b/kernel/debug/debug_core.c
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
 #include <linux/vmacache.h>
 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
 #include <linux/irq.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 
 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
 #include <asm/byteorder.h>
@@ -752,6 +753,29 @@ cpu_master_loop:
 				continue;
 			kgdb_connected = 0;
 		} else {
+			/*
+			 * This is a brutal way to interfere with the debugger
+			 * and prevent gdb being used to poke at kernel memory.
+			 * This could cause trouble if lockdown is applied when
+			 * there is already an active gdb session. For now the
+			 * answer is simply "don't do that". Typically lockdown
+			 * *will* be applied before the debug core gets started
+			 * so only developers using kgdb for fairly advanced
+			 * early kernel debug can be biten by this. Hopefully
+			 * they are sophisticated enough to take care of
+			 * themselves, especially with help from the lockdown
+			 * message printed on the console!
+			 */
+			if (security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL)) {
+				if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KGDB_KDB)) {
+					/* Switch back to kdb if possible... */
+					dbg_kdb_mode = 1;
+					continue;
+				} else {
+					/* ... otherwise just bail */
+					break;
+				}
+			}
 			error = gdb_serial_stub(ks);
 		}
 
diff --git a/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c b/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c
index 0852a537dad4c..ead4da9471270 100644
--- a/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c
+++ b/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 #include "kdb_private.h"
 
 #undef	MODULE_PARAM_PREFIX
@@ -166,10 +167,62 @@ struct task_struct *kdb_curr_task(int cpu)
 }
 
 /*
- * Check whether the flags of the current command and the permissions
- * of the kdb console has allow a command to be run.
+ * Update the permissions flags (kdb_cmd_enabled) to match the
+ * current lockdown state.
+ *
+ * Within this function the calls to security_locked_down() are "lazy". We
+ * avoid calling them if the current value of kdb_cmd_enabled already excludes
+ * flags that might be subject to lockdown. Additionally we deliberately check
+ * the lockdown flags independently (even though read lockdown implies write
+ * lockdown) since that results in both simpler code and clearer messages to
+ * the user on first-time debugger entry.
+ *
+ * The permission masks during a read+write lockdown permits the following
+ * flags: INSPECT, SIGNAL, REBOOT (and ALWAYS_SAFE).
+ *
+ * The INSPECT commands are not blocked during lockdown because they are
+ * not arbitrary memory reads. INSPECT covers the backtrace family (sometimes
+ * forcing them to have no arguments) and lsmod. These commands do expose
+ * some kernel state but do not allow the developer seated at the console to
+ * choose what state is reported. SIGNAL and REBOOT should not be controversial,
+ * given these are allowed for root during lockdown already.
+ */
+static void kdb_check_for_lockdown(void)
+{
+	const int write_flags = KDB_ENABLE_MEM_WRITE |
+				KDB_ENABLE_REG_WRITE |
+				KDB_ENABLE_FLOW_CTRL;
+	const int read_flags = KDB_ENABLE_MEM_READ |
+			       KDB_ENABLE_REG_READ;
+
+	bool need_to_lockdown_write = false;
+	bool need_to_lockdown_read = false;
+
+	if (kdb_cmd_enabled & (KDB_ENABLE_ALL | write_flags))
+		need_to_lockdown_write =
+			security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL);
+
+	if (kdb_cmd_enabled & (KDB_ENABLE_ALL | read_flags))
+		need_to_lockdown_read =
+			security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_DBG_READ_KERNEL);
+
+	/* De-compose KDB_ENABLE_ALL if required */
+	if (need_to_lockdown_write || need_to_lockdown_read)
+		if (kdb_cmd_enabled & KDB_ENABLE_ALL)
+			kdb_cmd_enabled = KDB_ENABLE_MASK & ~KDB_ENABLE_ALL;
+
+	if (need_to_lockdown_write)
+		kdb_cmd_enabled &= ~write_flags;
+
+	if (need_to_lockdown_read)
+		kdb_cmd_enabled &= ~read_flags;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether the flags of the current command, the permissions of the kdb
+ * console and the lockdown state allow a command to be run.
  */
-static inline bool kdb_check_flags(kdb_cmdflags_t flags, int permissions,
+static bool kdb_check_flags(kdb_cmdflags_t flags, int permissions,
 				   bool no_args)
 {
 	/* permissions comes from userspace so needs massaging slightly */
@@ -1180,6 +1233,9 @@ static int kdb_local(kdb_reason_t reason, int error, struct pt_regs *regs,
 		kdb_curr_task(raw_smp_processor_id());
 
 	KDB_DEBUG_STATE("kdb_local 1", reason);
+
+	kdb_check_for_lockdown();
+
 	kdb_go_count = 0;
 	if (reason == KDB_REASON_DEBUG) {
 		/* special case below */
diff --git a/kernel/time/timekeeping.c b/kernel/time/timekeeping.c
index 3b1398fbddaf8..871c912860ed5 100644
--- a/kernel/time/timekeeping.c
+++ b/kernel/time/timekeeping.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 #include <linux/clocksource.h>
 #include <linux/jiffies.h>
 #include <linux/time.h>
+#include <linux/timex.h>
 #include <linux/tick.h>
 #include <linux/stop_machine.h>
 #include <linux/pvclock_gtod.h>
@@ -2380,6 +2381,20 @@ static int timekeeping_validate_timex(const struct __kernel_timex *txc)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/**
+ * random_get_entropy_fallback - Returns the raw clock source value,
+ * used by random.c for platforms with no valid random_get_entropy().
+ */
+unsigned long random_get_entropy_fallback(void)
+{
+	struct tk_read_base *tkr = &tk_core.timekeeper.tkr_mono;
+	struct clocksource *clock = READ_ONCE(tkr->clock);
+
+	if (unlikely(timekeeping_suspended || !clock))
+		return 0;
+	return clock->read(clock);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(random_get_entropy_fallback);
 
 /**
  * do_adjtimex() - Accessor function to NTP __do_adjtimex function
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.debug b/lib/Kconfig.debug
index 075cd25363ac3..7e282970177a8 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig.debug
+++ b/lib/Kconfig.debug
@@ -1616,8 +1616,7 @@ config WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
 	  so architecture maintainers really need to do what they can
 	  to get the CRNG seeded sooner after the system is booted.
 	  However, since users cannot do anything actionable to
-	  address this, by default the kernel will issue only a single
-	  warning for the first use of unseeded randomness.
+	  address this, by default this option is disabled.
 
 	  Say Y here if you want to receive warnings for all uses of
 	  unseeded randomness.  This will be of use primarily for
diff --git a/lib/assoc_array.c b/lib/assoc_array.c
index 079c72e26493e..ca0b4f360c1a0 100644
--- a/lib/assoc_array.c
+++ b/lib/assoc_array.c
@@ -1461,6 +1461,7 @@ int assoc_array_gc(struct assoc_array *array,
 	struct assoc_array_ptr *cursor, *ptr;
 	struct assoc_array_ptr *new_root, *new_parent, **new_ptr_pp;
 	unsigned long nr_leaves_on_tree;
+	bool retained;
 	int keylen, slot, nr_free, next_slot, i;
 
 	pr_devel("-->%s()\n", __func__);
@@ -1536,6 +1537,7 @@ continue_node:
 		goto descend;
 	}
 
+retry_compress:
 	pr_devel("-- compress node %p --\n", new_n);
 
 	/* Count up the number of empty slots in this node and work out the
@@ -1553,6 +1555,7 @@ continue_node:
 	pr_devel("free=%d, leaves=%lu\n", nr_free, new_n->nr_leaves_on_branch);
 
 	/* See what we can fold in */
+	retained = false;
 	next_slot = 0;
 	for (slot = 0; slot < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; slot++) {
 		struct assoc_array_shortcut *s;
@@ -1602,9 +1605,14 @@ continue_node:
 			pr_devel("[%d] retain node %lu/%d [nx %d]\n",
 				 slot, child->nr_leaves_on_branch, nr_free + 1,
 				 next_slot);
+			retained = true;
 		}
 	}
 
+	if (retained && new_n->nr_leaves_on_branch <= ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT) {
+		pr_devel("internal nodes remain despite enough space, retrying\n");
+		goto retry_compress;
+	}
 	pr_devel("after: %lu\n", new_n->nr_leaves_on_branch);
 
 	nr_leaves_on_tree = new_n->nr_leaves_on_branch;
diff --git a/lib/siphash.c b/lib/siphash.c
index 72b9068ab57bf..71d315a6ad623 100644
--- a/lib/siphash.c
+++ b/lib/siphash.c
@@ -18,19 +18,13 @@
 #include <asm/word-at-a-time.h>
 #endif
 
-#define SIPROUND \
-	do { \
-	v0 += v1; v1 = rol64(v1, 13); v1 ^= v0; v0 = rol64(v0, 32); \
-	v2 += v3; v3 = rol64(v3, 16); v3 ^= v2; \
-	v0 += v3; v3 = rol64(v3, 21); v3 ^= v0; \
-	v2 += v1; v1 = rol64(v1, 17); v1 ^= v2; v2 = rol64(v2, 32); \
-	} while (0)
+#define SIPROUND SIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3)
 
 #define PREAMBLE(len) \
-	u64 v0 = 0x736f6d6570736575ULL; \
-	u64 v1 = 0x646f72616e646f6dULL; \
-	u64 v2 = 0x6c7967656e657261ULL; \
-	u64 v3 = 0x7465646279746573ULL; \
+	u64 v0 = SIPHASH_CONST_0; \
+	u64 v1 = SIPHASH_CONST_1; \
+	u64 v2 = SIPHASH_CONST_2; \
+	u64 v3 = SIPHASH_CONST_3; \
 	u64 b = ((u64)(len)) << 56; \
 	v3 ^= key->key[1]; \
 	v2 ^= key->key[0]; \
@@ -389,19 +383,13 @@ u32 hsiphash_4u32(const u32 first, const u32 second, const u32 third,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(hsiphash_4u32);
 #else
-#define HSIPROUND \
-	do { \
-	v0 += v1; v1 = rol32(v1, 5); v1 ^= v0; v0 = rol32(v0, 16); \
-	v2 += v3; v3 = rol32(v3, 8); v3 ^= v2; \
-	v0 += v3; v3 = rol32(v3, 7); v3 ^= v0; \
-	v2 += v1; v1 = rol32(v1, 13); v1 ^= v2; v2 = rol32(v2, 16); \
-	} while (0)
+#define HSIPROUND HSIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3)
 
 #define HPREAMBLE(len) \
-	u32 v0 = 0; \
-	u32 v1 = 0; \
-	u32 v2 = 0x6c796765U; \
-	u32 v3 = 0x74656462U; \
+	u32 v0 = HSIPHASH_CONST_0; \
+	u32 v1 = HSIPHASH_CONST_1; \
+	u32 v2 = HSIPHASH_CONST_2; \
+	u32 v3 = HSIPHASH_CONST_3; \
 	u32 b = ((u32)(len)) << 24; \
 	v3 ^= key->key[1]; \
 	v2 ^= key->key[0]; \
diff --git a/mm/util.c b/mm/util.c
index 3492a9e81aa3a..ac63e5ca8b211 100644
--- a/mm/util.c
+++ b/mm/util.c
@@ -343,6 +343,38 @@ unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top)
 #endif
 }
 
+/**
+ * randomize_page - Generate a random, page aligned address
+ * @start:	The smallest acceptable address the caller will take.
+ * @range:	The size of the area, starting at @start, within which the
+ *		random address must fall.
+ *
+ * If @start + @range would overflow, @range is capped.
+ *
+ * NOTE: Historical use of randomize_range, which this replaces, presumed that
+ * @start was already page aligned.  We now align it regardless.
+ *
+ * Return: A page aligned address within [start, start + range).  On error,
+ * @start is returned.
+ */
+unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range)
+{
+	if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(start)) {
+		range -= PAGE_ALIGN(start) - start;
+		start = PAGE_ALIGN(start);
+	}
+
+	if (start > ULONG_MAX - range)
+		range = ULONG_MAX - start;
+
+	range >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+	if (range == 0)
+		return start;
+
+	return start + (get_random_long() % range << PAGE_SHIFT);
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_WANT_DEFAULT_TOPDOWN_MMAP_LAYOUT
 unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *mm)
 {
diff --git a/mm/zsmalloc.c b/mm/zsmalloc.c
index 9152fbde33b50..5d5fc04385b8d 100644
--- a/mm/zsmalloc.c
+++ b/mm/zsmalloc.c
@@ -1718,11 +1718,40 @@ static enum fullness_group putback_zspage(struct size_class *class,
  */
 static void lock_zspage(struct zspage *zspage)
 {
-	struct page *page = get_first_page(zspage);
+	struct page *curr_page, *page;
 
-	do {
-		lock_page(page);
-	} while ((page = get_next_page(page)) != NULL);
+	/*
+	 * Pages we haven't locked yet can be migrated off the list while we're
+	 * trying to lock them, so we need to be careful and only attempt to
+	 * lock each page under migrate_read_lock(). Otherwise, the page we lock
+	 * may no longer belong to the zspage. This means that we may wait for
+	 * the wrong page to unlock, so we must take a reference to the page
+	 * prior to waiting for it to unlock outside migrate_read_lock().
+	 */
+	while (1) {
+		migrate_read_lock(zspage);
+		page = get_first_page(zspage);
+		if (trylock_page(page))
+			break;
+		get_page(page);
+		migrate_read_unlock(zspage);
+		wait_on_page_locked(page);
+		put_page(page);
+	}
+
+	curr_page = page;
+	while ((page = get_next_page(curr_page))) {
+		if (trylock_page(page)) {
+			curr_page = page;
+		} else {
+			get_page(page);
+			migrate_read_unlock(zspage);
+			wait_on_page_locked(page);
+			put_page(page);
+			migrate_read_lock(zspage);
+		}
+	}
+	migrate_read_unlock(zspage);
 }
 
 static int zs_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
diff --git a/net/core/bpf_sk_storage.c b/net/core/bpf_sk_storage.c
index e3ac363805203..83d7641ef67b0 100644
--- a/net/core/bpf_sk_storage.c
+++ b/net/core/bpf_sk_storage.c
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ static int bpf_sk_storage_del(struct sock *sk, struct bpf_map *map)
 	if (!sdata)
 		return -ENOENT;
 
-	bpf_selem_unlink(SELEM(sdata));
+	bpf_selem_unlink(SELEM(sdata), true);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -75,8 +75,8 @@ void bpf_sk_storage_free(struct sock *sk)
 		 * sk_storage.
 		 */
 		bpf_selem_unlink_map(selem);
-		free_sk_storage = bpf_selem_unlink_storage_nolock(sk_storage,
-								  selem, true);
+		free_sk_storage = bpf_selem_unlink_storage_nolock(
+			sk_storage, selem, true, false);
 	}
 	raw_spin_unlock_bh(&sk_storage->lock);
 	rcu_read_unlock();
diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c
index 64470a727ef77..966796b345e78 100644
--- a/net/core/filter.c
+++ b/net/core/filter.c
@@ -1687,7 +1687,7 @@ BPF_CALL_5(bpf_skb_store_bytes, struct sk_buff *, skb, u32, offset,
 
 	if (unlikely(flags & ~(BPF_F_RECOMPUTE_CSUM | BPF_F_INVALIDATE_HASH)))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	if (unlikely(offset > 0xffff))
+	if (unlikely(offset > INT_MAX))
 		return -EFAULT;
 	if (unlikely(bpf_try_make_writable(skb, offset + len)))
 		return -EFAULT;
@@ -1722,7 +1722,7 @@ BPF_CALL_4(bpf_skb_load_bytes, const struct sk_buff *, skb, u32, offset,
 {
 	void *ptr;
 
-	if (unlikely(offset > 0xffff))
+	if (unlikely(offset > INT_MAX))
 		goto err_clear;
 
 	ptr = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, len, to);
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c
index a096b9fbbbdff..b6a9208130051 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c
@@ -222,12 +222,18 @@ err_register:
 }
 
 static void nft_netdev_unregister_hooks(struct net *net,
-					struct list_head *hook_list)
+					struct list_head *hook_list,
+					bool release_netdev)
 {
-	struct nft_hook *hook;
+	struct nft_hook *hook, *next;
 
-	list_for_each_entry(hook, hook_list, list)
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(hook, next, hook_list, list) {
 		nf_unregister_net_hook(net, &hook->ops);
+		if (release_netdev) {
+			list_del(&hook->list);
+			kfree_rcu(hook, rcu);
+		}
+	}
 }
 
 static int nf_tables_register_hook(struct net *net,
@@ -253,9 +259,10 @@ static int nf_tables_register_hook(struct net *net,
 	return nf_register_net_hook(net, &basechain->ops);
 }
 
-static void nf_tables_unregister_hook(struct net *net,
-				      const struct nft_table *table,
-				      struct nft_chain *chain)
+static void __nf_tables_unregister_hook(struct net *net,
+					const struct nft_table *table,
+					struct nft_chain *chain,
+					bool release_netdev)
 {
 	struct nft_base_chain *basechain;
 	const struct nf_hook_ops *ops;
@@ -270,11 +277,19 @@ static void nf_tables_unregister_hook(struct net *net,
 		return basechain->type->ops_unregister(net, ops);
 
 	if (nft_base_chain_netdev(table->family, basechain->ops.hooknum))
-		nft_netdev_unregister_hooks(net, &basechain->hook_list);
+		nft_netdev_unregister_hooks(net, &basechain->hook_list,
+					    release_netdev);
 	else
 		nf_unregister_net_hook(net, &basechain->ops);
 }
 
+static void nf_tables_unregister_hook(struct net *net,
+				      const struct nft_table *table,
+				      struct nft_chain *chain)
+{
+	return __nf_tables_unregister_hook(net, table, chain, false);
+}
+
 static void nft_trans_commit_list_add_tail(struct net *net, struct nft_trans *trans)
 {
 	struct nftables_pernet *nft_net = nft_pernet(net);
@@ -2873,27 +2888,31 @@ static struct nft_expr *nft_expr_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
 
 	err = nf_tables_expr_parse(ctx, nla, &expr_info);
 	if (err < 0)
-		goto err1;
+		goto err_expr_parse;
+
+	err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	if (!(expr_info.ops->type->flags & NFT_EXPR_STATEFUL))
+		goto err_expr_stateful;
 
 	err = -ENOMEM;
 	expr = kzalloc(expr_info.ops->size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
 	if (expr == NULL)
-		goto err2;
+		goto err_expr_stateful;
 
 	err = nf_tables_newexpr(ctx, &expr_info, expr);
 	if (err < 0)
-		goto err3;
+		goto err_expr_new;
 
 	return expr;
-err3:
+err_expr_new:
 	kfree(expr);
-err2:
+err_expr_stateful:
 	owner = expr_info.ops->type->owner;
 	if (expr_info.ops->type->release_ops)
 		expr_info.ops->type->release_ops(expr_info.ops);
 
 	module_put(owner);
-err1:
+err_expr_parse:
 	return ERR_PTR(err);
 }
 
@@ -4242,6 +4261,9 @@ static int nft_set_desc_concat_parse(const struct nlattr *attr,
 	u32 len;
 	int err;
 
+	if (desc->field_count >= ARRAY_SIZE(desc->field_len))
+		return -E2BIG;
+
 	err = nla_parse_nested_deprecated(tb, NFTA_SET_FIELD_MAX, attr,
 					  nft_concat_policy, NULL);
 	if (err < 0)
@@ -4251,9 +4273,8 @@ static int nft_set_desc_concat_parse(const struct nlattr *attr,
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	len = ntohl(nla_get_be32(tb[NFTA_SET_FIELD_LEN]));
-
-	if (len * BITS_PER_BYTE / 32 > NFT_REG32_COUNT)
-		return -E2BIG;
+	if (!len || len > U8_MAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	desc->field_len[desc->field_count++] = len;
 
@@ -4264,7 +4285,8 @@ static int nft_set_desc_concat(struct nft_set_desc *desc,
 			       const struct nlattr *nla)
 {
 	struct nlattr *attr;
-	int rem, err;
+	u32 num_regs = 0;
+	int rem, err, i;
 
 	nla_for_each_nested(attr, nla, rem) {
 		if (nla_type(attr) != NFTA_LIST_ELEM)
@@ -4275,6 +4297,12 @@ static int nft_set_desc_concat(struct nft_set_desc *desc,
 			return err;
 	}
 
+	for (i = 0; i < desc->field_count; i++)
+		num_regs += DIV_ROUND_UP(desc->field_len[i], sizeof(u32));
+
+	if (num_regs > NFT_REG32_COUNT)
+		return -E2BIG;
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -5413,9 +5441,6 @@ struct nft_expr *nft_set_elem_expr_alloc(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
 		return expr;
 
 	err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
-	if (!(expr->ops->type->flags & NFT_EXPR_STATEFUL))
-		goto err_set_elem_expr;
-
 	if (expr->ops->type->flags & NFT_EXPR_GC) {
 		if (set->flags & NFT_SET_TIMEOUT)
 			goto err_set_elem_expr;
@@ -7291,13 +7316,25 @@ static void nft_unregister_flowtable_hook(struct net *net,
 				    FLOW_BLOCK_UNBIND);
 }
 
-static void nft_unregister_flowtable_net_hooks(struct net *net,
-					       struct list_head *hook_list)
+static void __nft_unregister_flowtable_net_hooks(struct net *net,
+						 struct list_head *hook_list,
+					         bool release_netdev)
 {
-	struct nft_hook *hook;
+	struct nft_hook *hook, *next;
 
-	list_for_each_entry(hook, hook_list, list)
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(hook, next, hook_list, list) {
 		nf_unregister_net_hook(net, &hook->ops);
+		if (release_netdev) {
+			list_del(&hook->list);
+			kfree_rcu(hook);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static void nft_unregister_flowtable_net_hooks(struct net *net,
+					       struct list_head *hook_list)
+{
+	__nft_unregister_flowtable_net_hooks(net, hook_list, false);
 }
 
 static int nft_register_flowtable_net_hooks(struct net *net,
@@ -9741,9 +9778,10 @@ static void __nft_release_hook(struct net *net, struct nft_table *table)
 	struct nft_chain *chain;
 
 	list_for_each_entry(chain, &table->chains, list)
-		nf_tables_unregister_hook(net, table, chain);
+		__nf_tables_unregister_hook(net, table, chain, true);
 	list_for_each_entry(flowtable, &table->flowtables, list)
-		nft_unregister_flowtable_net_hooks(net, &flowtable->hook_list);
+		__nft_unregister_flowtable_net_hooks(net, &flowtable->hook_list,
+						     true);
 }
 
 static void __nft_release_hooks(struct net *net)
@@ -9882,7 +9920,11 @@ static int __net_init nf_tables_init_net(struct net *net)
 
 static void __net_exit nf_tables_pre_exit_net(struct net *net)
 {
+	struct nftables_pernet *nft_net = nft_pernet(net);
+
+	mutex_lock(&nft_net->commit_mutex);
 	__nft_release_hooks(net);
+	mutex_unlock(&nft_net->commit_mutex);
 }
 
 static void __net_exit nf_tables_exit_net(struct net *net)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_limit.c b/net/netfilter/nft_limit.c
index 04ea8b9bf2028..981addb2d0515 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nft_limit.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nft_limit.c
@@ -213,6 +213,8 @@ static int nft_limit_pkts_clone(struct nft_expr *dst, const struct nft_expr *src
 	struct nft_limit_priv_pkts *priv_dst = nft_expr_priv(dst);
 	struct nft_limit_priv_pkts *priv_src = nft_expr_priv(src);
 
+	priv_dst->cost = priv_src->cost;
+
 	return nft_limit_clone(&priv_dst->limit, &priv_src->limit);
 }
 
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index b7cf5cbfdc677..aaf6566deb9f0 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -59,10 +59,12 @@ const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = {
 	[LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS] = "debugfs access",
 	[LOCKDOWN_XMON_WR] = "xmon write access",
 	[LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER] = "use of bpf to write user RAM",
+	[LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to write kernel RAM",
 	[LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity",
 	[LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access",
 	[LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes",
 	[LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM",
+	[LOCKDOWN_DBG_READ_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to read kernel RAM",
 	[LOCKDOWN_PERF] = "unsafe use of perf",
 	[LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS] = "use of tracefs",
 	[LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW] = "xmon read and write access",
diff --git a/sound/pci/ctxfi/ctatc.c b/sound/pci/ctxfi/ctatc.c
index 78f35e88aed6b..fbdb8a3d5b8e5 100644
--- a/sound/pci/ctxfi/ctatc.c
+++ b/sound/pci/ctxfi/ctatc.c
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
 			    | ((IEC958_AES3_CON_FS_48000) << 24))
 
 static const struct snd_pci_quirk subsys_20k1_list[] = {
+	SND_PCI_QUIRK(PCI_VENDOR_ID_CREATIVE, 0x0021, "SB046x", CTSB046X),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(PCI_VENDOR_ID_CREATIVE, 0x0022, "SB055x", CTSB055X),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(PCI_VENDOR_ID_CREATIVE, 0x002f, "SB055x", CTSB055X),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(PCI_VENDOR_ID_CREATIVE, 0x0029, "SB073x", CTSB073X),
@@ -64,6 +65,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk subsys_20k2_list[] = {
 
 static const char *ct_subsys_name[NUM_CTCARDS] = {
 	/* 20k1 models */
+	[CTSB046X]	= "SB046x",
 	[CTSB055X]	= "SB055x",
 	[CTSB073X]	= "SB073x",
 	[CTUAA]		= "UAA",
diff --git a/sound/pci/ctxfi/cthardware.h b/sound/pci/ctxfi/cthardware.h
index f406b626a28c4..2875cec83b8f2 100644
--- a/sound/pci/ctxfi/cthardware.h
+++ b/sound/pci/ctxfi/cthardware.h
@@ -26,8 +26,9 @@ enum CHIPTYP {
 
 enum CTCARDS {
 	/* 20k1 models */
+	CTSB046X,
+	CT20K1_MODEL_FIRST = CTSB046X,
 	CTSB055X,
-	CT20K1_MODEL_FIRST = CTSB055X,
 	CTSB073X,
 	CTUAA,
 	CT20K1_UNKNOWN,
diff --git a/sound/usb/clock.c b/sound/usb/clock.c
index 4dfe76416794f..33db334e65566 100644
--- a/sound/usb/clock.c
+++ b/sound/usb/clock.c
@@ -572,6 +572,17 @@ static int set_sample_rate_v2v3(struct snd_usb_audio *chip,
 		/* continue processing */
 	}
 
+	/* FIXME - TEAC devices require the immediate interface setup */
+	if (USB_ID_VENDOR(chip->usb_id) == 0x0644) {
+		bool cur_base_48k = (rate % 48000 == 0);
+		bool prev_base_48k = (prev_rate % 48000 == 0);
+		if (cur_base_48k != prev_base_48k) {
+			usb_set_interface(chip->dev, fmt->iface, fmt->altsetting);
+			if (chip->quirk_flags & QUIRK_FLAG_IFACE_DELAY)
+				msleep(50);
+		}
+	}
+
 validation:
 	/* validate clock after rate change */
 	if (!uac_clock_source_is_valid(chip, fmt, clock))
diff --git a/sound/usb/pcm.c b/sound/usb/pcm.c
index 6d699065e81a2..b470404a5376c 100644
--- a/sound/usb/pcm.c
+++ b/sound/usb/pcm.c
@@ -439,16 +439,21 @@ static int configure_endpoints(struct snd_usb_audio *chip,
 		/* stop any running stream beforehand */
 		if (stop_endpoints(subs, false))
 			sync_pending_stops(subs);
+		if (subs->sync_endpoint) {
+			err = snd_usb_endpoint_configure(chip, subs->sync_endpoint);
+			if (err < 0)
+				return err;
+		}
 		err = snd_usb_endpoint_configure(chip, subs->data_endpoint);
 		if (err < 0)
 			return err;
 		snd_usb_set_format_quirk(subs, subs->cur_audiofmt);
-	}
-
-	if (subs->sync_endpoint) {
-		err = snd_usb_endpoint_configure(chip, subs->sync_endpoint);
-		if (err < 0)
-			return err;
+	} else {
+		if (subs->sync_endpoint) {
+			err = snd_usb_endpoint_configure(chip, subs->sync_endpoint);
+			if (err < 0)
+				return err;
+		}
 	}
 
 	return 0;
diff --git a/sound/usb/quirks-table.h b/sound/usb/quirks-table.h
index 40a5e3eb4ef26..78eb41b621d63 100644
--- a/sound/usb/quirks-table.h
+++ b/sound/usb/quirks-table.h
@@ -2672,6 +2672,7 @@ YAMAHA_DEVICE(0x7010, "UB99"),
 					.altset_idx = 1,
 					.attributes = 0,
 					.endpoint = 0x82,
+					.ep_idx = 1,
 					.ep_attr = USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_ISOC,
 					.datainterval = 1,
 					.maxpacksize = 0x0126,
@@ -2875,6 +2876,7 @@ YAMAHA_DEVICE(0x7010, "UB99"),
 					.altset_idx = 1,
 					.attributes = 0x4,
 					.endpoint = 0x81,
+					.ep_idx = 1,
 					.ep_attr = USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_ISOC |
 						USB_ENDPOINT_SYNC_ASYNC,
 					.maxpacksize = 0x130,
@@ -3391,6 +3393,7 @@ YAMAHA_DEVICE(0x7010, "UB99"),
 					.altset_idx = 1,
 					.attributes = 0,
 					.endpoint = 0x03,
+					.ep_idx = 1,
 					.rates = SNDRV_PCM_RATE_96000,
 					.ep_attr = USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_ISOC |
 						   USB_ENDPOINT_SYNC_ASYNC,
diff --git a/tools/memory-model/README b/tools/memory-model/README
index 9edd402704c4f..dab38904206a0 100644
--- a/tools/memory-model/README
+++ b/tools/memory-model/README
@@ -54,7 +54,8 @@ klitmus7 Compatibility Table
 	     -- 4.14  7.48 --
 	4.15 -- 4.19  7.49 --
 	4.20 -- 5.5   7.54 --
-	5.6  --       7.56 --
+	5.6  -- 5.16  7.56 --
+	5.17 --       7.56.1 --
 	============  ==========
 
 
